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Abstract
This thesis attempts to answer the question why, and by 
what right, do some people punish others? I begin by 
examining the retributivist theory, largely through an 
analysis of the work of Kant and Hegel. I conclude that no 
adequate justification can be given for the core 
retributivist claim.
I then go on to examine consequentialist theories of 
punishment and "mixed” accounts. I find that the former, 
like consequentialism generally, cannot accommodate the 
special value of persons and, thus, cannot give an adequate 
account of just punishment. "Mixed" accounts are also 
found to be flawed as they do nothing to resolve the 
tensions between their retributive and consequentialist 
elements.
I go on to examine the "fair play" theory. I conclude 
that such a theory cannot justify punishment nor can it 
capture the truth of our moral obligations. I argue that 
fair play theorists rely on a contractarian understanding 
of morality and it is this that should underpin the account 
of punishment. Turning to contractarianism, I look at 
three different approaches, justice as reciprocity, as 
mutual advantage, and as impartiality. I argue that none 
of these approaches can give either an adequate grounding 
to justice nor to punishment. Instead I argue for a 
combination of mutual advantage and impartiality. That is, 
I argue that each agent has a prudential reason to enter 
into an agreement with others to co-operate on moral terms, 
(that is terms which would be agreed between agents 
conceived as fundamentally equal), but that such a reason 
is not sufficient. In the absence of any decisive reason, 
I claim that each individual so agrees as an act of 
existential commitment. The community thus formed is a 
coercive one, for it is necessary that the condition of 
sufficient security be fulfilled through the coercion of 
free-riders. Such coercion is converted into moral 
punishment only through being addressed to the offender as 
a member of the moral community. The theory of punishment 
combines these two elements in "hard treatment" and 
retributive blaming.
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Introduction
"He asked a very simple question: 'Why, and by what
right, do some people lock up, torment, exile, flog, and 
kill others, while they are themselves just like those 
they torment, flog, and kill?' And in answer he got 
deliberations as to whether human beings had free will or 
not; whether or not signs of criminality could be 
detected by measuring the skull; what part heredity 
played in crime; whether immorality could be inherited; 
and what madness is, what degeneration is, and what 
temperament is; how climate, food, ignorance, 
imitativeness, hypnotism, or passion affect crime; what 
society is, what its duties are - and so on but there 
was no answer on the chief point: 'By what right do some
people punish others?’
L. Tolstoy Resurrection1
The aim of this thesis is to answer Tolstoy's question: 
Why, and by what right, do some people punish others? It 
might be thought that this is a dangerous topic for a 
graduate student who has to fulfil the requirements of 
making "a distinct contribution to the knowledge of the 
subject and afford evidence of originality",2 for the 
problem of punishment has, if we date the beginning of the 
discipline of political philosophy to Plato, been around as 
long as the discipline itself.3 Yet, the study of 
punishment has tended to be concerned less with the 
question of whether punishment as a social practice can be 
given a moral grounding, than it has with the question of
■^Quoted in Duff 1986, 187. Duff cites Pincoffs 1967.
2University of London PhD regulations, in the LSE Calendar 1993, 836.
3Rather than cite some of the huge literature on punishment here, I 
will refer to works that I think are particularly helpful on certain 
problems as these arise in the text. I have applied this principle, 
as best I can, to the whole of this introduction; thus, e.g., in the 
(very introductory), discussion of utilitarianism below, the reader 
will find no references to the arguments I have used (unless I have 
quoted or found that I owed a special debt to a particular work for 
my presentation of the argument). When the arguments reappear in 
their full form in Chapter 3 they are, of course, fully annotated.
how one justifies the imposing of punishment on an 
offender; that is, punishment theory has tended to put the 
question "we have an offender, what are we morally 
justified in doing to her?" Rather than the question, "how 
can we justify having a set of rules the contravention of 
which renders the contravener liable to punishment?" This 
is why I think the quotation from Tolstoy so revealing, 
because the concerns of the punishment literature have, at 
times, resembled those that are given (in the quotation), 
in answer to Tolstoy's question. If we start by saying "we 
have an offender, what can we legitimately do", it seems 
natural to go on to ask whether we can blame her, or 
whether we can somehow account for her actions in a way 
that relieves her of blame. If we start by asking the 
second of my two questions, on the other hand, these things 
are no less important, but their place in the debate is 
different; the answers to these questions change the way we 
view the system itself, not the culpability or 
appropriateness of the offender.
I do not mean to suggest that the conceptual distinctions 
between these questions can, or ought to, be maintained 
rigidly. For the moment, however, I just want to signal 
two different approaches to the problem, it will be my 
contention that what we can do to an offender will be clear 
only if we solve the question of how we may legitimately 
think of him as an offender in the first place.
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Traditionally, the main theories of punishment that have 
dominated the subject have been retributivism and 
utilitarianism,4 Retributivists claim that the voluntary 
commission of an offence constitutes a necessary and 
sufficient condition of justified punishment, this because 
the act of offending makes the person morally deserving of 
punishment. The quantum of desert being a function of the 
gravity of the harm and the culpability of the offender. 
The retributivist, thus, uses desert to identify who should 
be punished and why; indeed, the quantity of desert is also 
meant to determine the correct response of the authorities, 
that is, how much the offender should be punished. 
Retributivism, in short, looks to the nature of the act.5
Retributivism seems to get some things right, our 
intuitions tell us that there is a relationship between the 
past act of offending and the punishment of the offender, 
indeed, if we endorse a definition of punishment as "of an 
offender for an offence",6 this is part of the very meaning 
of what it is to punish. Similarly, we feel that the 
punishment should be proportional to the level of guilt, an 
offender who acted negligently is, under normal 
circumstances, thought of as less culpable than one who 
acted intentionally, even if the end result is the same 
harm.
4The following summaries owe much to Lacey's excellent short entry 
(Lacey 1987), "Punishment" in Miller 1987, 409-12.
5See §1.
6See §18.
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Yet, retributivism is also a strange doctrine; it no doubt 
appeals to a strong intuition that "the guilty deserve to 
suffer", but it contradicts another, that "two wrongs do 
not make a right". Most seriously, retributivists do not 
seem able to explain why the guilty deserve to suffer, and 
when asked to do so they often seem to do no more than 
restate this basic proposition in different, and often 
"mystical" terms.7 Finally, whilst retributivism is able, 
it seems, to muster most of the intuitive arguments on its 
side, utilitarians can ask whether, if we were sure that 
punishment yielded absolutely no benefit in either social 
or individual terms, it would be right to maintain the 
practice of punishment.
By contrast, utilitarian justifications of punishment, in 
common with utilitarianism generally, hold that punishment 
is to be justified by its consequences.8 The most common 
form of such theory claims that punishment is justified 
because it deters the offender from future criminal acts 
(individual deterrence), and it deters others, (general 
deterrence). Other benefits claimed by some utilitarians 
include the reform or rehabilitation of the offender, her 
incapacitation (during periods of imprisonment), and the 
satisfaction of victims' grievances.
7Lacey 1987, 410.
8See Chapter 3.
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Utilitarianism, thus, sees the infliction of suffering not 
as intrinsically required in response to the desert of the 
offender, but as a means to realising good consequences. 
This means that the onus is on utilitarian defenders of 
punishment not only to show that punishment has desirable 
net consequences, but that the system of punishment itself 
is superior to other systems of "social hygiene".9 It 
seems likely that on some occasions better consequences 
could be achieved by inflicting punishment on an innocent 
scapegoat, or innocent members of an offender's family. In 
short, because utilitarianism locates value in states of 
affairs, rather than in individual agents, it can always 
consider, and may demand as morally obligatory, practices 
which are unjust.10 Utilitarian justifications of 
punishment suffer from the same shortcoming as 
utilitarianism in general, that is, they cannot account for 
the special value of persons.
Given that the problems associated with retributivism seem 
to stem from it attempting to account for why we should 
punish at all, and those associated with utilitarianism 
from its inability to determine to the satisfaction of 
justice who we should punish and how much, the answer seems 
to lie in some combination of these two theories. This was
9See Duff 1986, 1-3; Mary Mackenzie describes utilitarian
justifications of punishment that do not address this question as 
"institution begging", (Mackenzie 1981, 41).
10It may sometimes seem to us to be a moot point whether it is right 
to sacrifice one to the good of the whole, but when it is so, we view 
this as a sacrifice, as a tragic moral dilemma, not as a morally 
obligatory act over which we should, presumably, feel no pangs of 
conscience.
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the insight of H. L. A. Hart's seminal 1959 article, 
"Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment", which 
launched what have become known as "mixed" accounts of 
punishment. Hart's idea was that the problem of punishment 
could be divided into three conceptually distinct 
questions: "What justifies the general practice of
punishment? To whom may punishment be applied? How 
severely may we punish."11 Hart argues that the general 
justifying aim of punishment is utilitarian, but the 
distribution of punishment, who should be punished and how 
much, must be determined by retributive considerations.
Mixed theories have appeared in various forms since Hart's 
article first appeared, usually following Hart in giving a 
utilitarian answer to the question of why we punish and 
using retributivist principles as side-constraints. Others 
have attempted to account for punishment on the basis of 
desert but subject to limiting utilitarianism. The 
apparent attraction of mixed accounts, however, is illusory 
because they do nothing to overcome the fundamental 
conflict between retributivism and utilitarianism. As they 
stand retributivism and utilitarianism pull apart, and 
merely separating punishment out into separate questions 
cannot overcome this tension.12
In fact, in many ways, separating out the elements of 
punishment is unhelpful, for it takes away from the
^Hart 1959, in Hart 1968, 3.
12See §8; §§19-20.
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approach that is most likely to yield success. That 
approach is to examine punishment as a whole, and in the 
context of much broader questions of political theory. The 
reason why such an approach is most likely to succeed is 
that, far from separating utilitarianism and retributivism, 
what is needed "is to reconcile the consequentialist and 
retributive principles at a far deeper level",13 and to do 
this it is necessary to place punishment back amongst the 
questions from which it first sprang; questions such as, 
how do we understand the nature of morality and moral 
judgements? Why ought we to be moral? Why should some 
aspects of immorality be the subject of law? And why 
should persons obey the law?
Surprisingly, this approach to punishment is not common, 
although it is becoming increasingly so, and if there is a 
rallying cry contained within this thesis, and a claim to 
meet the stringent criteria laid out above for what it 
should do, it is in the claim that what I have attempted to 
do is recapture the philosophical study of punishment from 
the specialist sub-field of punishment theory. Having said 
that, I cannot claim to have answered all the questions 
above, nor, indeed, have I met the criteria laid out by 
Braithwaite and Pettit for a "comprehensive normative 
theory of the criminal justice system",14 (which include 
not only giving a moral justification for punishment but 
also answering numerous other questions, including such
13Lacey 1987, 411.
14See Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, Chapter 2.
things as how resources should be allocated in the criminal 
justice system). So what have I done?
The answer is that I have tried to do two things; first, to 
look at the traditional approaches to punishment to see 
whether they do indeed have the problems I have ascribed to 
them above, and whether their responses have been 
sufficient to meet these objections. Finding that they 
are, and haven't, I have turned my attention to the sorts 
of questions identified above, and here I have restricted 
myself to a certain kind of approach, contractarianism. In 
examining contractarian accounts of justice I have asked 
what rationale they give for coercion, and how this informs 
their accounts of punishment. At the same time, I have 
used the analysis of coercion to shed light on, and 
examine, the cogency of the theories of justice 
themselves.15
15I would like to make it clear as early as possible, that I have 
presupposed an adequate theory of autonomy. This was an extremely 
difficult decision for me, but three considerations eventually 
convinced me that it was better to assume autonomous persons, than 
give a full account of how such a position can be justified. The 
first is that such a pattern is followed in the contractarian 
literature with which I am concerned. The second is that, insofar as 
some liberal contractarians have begun to approach the problem, they 
have done so very inadequately and without realising the significant 
tensions a full theory of autonomy would raise within, especially 
impartialist, contractarianism, (references to this work can be found 
in Chapter 5, note 57). The final, and decisive, consideration was, 
therefore, that, whilst I am convinced that a full theory of autonomy 
can be given, it would have required an at least Chapter length 
disquisition. Given that such a Chapter would raise deep and general 
philosophical issues, I decided that this would have the great 
disadvantage of breaking up the argument unnecessarily, and that in a 
work of political philosophy it was better, all things considered, to 
leave such an enquiry to another time.
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This is not an attempt merely to try to apply the 
techniques of distributive justice to the problem of 
punishment, viewing social protection (or the distribution 
of harm), as resources to be dealt with like any other.16 
Rather, it is an attempt to meet Lacey's challenge and 
approach the subject at "a far deeper level". My 
conviction was, and is, that punishment can only be morally 
justified if we can correctly ground necessarily coercive 
moral norms. That is, if we can give a satisfactory 
account of morality that does not contain a satisfactory 
rationale for coercion then coercion (and its legal 
analogue, punishment), will have to be justified by an 
appeal to a second argument, and this can only take the 
form of a fundamentally retributive, fundamentally 
consequentialist, or mixed account, all of which are 
unsatisfactory.
The task, then, is to ground morality in such a way as to 
make sense of the notion of moral judgements, of the idea 
that the individual ought to be moral, and that in some 
cases failure to be moral necessarily invokes coercion. 
This is what I have tried to do in this thesis, however, I 
do not want to say too much here to anticipate the argument 
that follows.
There remain two tasks for this Introduction; to give an 
account of the structure of the thesis and to justify the 
choices I have made in what I have examined. I begin with
16For an analysis of this kind see Harel 1994.
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an analysis of retributivism, trying to make sense of the 
most basic claim that there is some relationship between 
the past act of the offender and his deserving punishment. 
I have chosen to look for a justification of this claim in 
the work of Kant17 and Hegel.18 The reason for choosing two 
theorists from the history of political thought, in what is 
a work of analytic political philosophy, rather than 
attempting to examine this claim in abstract terms, is that 
my conviction that punishment theory can only really be 
understood if it is located within a larger context meant 
that, whilst attempting an analytic examination of 
retributivism, I wanted to give it the best chance I could. 
It seemed to me then, and still does now, that 
retributivism (both contemporary and classic), often relies 
on background Kantian claims about respecting persons, and 
it thus seemed to make sense to examine it in the work of 
Kant himself.
Finding no satisfactory account of the retributive 
principle in Kant, I turn to Hegel. Again, this is because 
I believe that Hegel offers a profound and influential 
theory of morality and, since he enjoys the reputation of 
being a seminal retributive theorist, it seemed to me that 
if a justification of retributivism could be found, it was 
likely to be somewhere in Hegel's oeuvre. In fact, my 
conclusion is that Hegel is a great deal less retributive 
than is commonly thought.
17Chapter 1.
18Chapter 2.
18
There are some additional reasons for my choice of these 
two theorists; in the case of Kant, it is clear that a 
great deal of contemporary liberal theory, (most 
explicitly, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice), claims his 
work as its most important philosophical antecedent.19 I, 
thus, wanted to get Kant clear before I moved on to such 
theorising. Hegel, likewise, is often claimed by 
communitarian critics of liberalism, and he has informed a 
philosophical tradition that is as illustrious as his 
forbear. Having generally found myself sympathetic to 
Hegel, especially in comparison with Kant, it seemed 
natural to move to him in search of a justification for 
retributivism, and in search of a deeper understanding of 
the problems I knew would appear in the second part of the 
thesis. Although I would not want to be associated with 
the current communitarian school, the theory I propose in 
this thesis owes, or so it seems to me, a great deal to the 
influence of Hegel, although seldom is this obvious.20
Having found no coherent way of grounding the retributivist 
claim that the guilty deserve to suffer, and, indeed, 
having found that this principle is often "fudged" in Kant, 
and never so simple in Hegel, I turn to consequentialism.21
19Rawls 1971. See Appendix A, §C for a discussion of how influential 
the "Kantian Interpretation" is in Rawls's theory.
20In addition, I found the existing literature on Hegel's theory of 
punishment very unsatisfactory and, thus, I hoped the Chapter would
have something to add to Hegel exegesis.
21Chapter 3.
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Here the reason is obvious, consequentialists have provided 
one of the most influential theories of punishment, and, as 
I point out above, one that seems to match at least one 
intuition, that the system of punishment must have 
something to do with the future behaviour of the population 
subjected to it.
Rather than choose to examine consequentialism in the work 
of, say, Bentham, I have chosen a more independent analytic 
approach. This is partially because it is easier to grasp 
the basic thesis of consequentialism in the abstract, but 
also because the background moral theory on which it relies 
is the same as the theory of punishment, the latter is more 
clearly just an application of the former, (in a way in 
which it is not in retributive theory). An additional 
reason is that there have been a number of developments in 
consequentialist theorising about punishment which could 
not be understood on a basic Benthamite model. The 
conclusion of Chapter 3 is that consequentialism cannot 
adequately include a respect for justice and that this is 
fatally undermining for consequentialist accounts of 
punishment.
Having found retributivism, consequentialism and mixed 
accounts22 unsatisfactory, and, indeed, having found the 
very approach of such theories unhelpful, I turn to 
contemporary accounts of justice. I have already explained 
above why I believe that the route to morally justified
22Mixed accounts are dealt with in §§19-20; see also §8.
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punishment lies in such a direction, however, I have not 
defended my limited choice of contractualist theories of 
justice. One possible justification would be the limits of 
time and space on a thesis such as this, however, I think 
something more substantial can be said.
First, I have rejected, for the purposes of this thesis, 
realist accounts of morality. I have not defended this 
choice but it seems to me that we have no good reasons to 
believe in, say, God, Platonic forms, or, for that matter, 
in Kantian noumenal selves. Starting from this position, 
it seems to me that we can only ground morality in human 
reason and will, and if we are true to our conviction that 
morality is not "out there", then this must be our starting 
point. The challenge is to avoid the slide into relativism 
on the one side, and the appeal to metaphysics, or God, or 
some teleological theory, on the other. Of course, such a 
position does not necessarily have to be unfolded in 
contractualist terms, but here I can say two things. 
First, I believe such terms offer the best hope. Second, 
insofar as this thesis is part of contemporary Anglo- 
American political philosophy, there is no doubt that this 
has been the predominant approach of the last twenty-five 
years by theorists keen to keep to the path between 
relativism and God, and it seemed to me to be necessary, in 
the first instance, to attend to their attempts.
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With this in mind, I have divided23 current accounts of 
justice into three; Chapter 4 examines justice as mutual 
advantage and justice as reciprocity, the latter 
encompassing what has become one of the cores of the 
retributivist revival; theories of punishment as "fair 
play". In Chapter 5 I turn my attention to theories of 
justice as impartiality.24 Throughout, the intention is to 
use the rationale of coercion as a prism through which to 
examine the theories themselves, whilst at the same time 
trying to see whether the rationale, itself, is 
satisfactory.
I do not want to attempt a simplified version of the 
argument here, but, there is a sense in which the conflict 
between justice as mutual advantage and justice as 
impartiality mirrors the conflict between consequentialism 
and retributivism; justice as mutual advantage relying on 
the benefits of co-operation and justice as impartiality on 
a fundamental claim to respect others. Overcoming the 
objections to these theories and giving an account of my 
own, involves reconciling their separate demands at a deep 
philosophical level, and this is the argument proposed in 
Chapter 6, which claims to offer an anti-realist account of 
justice that successfully navigates the path identified 
above. Chapter 7 then extends this reconciliation to 
punishment, and concludes that a rationale can be found for
23Following Barry 1989; Kymlicka 1991.
24Because of the peculiarities of Rawls's account, but keeping in 
mind his importance in the discipline, I have examined his account of 
punishment in a separate Appendix.
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coercion at the abstract level of the theory of justice, 
and that this has a legal analogue in morally justified 
punishment, I then go on to examine the account of 
punishment in greater detail.
One final comment; this is a thesis in political philosophy 
and, although I have enormous sympathy for those who 
complain that philosophers of punishment are 
criminologically and sociologically naive and enormous 
respect for those philosophers who are not, it, therefore, 
falls far short of offering a complete theory of 
punishment. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that 
providing such a theory is possible philosophically, 
because, as will be clear below, I believe that the 
abstract philosophical demands that can be justified may 
take many different concrete forms in the real world. 
Nevertheless, the best I can maintain is that I have given 
an abstract justification for coercion, and, in the right 
empirical circumstances for punishment.
23
Chapter 1: Retributivism
"The law of punishment is a categorical 
imperative, and woe to him who crawls through 
the serpentine windings of the doctrine of 
happiness looking for some advantage to be 
gained by releasing the criminal from 
punishment or by reducing the amount of it!" 
(Kant 1797, 141)1
1. Retributivisms
Retributivism has traditionally been regarded as one of the 
"great schools" of punishment theorising, opposed by the 
other, consequentialism. Yet, retributivism has had a 
decidedly mixed history. In 1969 one standard text on 
punishment recorded that "there no longer are defenders of 
the traditional retributive theory.... At any rate, there 
are no defenders writing in the usual places".2 By 1984, 
however, the new edition of this book had a postscript 
dedicated to the "new college industry [which] turns out 
theories of retribution".3 What is, perhaps, more 
interesting is that retributivism became discredited not 
only because it is, as we shall see, difficult to find 
philosophical arguments in its support, but because the 
task of finding such arguments itself became the subject of 
disdain. Just at the time when contemporary political 
philosophy found its greatest defender of the importance of 
our "considered moral judgements", in John Rawls's A Theory
1I have followed A. C. Baier’s translation (see Baier 1993, 441 and 
17n), rather than that of Mary Gregor.
2Honderich 1969, 148.
3Honderich 1984, 10.
of Justice,4 it became intellectually fashionable to deny 
that the sincerely held conviction that punishing offenders 
was morally good could be anything other than an expression 
of barbarism or a throwback to a more primitive age.5
One standard problem with considering the retributivist 
justification of punishment is that there is no consensus 
on what retributivism actually is. Retributivism has no 
clear definition, it resembles an "essentially contested 
concept" rather than a rigorous term which can be used to 
distinguish clearly one non-consequentialist theorist from 
another. Indeed, given the bewildering number of writers 
who lay claim to the ascription "retributivist", it is 
difficult to imagine giving anything but an affirmative 
answer to Antony Duff's question, "has the label 
'retributivist' been applied to such a diversity of views 
and principles that it now lacks any unambiguous or unitary 
meaning?"6 Nonetheless it is possible to make certain 
distinctions which, if they will not solve the question of 
what retributivism is, might go some way to telling us what 
it concerns and what it is not.
The first thing that requires clarification is that in this 
chapter I am primarily concerned with the question of what
4See Rawls 1971, 21; Kymlicka 1990, 7-8.
5For an excellent discussion of this see Moore 1987.
6Duff 1986, 4. Cottingham likewise remarks that, "the fact is that 
the term 'retributive' as used in philosophy has become so imprecise 
and multi-vocal that it is doubtful whether it any longer serves a 
useful purpose." (Cottingham 1979, 238). See also Ten 1987, Chapter 
3.
justifies the general practice of punishment, and it is 
thus not sufficient to identify retributivism with the jus 
talionis, or any other answer to Hart's third question;7 
"how much?" Having established this, I do not believe the 
second of Hart's questions, "whom should we punish?" can be 
separated off as easily; retributivism is closely linked 
with culpability and desert, and thus who might qualify as 
an object of punishment is entailed by any retributive 
theory, although the question of whether the offender 
should then be punished might depend upon the precise 
formulation of the theory in question.
A quarter of a century ago, H. L. A. Hart suggested a model 
of retributivism as follows:
"Such a theory will assert three things: first that a 
person may be punished if, and only if, he has 
voluntarily done something morally wrong; secondly, that 
his punishment must in some way match, or be the 
equivalent of, the wickedness of his offence; and 
thirdly, that the justification for punishing men under 
such conditions is that the return of suffering for moral 
evil voluntarily done, is itself just or morally good."8 
Although it has been largely ignored in the literature, 
(and is only introduced by Hart in order to be "modified"), 
this simple model repays serious consideration. The first 
claim has it that it is permissible to punish someone if,
7Hart 1959, in Hart 1968, 3.
8Hart 1968, 231. For a useful discussion of this model see Bedau 
1978.
and only if, they are morally culpable. The second that 
punishment must be proportional, and the third that if 
these conditions are met, punishment is just or "morally 
good". I shall, for the moment, ignore the second of these 
claims9 and examine the first and third.
The first claim matches up to two of the most controversial 
questions within retributivist writing: Is punishment
permissible (given that the other conditions for justified 
punishment are fulfilled), or obligatory? Second, is 
punishment a response to legal or moral culpability? Both 
of these questions will be considered below, however, what 
is important to note here is that there is nothing in this 
principle that makes it particularly retributivist. It 
could for example be accepted by a rule-utilitarian theory, 
an expressivist theory, a victims' grievance satisfaction 
theory, a moral education theory, as well as by other more 
marginal approaches such as restitution theory. What, 
then, must be at the core of retributivism as a general 
justification for punishment is the third of Hart’s claims. 
Yet Hugo Adam Bedau, in considering this third claim, 
echoes Honderich when he says, "I cannot think of any 
retributivist today who defends R3 [Hart's third claim]".10 
And Hart, himself, says of it that it,
"appears to be a mysterious piece of moral alchemy in 
which the combination of the two evils of moral
90n the grounds identified above that I am not concerned with the 
question "how much?" but rather with retributivism as a justification
for the practice of punishment.
10Bedau 1978, 615.
wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good~[or]-.it 
seems to be the abandonment of any serious attempt to 
provide a moral justification for punishment."11 
I shall, for the greater part of this and the next chapter, 
be concerned with this "moral alchemy", largely through 
considering two of the most seminal retributivist thinkers, 
Kant and Hegel.
There is, however, still the issue of precisely what Hart's 
third claim amounts to. In at least one version - normally 
proposed by anti-retributivists - this claim is absurd. 
That version has it that punishment in itself is a moral 
good. This is absurd because it would mean that the 
behaviour of the offender in offending was a means to the 
production of a moral good and thus of moral value, and 
this is obviously false. Rather, what this claim, at its 
strongest, must mean is that if and only if an offence has 
occurred, the punishing of the offender is morally good; 
the world would, of course, be a better place without 
either the offence or the punishment. In other words, what 
the third claim must amount to is that punishment is 
morally justified by the past act of the offender, for it 
is the past act which creates the conditions by which (a 
certain regulated and correctly imposed), harming of an 
agent (a prlma facie wrong), is converted into a punishment 
which is morally right. Let us try to make sense of this 
claim.
n Hart 1968, 234-5.
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Michael Moore states that the central core of retributivism 
is,
"the view that punishment is justified by the moral 
culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist 
punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves 
it”.12
He goes on to distinguish this from other claims which in 
his opinion are labelled "quite misleadingly, 
’retributivism1".13 These other claims concern such things 
as the amount of punishment (the jus talionis for example), 
victims' grievance satisfaction, society's grievance 
satisfaction, the avoiding of private vendettas, 
expressivist theories, and formal theories of justice.14 
Further, Moore argues that Hart merely establishes guilt as 
a necessary rather than a necessary and sufficient 
condition for justified punishment. Interestingly Moore 
appears to take his own proposal to be that guilt is a 
necessary and sufficient condition, and this to mean that 
his proposal "gives society more than merely a right to 
punish culpable offenders... but also gives society the duty 
to punish."15 However, it is not at all clear how this 
follows; that guilt is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for justified punishment means just that if, and only if, 
someone is guilty then their punishment would be justified.
In other words society has a good reason to punish and, in
12Moore 1987, 179.
13Moore 1987, 179.
14Moore 1987, 179-181.
15Moore 1987, 182.
the absence of reasons to the contrary, the offender ought 
to be punished. That is not necessarily the same as saying 
that the offender must be punished all things considered. 
This would only be so if one assumed a moral theory of a 
particular kind. Crude utilitarianism, for example, admits 
of no distinction between actions which are morally 
justified and those which are morally obligatory, but this 
is not often thought to be a characteristic in its favour, 
not least because of the problem of supererogatory acts.16
Nonetheless, Moore's distinction is crucial; as noted above 
with respect to Hart's first claim, a theory of punishment 
which held that guilt was merely a necessary condition for 
punishment could be consequentialist - rule-utilitarianism, 
for example - or the guilt condition can be used to answer 
the distributive question, "whom should we punish?", rather 
than the question of justification, "why punish?".
The problem is to find a set of claims that, whilst not 
tightly defined, provide the framework for understanding 
certain theories as being retributive. The most obvious 
similarity between theories competing for the term is in 
what they are not, they are all not consequentialist. This 
is far from being as glib a remark as it may seem, for what 
follows is that if a theory claiming to be retributivist 
can be revealed to be relying in some manner on a version
16ln short, necessary and sufficient means that all and only those 
who are culpable offenders may be punished, and other things being 
equal ought to be. Moore seems to think that it means that they 
"must" be in all cases, i.e., all things considered.
of consequentialism, then it may be dismissed as a 
retributivist theory.17 Put positively the retributivist 
claim is that punishment is to be justified through its 
relationship to what has already happened, and, further, 
retributivist theories explain that relationship through a 
notion of desert. Thus, in essence, Moore has the heart of 
retributivism right.18
The problem with this, however, is that this description of 
the central core of retributivism does not get us very far 
because the nature of each of the key terms is, itself, a 
subject of controversy. Central to Moore's way of 
characterising retributivism is the notion of desert, yet 
one can surely ask what it means to say that an offender 
deserves punishment, just as one can ask what it means to 
say that the punishment of an offender is morally good. 
This is, perhaps, why Hart avoids recourse to the notion of 
desert in characterising retributivism.19 In the end, 
however, one surely has to take Hart's model as expressing 
the conditions for deserved punishment; the notion of 
desert is simply unavoidable if retributivism is to sustain 
its traditional form.
17I see no reason to limit non-retributivist theories to those which 
are concerned with "crime control" (as does Scheid 1983), or 
conversely to define retributivism as a theory in which crime control 
is not "morally relevant".
18And, indeed, he is right in distinguishing retributivism from other 
non-utilitarian theories of punishment.
19Cf. Walker 1969, 1-22; and Walker 1991, 72-82.
The multiple examples of retributivist theories derive from 
the differences in understanding this central core, that 
is, the idea that the offender's past action makes that 
offender morally deserving of punishment. Two points of 
the debate are crucial: First, the question of whether 
guilt is not only necessary and sufficient for justified 
punishment, but also creates an obligation on society to 
punish. Second, the question of whether guilt is to be
construed in legal or moral terms.
Within retributivist writing one must, then, be careful to 
distinguish what I shall term hard moral retributivists,
i.e., those who believe that punishment is an obligation 
once moral guilt has been established; hard legal 
retributivists, who likewise would claim punishment is an 
obligation once legal guilt has been established; and soft 
moral (or legal) retributivists, who would argue that moral 
(or legal) guilt makes punishment morally permissible.20
In the remainder of this chapter, and in the next, I intend 
to examine the views of two seminal retributivist
20lt might be argued that a pure moral retributivist position on 
punishment is unsustainable because legal guilt is a necessary 
condition of punishing, the definition of punishment being that it is 
imposed by an authority for the contravention of a law. A moral 
retributivist could, of course, agree and argue that all moral 
offences ought to be legal offences, but, more likely he might argue 
that moral guilt is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
imposition of suffering and that, when it is accompanied by legal 
guilt, such suffering is imposed as punishment. This could take the 
form of arguing that some law should be found to punish the morally 
guilty because they deserve to be punished, even if their moral 
offence is not the same as the legal charge. Thus, The Guardian (25 
January 1993), reported that a Thai monk had been charged with 
damaging a coffin because no offence barring sexual intercourse with 
a corpse (the monk's "moral" offence), could be found under which he 
could be charged.
theorisers of punishment, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, 
and in so doing I will examine interpretations of their 
work which have often been adapted as free standing 
theories in the modern literature.
2. Kant
There is little doubt that punishment was for Kant, and is 
for Kantian theorists, an especially difficult problem. 
Kant recognises the necessity of punishment yet faces the 
fact that it is, prima facie, an infringement on the 
individual's autonomy. What is more it is an infringement 
that is made necessary by a contingent fact - that of the 
individual having committed a criminal act. Indeed, in The 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that punishment would 
be eliminated from the ideal society.21 Nonetheless, Kant 
believes that punishment is obligatory once guilt is 
established, so, if he turns out to be a retributivist, he 
will, in my terms, be a hard one.22 At this stage it would 
be premature to give an answer as to whether his concern is 
with moral or legal guilt.
It may seem to some extraordinary to write in this manner 
about Kant; that is, as if there were any ambiguity in his 
arguments concerning punishment. The traditional view has
21Kant 1787, 312: "The more legislation and government are brought 
into harmony with the [ideal], the rarer would punishments become, 
and it is therefore quite rational to maintain, as Plato does, that 
in a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required".
22See, for example, Kant 1797, 142.
it that if anyone holds to unreconstructed (and in the 
opinion of some unthinking23), retributivism then that 
person is Kant,24 and quotes such as the one which prefaces 
this Chapter abound to show just how retributivist Kant's 
philosophy is. Yet, as several recent commentators have 
pointed out,25 such a reading of Kant has to account for 
other passages which are as clear, but as clearly not 
retributivist. Consider the following two passages from 
the Lectures on Ethics:
"Punishments are deterrent if their sole purpose is to 
prevent an evil from arising; they are retributive when 
they are imposed because an evil has been done. 
Punishments are, therefore, a means of preventing an evil 
or of punishing it. Those imposed by governments are 
always deterrent. They are meant to deter the sinner 
himself or to deter others by making an example of him."
"Ruling authorities do not punish because a crime has 
been committed, but in order that crimes should not be 
committed." 26
23Cooper, for example, says that Kant has "no theory at all beyond 
the denial of utilitarianism". (Cooper 1971, 160). For similar (and 
other) criticisms of Kant's views on punishment, see Arendt 1982, 7- 
8; Brown 1962; Cohen 1939.
24E.g., "The most thoroughgoing retributivists, exemplified by Kant, 
maintain that the punishment of crime is right in itself...." (Benn 
1967, 30).
25See, for example, Byrd 1989; Tunick 1992b, 95-101; Riley 1983, 107- 
110; Scheid 1983.
26Kant 1930, 55 and 56.
It will be the claim of this Chapter that Kant’s theory 
encompasses deterrent, retributive and (to a lesser extent) 
fair play elements. In order to understand how this is 
possible, however, it is first necessary to look more 
generally at Kant's philosophy, although it will only be 
possible to do this in an extremely restricted manner.27
3. The Noumenal and Phenomenal Worlds
At the heart of Kant1s philosophy is a distinction between 
the sensory, phenomenal, world and the intellectual, 
noumenal, world. This bifurcation is repeated in various 
forms; in the distinction between things as they appear to 
us and things in themselves, between man as a determined 
and man as a free being, and between the moral and 
juridical realms. The most important form of this 
distinction, as it concerns punishment, is between the 
moral and the juridical, each of which is characterised by 
very different features. Taking Kant's ethics - the moral 
world - first; Kant argues that the only thing that is good 
in itself is the good will, which, as will be shown below, 
means that our actions to be moral have to be free, in the 
sense that an individual is free when his will is not 
determined by anything other than itself. Pure practical 
reason - i.e., practical reason which is not determined by 
contingently given ends - must, then, be sufficient to 
command action, and the individual in according his
27For good brief introductions to Kant's moral philosophy see Allison 
1990; Hill, 1992; O’Neill 1991.
behaviour to such reason achieves autonomy;28 it must also 
be formal and unconditional because it must be sufficient 
to command independently of contingent factors about the 
world (including, of course, factors about the agent). The 
form given by Kant to pure practical reason is the 
categorical imperative, which in its most general form is 
the injunction to: "Act only on that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law".29
The categorical imperative embodies the "pure idea of law" 
that is, it commands "unconditionally, ...universally or 
without qualification."30 The content of the law is 
derived from testing subjective maxims against the 
requirement of the categorical imperative; those which pass 
are, then, substantive moral laws. I shall consider one 
example, that of promise keeping below, but first, I wish 
to press ahead with the characterisation of Kant's ethics.
The question which must arise concerns the relation between 
actual agents, that is between members of the phenomenal 
world, and the moral law, for the moral law must, as noted 
above, be sufficient to motivate action. The agent must 
not act simply in accordance with the external demands of 
the moral law, but it must be the case that his actions 
could have been motivated purely by duty to that law, in
28For an alternative view of Kantian autonomy see Hill 1989.
29Kant 1948, 84.
30Charvet 1981, 70.
the absence of any other contingent reason.31 But how is 
it possible for the moral law to determine the phenomenal 
agent? Kant, himself, admits that for this to be possible 
man must exist not only as a phenomenal being, but also as 
a rational being whose end is to live in accordance with 
its own nature which is itself rational. If morality is to 
be possible this being must be entirely free, i.e., self­
determining, because it must not be the case that adherence 
to the moral law is a matter of contingency or 
circumstance.
Kant1s argument for our being free depends again on this 
bifurcation between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. 
Kant argues that whilst we can only have access to things 
in the world through our sensory faculties, there must be 
some way these things are, independently of our relations 
to them; they must exist also as "things in themselves". 
Applied to ourselves, that is to human beings, we know 
ourselves as phenomenal beings but we must also suppose 
that each of us exists as a "thing in itself", as what Kant 
calls a "noumenal" being. We can, of course, have no 
empirical knowledge of things in themselves, of the 
noumenal world, but through our special capacity of reason 
we can have rational belief about it. Reason attempts to 
go beyond experience and empirical knowledge and seeks an 
originating cause which is itself not an effect of some 
other cause; reason demands that at some point there is an 
"unmoved mover".
31See infra, note 36.
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Kant claims that freedom is such an idea of reason; man is 
to be thought of as causally determined when conceived as a 
phenomenal being but as also belonging to another realm, a 
realm of reason, in which conceived as a member of this 
realm - as a noumenal being - man is independent of 
causality and is in possession of a free will, an 
originating cause. The moral world is thus coextensive 
with the noumenal. Moral action is that which is in 
accordance with the categorical imperative and in the 
absence of other contingent reasons it is performed out of 
a sense of duty to the moral.32 In short, the agent in 
living in accordance with the moral law is living in 
accordance with his own nature as a free rational being.
Turning now to the juridical realm. Unlike the moral, the 
juridical realm is the realm of externality. In other 
words, its concern is not with the internal motivations of 
the agent but only with the agent's external actions, man 
conceived as a phenomenal rather than as a noumenal 
being.33 Similarly, juridical legislation is addressed to 
the contingent, subjective motivations of the individual, 
as against the moral law which addresses the objective
32Where other motivations are present it must be the case that in 
their absence the motivation of duty to the moral law would have been 
sufficient to ensure the agent's performance of the action. See 
infra, note 36.
33"Kant is clear that what matters in morality is the good will, or 
the incentive of one's actions, while all that counts in politics and 
law is that one's external behavior (however motivated) be consistent 
with everyone's freedom under a universal law", (Riley 1983, 108). 
See also Byrd 1989; Scheid 1983, 266-71.
motivation of duty to the categorical imperative. This, of 
course, means that the fulfilment of the agent's juridical 
obligations is empirically verifiable; all one needs to do 
is check that the agent did indeed do that which he was 
obliged to do.34
Compare this with the moral realm. What is at issue in the 
juridical world is, as noted above, the freedom to form and 
act upon subjectively chosen maxims. The motive, or end, 
which guides the agent is irrelevant in juridical terms. 
The morality of the agent's actions, on the other hand, is 
determined only by the motivation; if, and only if, there 
is an internal correspondence between the subjectively 
chosen maxim and the demands of the categorical imperative 
can the action be said to be truly moral. Because the 
correspondence has to be internal it is obviously not the 
case that the subjective maxim must simply result in 
actions which the categorical imperative would endorse as 
right, for that would only be an external correspondence. 
Consider Kant's most famous example, that of promise 
keeping.
Kant argues that promise keeping is a moral duty35, in 
other words it is commanded by the categorical imperative.
34Byrd 1989, 156-162; Fleischacker 1992, 202; Scheid 1983, 262-68. 
Further characterisation of the juridical realm follows below, §4.
35For the sake of simplicity I am, for the moment, ignoring Kant's 
classification of duties (perfect and imperfect; to self and to 
others). Good discussions of these can be found in Byrd 1989, 168-9 
and Scheid 1983, 266-7. Kant’s argument that promise keeping is a 
requirement of the categorical imperative can be found in Kant 1948,
Let us say that person P makes a promise to person A to do 
X at some specified time Y. The categorical imperative 
tells us that P ought to do X at time Y. At time Y f P does 
X, and thus his external actions are in accordance with the 
demands of the moral law, nonetheless the performance of X 
at time Y by P was only a moral action if P would have been 
sufficiently motivated by duty to the moral law in the 
absence of any contingent factors, such as that it was in
his interest to do X, or even, that he wanted to be the 
sort of person who performs his duty.36 The morality of an 
action, thus, is only discernible to one who knows the 
internal motivations of the agent, and Kant claims that the 
only being with such a capacity is God. Not even the 
agent, himself, may be sure of his own reasons for 
action.37
The significant differences between the moral and the 
juridical realms should now be clear. Moral and juridical 
legislation may both command the performance of an action,
67-68. It is not my purpose here to evaluate this claim, a brief 
discussion of its problems can be found in Charvet 1981, 72-74.
36Byrd seems to argue that Kant demands that for an action to be 
moral it must be the case that the performance of the action was 
motivated only by duty to the moral law. This is too strong; if the 
agent is motivated to perform the action by some contingent 
motivation (say a desire to be the sort of person who performs his 
external duties) then the action is still moral if in the absence of 
this motivation the agent would still have performed the action out 
of pure respect for the moral law. It is a common error to suppose 
that because Kant demands the presence of the motivation of duty, he 
demands that it is in any given case the actual motivation for the 
action. Of course, we cannot know whether, in any given case, the 
motivation of duty would have been (or was) sufficient.
37"The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of 
our own conduct, thus remain entirely hidden from us." (Kant 1787, 
475n); See also Kant 1948, 74-5; Byrd 1989, 161; Fleischacker 1992, 
202.
but from the perspective of morality, that is conceived 
independently of any contingent factors, it is also 
demanded that the action would be performed for the right 
reason, and thus morality addresses itself only to the 
internal motivations of the agent. Finally the performance 
of a moral action is unverifiable except by God. Juridical 
legislation addresses itself only to the external 
motivations and the performance of the agent. It asks 
merely that the agent do the action, not that she do it for 
a particular reason. It is thus easily verifiable, we know 
whether P kept her promise to A simply by asking whether P 
did X at time Y. We cannot know whether P thus deserves 
the accolade moral, that is only for God to judge.38
4. Legal and Moral Punishment
Kant’s bifurcation of the moral and juridical realms means 
that it is neither wise nor helpful to talk of punishment 
per se in Kant's philosophy; one can only speak of legal or 
moral punishment. For the moment I shall put aside the 
moral realm and the question of the relation between the 
juridical and moral perspectives; both of these concerns 
will be dealt with below, but first to the question of what
38This interpretation, in which the motivations of the agent are 
opaque to others, seems to me to be the most coherent if Kant's 
distinction between the moral and juridical realms is to stand up. 
It has to be admitted, however, that Kant, when considering the jus 
talionis, occasionally talks of legal punishment in proportion to 
"inner wickedness", (see Kant 1797, 142). The balance of his
remarks, however, support the reading given above; see, for example, 
Kant 1960, 87 and 91; this is also the conclusion reached by Hill 
1978 in Hill 1992, 185-87.
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justifies legal punishment, that is, punishment in the 
juridical realm.
The best way to approach this question is to ask what role 
the juridical realm plays in Kant's philosophy. In order 
to answer this two things must be held constantly in mind: 
First, the differences between the juridical and the moral 
perspectives discussed above, and second that Kant was 
profoundly concerned with the quest for stability and 
peace. One can best examine the role of the juridical 
realm through the device of the social contract, envisaged 
as a device for discovering the rational principles for 
regulating the inter-personal co-operative actions of a 
group of people, that is, of a society. This is a device 
which was familiar to Kant:
"The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may 
seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only 
they are intelligent. The problem is: 'Given a multiple
of rational beings requiring universal laws for their 
preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to 
exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in 
such a way that, although their private intentions 
conflict, they check each other, with the result that 
their public conduct is the same as if they had no such 
intentions.'" 39
Kant argues, on this interpretation, that the rational 
course of action for a group of people, when that group
39Kant 1795 in Kant 1963, 112.
contains likely criminals,40 is to institute a system of 
rules and a system of punishment. The latter is needed 
because without it the enterprise would fail and the 
society would decay into anarchy. This outcome is not only 
because of the sum of individual misdeeds, but because 
without punishment what Hobbes called the condition of 
"sufficient security"41 could not be attained, and thus the 
trust necessary to the success of any co-operative venture 
would be absent. The condition of sufficient security 
holds when each individual is sufficiently convinced that 
others will co-operate (by for example keeping their word), 
so that he is prepared to enter co-operative ventures, (for 
example, a transaction based on a promise).42 But this 
only tells us that the juridical realm applies to civil 
society and the maintenance of peace. What it does not 
tell us is why civil society is important.
Clearly the answer to this question lies in the fact that 
civil society creates and maintains the conditions 
necessary for external freedom, i.e., for the freedom to 
develop and act upon subjectively chosen maxims, without 
interference from others, with the important caveat that 
such freedom must be equal. In more modern terms, civil
40This condition is what distinguishes the actual from the ideal 
world, in which punishment would be unnecessary; laws "will naturally 
also be penal laws if there are any criminals among the people". 
(Kant 1797, 143)
41Hobbes 1651, Part I, Chapter 15, 215.
42The problem of the necessity for conditions of trust to prevail is 
now referred to as the "assurance problem". It is the subject of an 
extended discussion below, §36.
society functions to provide the greatest possible external 
freedom compatible with equal freedom for others.43 
Consider the case of possession, which is central to Kant's 
justification of civil society. Kant argues that 
possession is necessary to freedom, possession being 
required for use, and use for freedom of choice. Justice 
as such, or the "mere concepts of Right",44 cannot yield 
the right to possession and therefore it must be a 
postulate of reason. This claim,
"put[s] all others under an obligation, which they would 
not otherwise have, to refrain from using certain objects 
of our choice because we have been the first to take them 
into our possession."45 
But if this is so, and Kant succeeds in establishing the 
necessity of possession, then it establishes a universal 
law placing an obligation on all to refrain from using the 
possessions of others. If this were non universal, it 
would merely represent a one-sided attack on the freedom of 
some, for in this instance one would be obliging another to 
respect one's possessions without taking on a reciprocal 
obligation. The security that each will undertake his 
obligations is given, in Kant's view, by civil society.46
43 "A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in 
accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be
consistent with that of all o t h e r s (Kant 1787, 312 emphasis in
original). Cf. John Rawls's first principle (the "liberty 
principle"). Rawls 1971, 250.
44Kant 1797, 69.
45Kant 1797, 69.
46See Byrd 1989, §4; Murphy 1970 presents an interpretation of Kant's
philosophy based very largely on this idea of reciprocity.
"When I declare .. something external to be mine, I 
thereby declare that everyone else is under obligation to 
refrain from using that object of my choice, an 
obligation no one would have were it not for this act of 
mine to establish a right. This claim involves, however, 
acknowledging that I in turn am under obligation to every 
other to refrain from using what is externally his.... I 
am therefore not under obligation to leave external 
objects belonging to others untouched unless everyone 
else provides me assurance that he will behave in 
accordance with the same principle with regard to what is 
mine. ~ It is only a will putting everyone under 
obligation, hence only a collective general (common) and 
powerful will, that can provide this assurance. But the 
condition of being under a general external (i.e., 
public) lawgiving accompanied with power is the civil 
condition."47
We are now in a position to consider some of the accounts 
Kant gives of the role and justification of legal 
punishment in civil society.
5. Deterrence and Respecting Others
Civil society, then, is formed by the agreement of the 
members to live under a common authority which organises 
itself through law. This agreement must be understood as 
juridical, that is between phenomenal beings who are self- 
interested and concerned to safeguard their external
47Kant 1797, 77.
freedom.48 For this reason, the laws "will naturally also 
be penal laws if there are any criminals among the 
people".49 Punishment, thus, appears consequentialist in 
nature; if the role of civil society is seen as providing a 
condition of sufficient security then it seems to follow 
that punishment is to be understood as a mechanism for 
maintaining civil society through deterring potential 
offenders, thus, creating the condition of sufficient 
security.50 In short, the justifying purpose of the system 
of punishment is to protect the social order; to maintain 
civil society so as to ensure continued external freedom.51
If such a agreement were purely to be understood in 
juridical terms, then the deterrence aspect of legal 
punishment would not contradict Kant's conviction that 
morally good action is done with a pure will, because such 
punishment is addressed to the external motivations and 
performances of the citizens as phenomenal beings. This 
analysis would also quite satisfactorily explain the 
deterrence based comments of Kant quoted above, and it can 
also claim textual support from elsewhere in Kant's work. 
For example, in the discussion of the drowning man which
48By far the best exponent of this idea is Jeffrie G Murphy, 1970, 
1972 and 1973; see also Williams 1983, 98-102; Aune 1979, 166; Shell 
1980, 161. Arguments against this interpretation can be found in 
Byrd 1989, 181; Scheid 1983, 265 n7.
49Kant 1797, 143.
50See Byrd 1989; Tunick 1992b, 95-102; Scheid 1983.
51Byrd would prefer to say that the "threat of punishment" is 
deterrence based, rather than that the justification of the system of 
punishment is so. (See Byrd 1989, 183 105n) However, this
distinction does not seem to me to be particularly useful, see §8.
appears twice in his writings, Kant argues that a man in a 
shipwreck, who, faced with certain death by drowning, 
"shoves another, whose life is equally in danger, off a 
plank on which he had saved himself", could not be legally 
culpable because "the punishment threatened by the law 
could not be greater than the loss of his own life."52 In 
other words, the use of the law in such cases could not be 
justified because the law could not have a deterrent 
effect, the certainty of death from drowning being greater 
than that of judicial execution, for the latter depends 
upon one’s being apprehended and convicted.
The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the 
noumenal world altogether. What it has ignored is the 
important caveat that civil society is for the protection 
of equal freedom. This must be the case, for although the 
agreement to organise in civil society is between 
phenomenal beings, it must, if it is to be compatible with
the requirements of the universal law, respect the
categorical imperative's demand that one should:
"act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other,
never simply as a means but always at the same time as an
end."53
52Kant 1797, 60. See also Kant 1974, 68. Nonetheless the man is not 
inculpable. See below, §9.
53Kant 1948, 91. Hence the argument for the universal demand to 
respect the right of possession.
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The deterrence based system of punishment, then, is not an 
unfettered consequentialism, subject to all the objections 
that plague that theory, most of which revolve around the 
fundamental claim that consequentialism treats people as 
means to better states of affairs.54 Rather, the agreement 
is to co-operate under equal laws with the condition that 
whoever breaks those laws will be coerced.
The rationale of coercion, however, is unclear. At first, 
it appears as if Kant1 s argument is that those who do not 
obey the law should be coerced in order to satisfy the 
demand of providing the condition of sufficient security, 
but this would still be to treat people as means for a 
social good, it would not treat them as "ends in 
themselves". The problem is in seeing how the demand that 
the law guarantee equal freedom is translated into 
punishment practices. If Kant is to constrain the 
consequentialist rationale by the demand that the agreement 
be such that it is compatible with what could be agreed 
between noumenal beings, he needs to show that retributive 
punishment is what is required to treat people equally, in 
which case the "added bonus", so to speak, would be the 
provision of the condition of sufficient security.
Certainly there is plenty in Kant to support his fearful 
reputation as a seminal retributivist theorist. Consider 
one of Kant's more (in)famous passages from The Metaphysics 
of Morals:
54See supra, Introduction; §18.
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"Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the 
consent of all its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting 
an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the 
world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first 
have to be executed, so that each has done to him what 
his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the 
people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for 
otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in 
this public violation of justice."55
The key lies in the language of doing to the offender what 
"his deeds deserve", this suggests a far more retributivist 
theory than the deterrence based analysis would allow, as 
does Kant's unambiguous support for the jus talionis.56 As 
Patrick Riley has pointed out, Kant "often wants to be able 
to say that punishment must be deserved or merited", and in 
fact he often does say just that.57 Kant must find an 
argument, then, that will allow him to constrain the 
agreement between phenomenal beings by the demand that 
treating people equally requires that the guilty suffer a 
punishment that is imposed on the offender "only because he 
has committed a crime."58 The central question, then, is
55 Kant 1797, 142.
56See Kant 1797, 141: "But what kind and what amount of punishment is 
it that public justice makes its principle and measure? None other 
than the principle of equality, -.only the law of retribution (ius 
talionis) - can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of 
punishment".
57Riley 1983, 109. The discussion of punishment found in Kant 1797, 
100-102, contains numerous retributivist sounding passages.
58Kant 1797, 141.
given the necessity of a system of punishment, how is it 
compatible with the requirement to treat people as ends? 
This is, in a sense, no more than to ask how punishment 
can, in Kant's view, be deserved, and we have thus reached 
the core intuition of retributivism. There are two 
arguments marshalled by Kant to defend the idea that the 
criminal deserves punishing, both derived from the idea 
that the criminal wills his own punishment. The first 
attempts to fill this out in the nature of the agreement, 
and the second in the nature of the offender's act.
6. Willing One's own Punishment: Contractarian 
Retributivism
Jeffrie G Murphy59 has argued that the social contract 
picture presented above is a valid representation of Kant's 
views, what is more, he thinks it contains a way of 
combining the autonomy of the individual and retributive 
punishment. Murphy suggests that the social contract 
presentation of Kant's understanding of the legal realm 
means that people can be said to have consented to the 
system of punishment, and thus to their own punishment 
should they commit an illegal act:
"What is needed, in order to reconcile my undesired 
suffering of punishment at the hands of the state with my 
autonomy, ~is a political theory which makes the state’s 
decision to punish me in some sense my own decision. If 
I have willed my own punishment (consented to it, agreed
59See Murphy 1970, and, more especially, 1973.
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to it) then - even if at the time I happen not to desire 
it - it can be said that my autonomy and dignity remain 
intact."60
This interpretation can claim textual support from Kant:
"No one suffers punishment because he has willed it but 
because he has willed a punishable action; for it is no 
punishment if what is done to someone is what he wills, 
and it is impossible to will to be punished. Saying that 
I will to be punished if I murder someone is saying 
nothing more than that I subject myself along with 
everyone else to the laws, which will naturally also be 
penal laws if there are any criminals among the 
people."61
It is important to realise that what is at issue here is 
not the justification of punishment as a practice, it is 
not that punishment is just because the offender would have 
consented to the institution of punishment in a rational 
contract, it is that punishment does not impinge upon the 
autonomy of the offender given that, conceived as a 
rational being, he consents to the practice of punishment.
The problem with such an argument is that as phenomenal 
beings agreeing to be bound by the rules of civil society, 
we cannot agree to deserved punishment, we can agree to be 
subjects of punishment when we break the rules, but as such 
subjects we are merely means to the maintenance of the 
agreement. We cannot agree to anything more - to deserved
60Murphy 1973, 287.
61Kant 1797, 143-4.
punishment - because as phenomenal beings we cannot choose 
to be criminal, we are simply caused to be. As a 
heteronomous, phenomenal being, I break the law because it 
is in my prudential interest to do so, and this is what 
motivates me. In order to be deserving of punishment, I 
would have to be free to choose between good and evil, and 
I am not.
What is even more undermining for this defence of Kant is 
that even the noumenal will cannot choose to do evil; the 
good will is the only thing that is good in itself, that 
is, autonomy is defined as living in accordance with one’s 
rational nature, which is the same as saying in accordance 
with the demands of pure practical reason, or the 
categorical imperative. That is why evil is heteronomous, 
a consequence of the contingent desires of the phenomenal 
being motivating the agent to act contrary to the demands 
of his rational nature as a moral being. Evil, in short, 
is a consequence of natural causation. However, even if we 
granted Kant the idea from common sense morality, that as 
free beings we could choose to do good or evil, this would 
still not rescue the position, for the agreement to form 
civil society cannot be between noumenal beings, for 
reasons I have highlighted above. The noumenal realm is 
concerned with the internal motivations of the agent and, 
thus, an agreement between noumenal wills could not be one 
based on coercive terms.
In summary, it seems that desert can only be attributed to 
the agent conceived as a noumenal being (and even here it 
is doubtful), but, as a noumenal being the agent could not 
agree to a mutually binding system of coercive laws to 
regulate behaviour, for the noumenal self is free only 
insofar as it is self-determining.62 However, the self 
that is capable, and needs, the agreement - the phenomenal 
self - is heteronomous, and thus cannot be deserving.
The contractarian approach to the idea that the agent wills 
her own punishment, then, does not succeed, however, Kant 
has a second argument, derived from the nature of the 
of fender's act.
7. The Rebounding Maxim
Consider the following the remark by Kant:
"For the only time a criminal cannot complain that a 
wrong is done to him is when he brings his evil deed back 
upon himself, and what is done to him in accordance with 
penal law is what he has perpetrated on others^ .."63 
Samuel Fleischacker has argued that it is only by taking 
passages such as this seriously that we can understand 
Kant's theory of legal punishment.64 The claim is that 
when an individual performs a criminal act he acts as if
62See §3.
63Kant 1797, 169.
64Fleischacker 1992. A similar argument is presented in Pincoffs 
1966, 8-9.
the maxim upon which he acts were a universal one, and thus 
the punishment is merely that maxim being reapplied to, or 
rebounding upon, him; in Pincoffs' words, the criminal's 
"crime of violence against another’s freedom implies a 
maxim sanctioning such actions; as a rational being - and 
only as such does his autonomy have value - he must be 
prepared to will that maxim as a universal law, and thus 
to will that others should violate his freedom as he 
violates theirs. In punishing him, the essence of 
punishment being the hindrance of freedom, we therefore 
do to him just what he has as a rational being willed 
that we should do - we respect his autonomy and his 
will."65
The argument is that it is only by taking the agent1s maxim 
as if it were a universal one that the punisher treats the 
offender as an end, and thus punishing the offender is a 
manifestation of the state’s respect for his autonomy, it 
takes his heteronomous will as if it were autonomous and 
thus treats him as a rational being, and as an equal under 
the law.
Fleischacker claims that it is not disingenuous to treat 
the offender as if he had willed the maxim to be universal 
because, as noted above, the judge can only judge the 
action of the individual not the individual1s motivational 
state; the action is one which can be interpreted as in 
accordance with a freely chosen maxim, even if that was
65Pincoffs 1966, 8-9.
actually not the case and the individual was, say, acting 
out of passion.
Whilst on the surface this account seems attractive, not 
least for the fact that it can accommodate Kant's rigorous 
implementation of the jus talionis, it is open to three 
serious objections. The first concerns the ascription of a 
particular maxim to a particular action. Kant, for 
example, discusses the case of bestiality and Fleischacker 
follows him in arguing that, "one who commits bestiality 
acts as though he had willed that all men deny their human 
(social) nature".66 This is not, it seems to me, an 
uncontroversial description of bestiality, and it is not at 
all clear how the judge is to capture the best description 
of the action in the form of a maxim upon which the 
offender can be said to have acted. This is significant 
because it is that maxim (and no other), which is to 
rebound upon the individual. The case of bestiality is a 
hard but good one; Kant proposes banishment - "permanent 
expulsion from civil society"67 - for the offender on the 
grounds that the crime is against one's nature as a human. 
Of course one can understand Kant's desire to avoid a more 
forthright description given the possible consequences 
under the jus talionis, nonetheless it is difficult to see 
why one should accept his, and Fleischacker1s, particular 
version of this crime.
66Fleischacker 1992, p200. See Kant 1797, pl69.
67Kant 1797, 169.
It is important to distinguish this problem - of which 
maxim the judge should ascribe to the action - from the 
sort of criticism that is found, for example, in Duff's 
Trials and Punishments.68 Duff argues that one cannot 
ascribe a maxim to the individual because we do not know on 
what precise maxim that individual was actually acting. 
Such a problem is avoided by Kant; the judge is not 
required to evaluate the actual maxim upon which the agent 
acted - because, as noted above, motivations are opaque in 
Kant's philosophy - rather, he is required to ascribe a 
description in the form of a maxim to the action.69 The 
problem highlighted above is that Fleischacker and Kant 
assume there to be a (single) maxim which uniquely 
describes every act, and this is, frankly, implausible.
Duff's other criticism is also not appropriate here. Duff 
argues that in reapplying the maxim of the offender, we are 
doing to the offender what he has willed and, if this is 
the case, this cannot be punishment - a view with respect 
to the offender's will with which Kant entirely concurs.70 
But the criminal does not will his punishment, he wills the 
offence. Society in reapplying the maxim under which his 
actions can be described does not act in accordance with
68Duff 1986, 201-2. It should be noted that Duff does not take the 
position being described to be Kant's.
69ln Fleischacker's telling phrase "not dishonesty, but an essential 
blindness, characterizes the workings of justice." (Fleischacker 
1992, 204).
70"...for it is no punishment if what is done to someone is what he 
wills, and it is impossible to will to be punished." (Kant 1797, 
pl43); Duff 1986, pp201-2?
his phenomenal will, but in accordance with this will as if 
it were his rational, autonomous, will.
The second objection is even more serious; what is 
difficult to understand is why the rebounding of the maxim 
is to be understood as (justified) punishment. The 
criminal wills, say, to kill another, and on this account 
we respect his autonomy by interpreting this as if he had 
willed it to be universal, and thus we are entitled to kill 
him; he cannot, so to speak, rationally exempt himself from 
the consequences of his own maxim. This seems to be an 
attractive solution, since there is general agreement that 
reasons do possess this feature of impersonality, but why 
is our rebounding the maxim onto the offender, punishment?
In the first instance the criminal might agree that the 
community is entitled to kill him; "yes”, she might say, "I 
accept that I (in some sense), willed that killing is 
permissible and you can kill me", but she may legitimately 
object if, in killing her, the community claims that it is 
doing anything different from what she has done. On this 
interpretation the criminal is simply claiming that it is a 
"dog eat dog" world in which killing to advance one's 
interests is permissable; of course, she must accept that 
this means the community can kill her in its interests, for 
in this amoral world she has lost.
In order to convert the execution of the criminal into 
punishment, it is necessary for the community to claim that
the criminal' s real will is to live in accordance with 
morality and that her empirical will has put her in 
conflict with herself. The claim must then be that the 
infliction of suffering negates the empirical will and 
restores the offender to her real will, and in this sense 
it is not merely doing to the offender what she has done, 
but is punishing the offender on her behalf.71 The problem 
with this is that if what is of concern is that the 
offender should be brought back to morality, it is not at 
all clear why this should be done through the infliction of 
punishment, or, indeed, whether it can be done through 
punishment.72
Even if we accept that the impersonality of reasons can 
give us an account of punishment (rather than something 
else), there is a third objection. What this account 
fails to provide is any explanation for why we have a duty 
to punish in this manner; why should we treat the 
heteronomous actions of a phenomenal being as if they were 
the autonomous actions of a noumenal one? Combining it 
with the general justifying aim, we could say that given 
that punishment is necessary for the maintenance of civil 
society and that we must never treat another as a means, 
the only way to reconcile these demands is to punish in 
this manner - i.e., all and only the guilty in accordance 
with the rebounding of the maxim ascribed to the criminal
71This is Hegel * s interpretation of the Kantian idea that the maxim 
rebounds on the offender, it is pursued in much greater length in
§§14-15.
72See §14.
action. But this seems to establish only that punishment 
when required by deterrence is permissible if it is in this 
form. It does not seem to make punishment obligatory; that 
would only follow if punishment itself was a good in that 
it respected persons, that is independently of its 
deterrence value.
Fleischacker suggests something very similar to this; he 
argues that in the moral realm punishment is good, and the 
legal realm is, in some sense, a bad copy of the moral. 
This seems to challenge the interpretation of the legal 
given above, however, when considering why the legal ought 
to be this bad copy of the moral, Fleischacker falls back 
on a consequentialist concern, that of preserving 
"perpetual peace", and thus his reading fails in the end to 
provide the retributivist core Kant needs.
8. Threat and Execution
I would like to make one final point; throughout this 
Chapter I have used the distinction between the general 
justifying aim of punishment and the distribution of 
punishment. The general justifying aim of legal punishment 
is, I have claimed, deterrence based in the absence of a 
free standing account of desert with which to constrain it. 
But a number of the theorists I have considered, most 
notably B. Sharon Byrd and Don Scheid, argue that it is 
precisely this distinction which solves the apparent 
inconsistency in Kant's theory. Punishment, they argue, is
deterrence based in its general justifying aim but 
retributive in distribution.73 And this is, of course, 
also at the centre of H. L. A. Hart's "Prolegomenon to the 
Principles of Punishment".74
In some senses I have accepted this distinction in my 
search for an adequate defence of retributivism in Kant1s 
work. Byrd's argument relies on the idea that the threat 
of punishment is addressed to phenomenal beings involved in 
the agreement to co-operate in civil society. Although it 
does threaten them, it is not autonomy infringing because 
the subjects it addresses are not being addressed as 
autonomous beings. When it comes to implementing the 
punishment, however, this is done on the basis of desert, 
and is, thus, retributive.
What strikes me about this argument is that it presupposes 
that Kant has an adequate theory of desert, and that is 
something I have found conspicuous only by its absence, but 
also, that if one granted that Kant had a free standing 
argument for desert that would undermine the structure of 
Byrd's argument. Given that Kant regards the imposition of 
punishment as obligatory, an account of desert would give a 
prima facie general justifying aim for punishment; one 
would have a system of punishment in order to give people 
what they deserve. No doubt having the system of 
punishment would also deter individuals seen as phenomenal
73See Byrd 1989; Scheid 1983.
74Hart 1959.
beings, but this could no longer be regarded as the reason 
for having punishment in the first place, it would, as I 
said above, just be an added bonus.
9. Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems as if there is no satisfactory way 
to theorise the relation between the noumenal (moral) and 
phenomenal (juridical) in Kant's philosophy. Within the 
latter Kant argues for a largely deterrence based system of 
punishment, nonetheless he thinks that this is compatible 
with a retributive element based on desert, which is the 
theory that dominates his discussions of the noumenal 
realm. The various specific attempts to show the 
compatibility and relationship between these realms and 
theories are all unsatisfactory.
In the end, the reason for Kant's belief that punishment is 
fundamentally retributive which leads him to characterise 
the moral realm in the way he does, is, I believe, revealed 
in the connection he sees between the idea of transgression 
and punishment. As of now, even if the gap between the 
idea of responsibility and the heteronomous actions of the 
offender could be bridged, no argument has been given, 
beyond deterrence, to actually inflict punishment. The 
retributive claims in much of Kant's writing rely on a 
simple statement that there is a relationship between 
transgression and punishment; for Kant, there seems to be 
something innate in the notion of transgression that
implies retributive punishment. Kant's argument for this 
is largely intuitive, and so we come back to the position 
from which respect for persons and contractualism were 
supposed to have rescued us; that is that Kant simply 
assumes that punishment has a retributive element, and 
takes the form of the jus talionis, because it is self- 
evidently so as part of justice. There is a "celestial 
mechanics",75 i n  which "every criminal action 
metaphysically deserves 'an equal an opposite reaction', in 
the shape of punishment."76
Thus, if we return to the example of the drowning man cited 
earlier. Kant says that although the sailor who shoves the 
other off the plank on which he had saved himself is not 
legally punishable, because the cause of deterrence cannot 
be served in such a circumstance, the sailor is "not to be 
judged inculpable".77 And, again, in the diaspora example, 
it is clear that no deterrence benefit arises from 
executing all the murderers before civil society disperses. 
Likewise, if one considers the rebounding maxim argument as 
a free standing account of deserved punishment, Kant 
provides no answers to the questions I posed there, why 
should the maxim rebound and why is this punishment? In 
the end, one can only conclude that Kant has no argument; 
in the retributive frame of mind for which he is famous, 
Kant's position is genuinely without foundation and thus of
75Cohen 1939, 279.
76Fleischacker 1992, 204.
77Kant 1797, 60.
little use to a defence of retributivism. He does adhere 
to the two fundamental tenets of this doctrine: that 
punishment is obligatory and the suffering of the offender 
is both morally good and justified by his past act, but he 
takes these as self evident truths derived from the ideas 
of justice and transgression.
Nevertheless, although Kant is probably the most famous 
retributive thinker he is by no means the only one, and 
before dismissing retributivism as invariably based on the 
mere mystical restating of its fundamental intuition, I 
will turn to another such theorist, G. W. F. Hegel, in an 
attempt to find the grounding for the conviction that the 
guilty deserve to suffer.
Chapter 2: Hegel and the Annulment of
the Wrong
"Those who have gone beyond Hegel are like country people 
who must always give their address as via a larger city; 
thus the address in this case read - John Doe via 
Hegel."(Soren Kierkegaard, 17 January 1838J1
"Hegel's philosophy", writes Bertrand Russell "is very 
difficult - he is, I should say, the hardest to understand 
of all the great philosophers".2 Even Alan Wood, in his 
excellent study of Hegel's ethical thought, admits that 
whilst "the retributivist intent of Hegel's theory [of 
punishment] is clear enough ... its central claims are 
shrouded in obscure metaphors."3 Nevertheless, Wood 
believes that Hegel offers an account of the core of 
retributivism. Hegel, he believes, argues that, "the 
justification of punishment is that it is inherently just 
to inflict some evil on those who have done wrong."4
The "obscure metaphors" of Hegel's theory are notorious; 
punishment is an "annulment",5 or a "cancellation", which
■•■Quoted in Stern 1993, epigraph.
2Russell 1946, 701. Russell's Chapter shows strong evidence that he 
found Hegel impossible rather than difficult to understand. Good
introductions to Hegel's social and political thought are Hampsher- 
Monk 1992, Chapter 9; Plant 1983; Taylor 1979; Wood 1990, although in 
an otherwise excellent study Wood's discussion of Hegel's theory of 
punishment is disappointing.
^ood 1990, 109.
^Wood 1990, 108.
5Hegel 1967, S99R.
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is "an infringement of an infringement".(§101)6 In this 
Chapter I shall try to make sense of these metaphors and, 
in so doing, look to Hegel for a coherent account of 
retributivism. First, however, it is necessary to explain 
what it is that Hegel means by crime; in the second part of 
the Chapter I shall then go on to show how Hegel develops 
two accounts of coercion, which, despite their obscurity, 
shed light on contemporary approaches to punishment 
theorising, although unfortunately not on the core of 
retributivism.
10. Wrong
Before one engages with Hegel on the idea or justification 
for punishment one has first to examine his analysis of 
wrong, and thus of crime.7 The discussion of wrong, crime 
and punishment in The Philosophy of Right.8 occurs at the 
end of Hegel's analysis of Abstract Right, before the 
transition to Morality.9 Hegel is still concerned with the
6All such parenthetical references are to Hegel 1991. R denotes a 
Remark, A an Addition. All italics appear in the original.
7Two authors who explicitly admit this to be the necessary starting 
point for an analysis of Hegel on punishment are Nicholson 1982; and 
Tunick 1992a, 25-29.
8In this chapter I shall be primarily concerned with The Philosophy 
of Right, this is because it contains Hegel's best discussion of 
punishment and because it is part of his mature work. For a 
discussion of early versus late Hegel and the problem of punishment, 
see Tunick 1992a, Chapter 4.
9That is, it lies between §82 and §104. The term "punishment" does 
not appear in this part of the text of The Philosophy of Right 
because the sphere of Abstract Right is prior to society. Instead 
Hegel favours the term Aufhebung, translated as "cancellation" by 
Nisbet (Hegel 1991) and "annulment" by Knox (Hegel 1967). Hegel is 
less careful in the Remarks and Additions where he makes it clear
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abstract will; what has been shown so far is that if the 
abstract will is to have determinate existence then it must 
be embodied (§§34-40), and manifest itself in property 
(§§41-65), which can be alienated (§§65-70). Further, 
one's will must be given objective standing through the 
recognition of one's right in property by an other and this 
recognition is manifested through contract (§§71-81).
Hegel divides wrong into three categories, "unintentional 
wrong" (§§84-86); "deception" (§§87-89); and "coercion and 
crime" (§§90-103). Unintentional wrong occurs when two 
wills' claim rights over a piece of property to which only 
one is in fact entitled. This is "the sphere of civil 
actions" (§85). Neither party denies the claims of rights, 
but one is mistaken in making his claim. For example, if I 
mistakenly drink your pint of beer in a bar, believing that 
it is mine, I do not assert that you have no right to your 
pint of beer, or even - should I be disabused of my 
incorrect belief - to the pint of beer that I have drunk. 
I am simply mistaken, and by drinking a pint of beer that 
is in fact yours I have denied your legitimate right to 
that pint. In unintentional wrong,
"Right is recognised in this case. Each person wills 
what is right, and each is supposed to receive only what 
is right; their wrong consists solely in considering that 
what they will is right." (S86A)
that punishment is what he has in mind [e.g. "If crime and its 
annulment (which later will acquire the specific character of 
punishments)" Hegel 1967, §99A]
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Such wrongs are non-malicious. The offending party does 
not deliberately challenge the right of the other party, he 
is simply in error over the content of that right. In 
Hegel's view the offender is wrong because he relies on his 
particular, subjective judgement about what is right. 
Importantly, neither party denies the legitimacy of rights, 
that is, once society is established, of the foundation of 
law. Thus, "this first kind of wrong negates only the 
particular will, while universal right is respected" 
(§86A).10 Such unintended wrong is not a subject for 
punishment. Rather, both parties submit themselves to the 
authority of the law - that is to a disinterested judge - 
who settles the dispute. Compensation (or restitution), 
not punishment is required.11
Deception, or fraud, is a more difficult category.12 In 
his discussion of fraud Hegel seems most concerned with 
contract, and it is this which allows him to distinguish 
the deceiver from the criminal. In fraud, the deceiver 
appears to act in accordance with right, that is, his fraud 
depends upon his appearing to his victim to recognise the 
claims and binding nature of law. Nicholson suggests that
10For further elucidation of this wrong see Nicholson 1982, 109-111; 
Tunick 1992a, 26.
13-The argument for compensation should be obvious: If I have drunk 
your pint of beer, thinking that it is mine, and then discover my 
error, I am obliged to replace the pint (and also compensate you for 
any further damages caused by my action).
12Nicholson remarks that "it suits the triadic pattern common in 
Hegel's presentation that fraud should be a category on its own" 
although Nicholson goes on to argue that Hegel has a line of argument 
open to him that would "justify making fraud distinct from crime". 
(Nicholson 1982, 114-5)
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there are parallels between Hegel's distinction between 
fraud and crime and the contemporary distinction between 
white-collar crime and crimes of violence against persons 
or property.13 White-collar crime is parasitic on the 
existence of good, stable business relationships and thus 
needs a relatively established and healthy "host". 
Similarly, for Hegel, fraud requires the existence, and 
ostensible recognition, of right in contract. But Hegel 
also appears to go further; he describes fraud as a wrong 
against only the universal will - that is only against 
right - not against the particular will. In other words 
when one is defrauded one believes (in order for the fraud 
to be successful), that one is not being defrauded (in 
crime the case is different - one does not need to believe 
one is not being mugged for the mugger to be successful). 
Thus, Hegel claims, one's particular will is not harmed 
although, I take it that it has to be added that this 
claim, even if true, only applies for as long as the victim 
remains ignorant of the deception.
This idea - that one's particular will remains unharmed as 
long as it remains ignorant - is surely a bizarre one; if I 
desire to buy Tower Bridge, and somebody passing on the 
street (with no legal right to Tower Bridge), sells it to 
me, it seems clear that my particular will is frustrated 
from the moment that I pass over my money in return for a 
worthless "contract". I did not desire a piece of paper 
with words to the effect that I owned Tower Bridge on it; I
13Nicholson 1982, 114-5.
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desired ownership of Tower Bridge, The general idea behind 
Hegel's distinction is that fraud has all the appearance of 
right whereas crime, as we shall see, appears as a direct 
negation of right, but I have grave doubts that it can be 
sustained as a separate category of wrong in the way that 
Hegel desires.14
Crime, Hegel's third category of wrong, is an offence 
against both the particular and the universal will. It is 
important, at this point, to remember that for Hegel 
contract and property are not simply useful devices for 
regulating co-operative enterprise, but are mechanisms 
through which abstract personality becomes actual in the 
world. Contract extends the concretisation of the abstract 
will because it involves the recognition of the person's 
rights in things by another. The criminal by, for example, 
stealing property, not only appropriates something that is 
already owned - that is treats the property as if it were 
still a part of the natural world of things - but treats 
the owner as if he, too, were a thing rather than a being 
with rights.
14Tunick makes heavy weather of Hegel's invocation of the categories 
of "simple negative", "positive infinite" and "negative infinite" 
judgements. Despite his self-aggrandising claims to being the only 
commentator he knows to take seriously and make clear these 
categories, his analysis of the differences between fraud and crime 
in the end amounts to the claim that "I think Hegel is saying that 
the criminal acts as if he lacks this understanding [the 
understanding of right]". (Tunick 1992a, 27-9) The meaning and
purpose of the correspondence between the categories and the forms of 
wrong is certainly no more clear by the end of Tunick's discussion 
and is, it seems to me, certainly treated no more "seriously" than it 
is by Nicholson 1982.
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"The initial use of coercion, as force employed by a free 
agent in such a way as to infringe the existence of 
freedom in its concrete sense - i.e. to infringe right as 
right - is crime. This constitutes a negatively infinite 
judgement in its complete sense _ whereby not only the 
particular - i.e. the subsumption of a thing under my 
will - is negated, but also the universal and infinite 
element in the predicate 'mine' - i.e. my capacity for 
rights.” (§95)
Hegel claims that such action is "null" (§97), because it 
denies that the owner of the thing has rights, and thus 
contravenes the universal will. This raises two important 
questions that are essential to an interpretation of 
Hegel's theory of punishment: Why does an attack on a 
particular right to a particular thing constitute a denial 
of all rights, that is on the idea of right? And second, 
in what sense is such a denial invalid? The first of these 
questions will lead to one element of Hegel1 s theory of 
punishment and the second, through a less direct path, to 
the other.
Crudely, Hegel argues for the necessity of coercing the 
coercer on two grounds. First, it annuls the crime and 
restores right. Second, it is required if society is to 
treat the criminal as a rational being - it is the 
criminal's right to be punished. These two reasons, which, 
following Mark Tunick, we can call the "objective" and 
"subjective"15 reasons to punish, lie at the heart of
^Tunick 1992a, 35.
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Hegel's theory, although different commentators on Hegel 
have given varying interpretations of these claims. I 
shall consider each of the reasons below, analysing the 
possible readings in an attempt both to clarify what Hegel 
was saying and to see whether it has any merit. I am 
concerned, here, with the justification for coercion,, and 
punishment justified as a harm to the offender, and it is 
important that this is clear, not least because the 
conclusion of this chapter will turn on the claim that 
Hegel may have either or both an expressivist or moral 
educative account of punishment, but he lacks a coercive 
(and in that sense, retributivist) account.
Before beginning, however, it is necessary to enter a 
methodological warning. As noted above,16 Hegel's most 
important discussion of punishment occurs in the section on 
Abstract Right, prior, in other words to organised society 
and thus to punishment. In Abstract Right, Hegel's concern 
is with "annulment" or "cancellation". This does not mean, 
however, that punishment is to be justified in ethical 
society, or in the state, and not in the sphere of Abstract 
Right. The "truth" of punishment, like the "truth" of 
rights, will be finally revealed in the ethical life of the 
modem state, and for that reason the discussion of rights 
and annulment in Abstract Right is necessarily incomplete. 
However, the argument for the annulment of the crime in 
Abstract Right must remain at the centre of the argument
16See supra, note 9.
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for punishment in ethical society, it is incorporated not 
annulled.
Furthermore, wrong and its annulment plays a crucial role 
in the transition from the sphere of Abstract Right to the 
sphere of Morality, and this is important; the structure of 
The Philosophy of Right cannot be ignored in the analysis 
of the individual arguments contained therein. When 
considering Hegel's justification for the use of coercion, 
however, it is difficult to show each argument separately, 
so in what follows I shall jump between the spheres of 
Abstract Right and the State in an attempt to show how each 
argument is to be understood. I shall, at the end, 
however, consider Hegel's full account of punishment in the 
ethical state.
11. The "Objective Reason”: Punishment as the Annulment of 
Wrong
Three of the most acute commentators on Hegel's theory of 
punishment have all argued from Hegel' s charge that crime 
is null to a particular interpretation of Hegel's 
justification for a retributive form of punishment.17 In
17Cooper 1971; Stillman 1976? Nicholson 1982. There are differences 
between the accounts, noticeably in that Cooper places more emphasis 
on the idea of "right" than on its infringement - that is, on 
"crime". Nicholson is quite explicit in denying that his is an 
analysis of Hegel's theory of punishment, instead focusing on crime. 
Nonetheless, he suggests that his (excellent) analysis of crime 
supports Stillman's account of punishment, and, I take it, endorses 
that account. Despite some important disagreements, I think that 
they can be treated as variations on a single theme, and certainly 
Stillman pays tribute to Cooper as being "especially valuable" 
(Stillman 1976, 169), and Nicholson cites both Stillman and Cooper as
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brief, the argument is that crime is wrong and null, and 
must itself be annulled so that it is not held as right. 
This annulment becomes, in society, punishment. Trying to 
make sense of this requires, as noted above, that one first 
makes sense of the claim that crime is null.
The clearest passage in which Hegel makes the claim that 
crime is null is in the addition to §97 s
"Through a crime, something is altered, and the thing 
exists in this alteration; but this existence is the 
opposite of the thing itself, and is to that extent 
within itself null and void. The nullity is [the 
presumption] that right as right has been cancelled. For 
right, as an absolute, cannot be cancelled, so that the 
expression of crime is within itself null and void, and 
this nullity is the essence of the effect of crime.”
(S97A)
Hegel1s claim is clearly that crime denies the validity of 
right and this is incoherent, or inconsistent, and thus 
"null". But why, to return to the question asked at the 
end of the last section, should a specific crime be seen to 
attack the very foundation of right itself?
Hegel makes two claims, one is that when a criminal, say, 
steals property, he denies the property owner's status as a 
rights bearing person; that is, he treats his victim as a 
thing and denies the victim's "capacity for rights" (quoted 
above). The second claim is more general and is that the
amongst "the best accounts" (Nicholson 1982, 103) Particular details 
of their accounts and the differences between them follows below.
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criminal denies the existence of rights per se, in other 
words, not simply of the victim, but of everybody else 
(including himself).18
The first claim makes more sense once one recalls that, for 
Hegel, rights are not simply useful devices for regulating 
social conduct, but are claims that abstract will makes to 
embodiment in the world; that is, they are essential to 
human freedom. The argument is thus that should one 
challenge the right of an individual to property one 
challenges not only that claim to that property, but also 
the victim's claim to anything other than abstract 
freedom.19 One is, in Kantian terms, treating the other as 
a means and not as an end. This claim, furthermore, is 
inconsistent and this inconsistency marks the passage to 
Hegel's second argument, that the criminal denies the 
validity of rights as such. The inconsistency stems from 
the fact that the criminal as a rational being requires, as 
a necessary condition of his embodied freedom, the sphere 
of right. In Abstract Right all persons are identical,20 
and thus to deny the rights of one person is to deny the 
rights of all (including, of course, the person doing the 
denying), and thus, given the derivation of right from the
18See Knox's note 86 to §99 of his translation of The Philosophy of 
Right. (Hegel 1967, 331).
19See Nicholson 1982, 112.
20,,In terms of personality”, that is, in Abstract Right, "persons are 
equal". (§49R)
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necessary embodiment of the abstract, free, will, it is to 
deny the existence of right.21
Hegel's claim that crime is a "negatively infinite 
judgement" (§95, quoted above), makes this point clear. A 
negative infinite judgement is an assertion of total 
incongruity between subject and predicate, crime asserts 
incongruity of person and right and this is absurd; it is, 
in Tunick's memorable phrase, like saying "the rose is no 
elephant". To say,
"'your right to your property is no right' [indicates 
that] the criminal is so utterly ignorant of what a right 
is, flouts it to such an extreme, that he could not 
understand what it would mean to say something is not a 
right; he might just as well say 'your right is no 
elephant'".22
Of course, Tunick is forced to retreat slightly because the 
criminal cannot lack the understanding of what right is, 
because if he did so he would not be responsible,23 he 
merely "acts as if he lacked this understanding".24
21See Stillman 1976, 171.
22Tunick 1992a, 29.
23That Hegel thought this is clear in his wonderful (because one 
suspects entirely serious) note concerning "Christ's intercession on 
the Cross for his enemies: 'Father, forgive them, for they know not 
what they do'". This is, Hegel says, "a superfluous request if the
fact that they did not know what they were doing removed the quality 
of evil from their action so that it did not require forgiveness." 
(Note to §140) Michael Mitias has argued that because to commit a 
crime requires that one understand right, but crime is differentiated 
from fraud precisely by the denial of this understanding on the part 
of the criminal, Hegel has committed himself to the view that there 
can be no crime. (Mitias 1978).
24Tunick 1992a, 29.
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Hegel1 s argument thus far is a variation of a fairly 
standard universalist theme, which retains support through 
to contemporary political philosophy. That is, the 
argument that it is inconsistent to claim rights on the 
basis of something shared in common with others, and then 
to deny others rights claimed on the same shared feature. 
The Hegelian twist is that the rights are derived from the 
necessity for embodiment of abstract wills, rather than 
directly from claims of value inherent in such wills, and 
this means that the existence of such rights as actual is 
dependent upon their recognition by other independent 
individuals. Because the criminal's will, to be actual, 
depends upon the existence of rights, his apparent 
assertion that rights do not count (as it were), is, Hegel 
claims, inconsistent and incoherent. It is "null".
Hegel's next step is, in brief, to say that the criminal's 
denial of right must be countered; it, itself, must be 
annulled. From the "objective" perspective, the primacy of 
right must be restored. Before we ask why such annulment 
should take the form of punishment, however, there is a 
prior question not sufficiently identified in the theorists 
who follow Hegel's own steps; this is, why need the crime 
be annulled at all?
One interpretation that has been offered takes seriously 
Hegel's claim that without coercion right would be 
invalidated and wrong held to be right. Above, it was
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claimed that the criminal will was inconsistent because it 
denied the existence of rights which it, itself, must claim 
in order to be realised as actual. In less opaque terms, 
the criminal will is, by denying that its victim had 
rights, denying the rights of all, including itself, whilst 
at the same time it makes a claim to those rights. One 
interpretation of the claim that the criminal will must be 
annulled takes the idea that, if it is not, wrong will be 
held to be right to mean that this will be destructive of 
the system of rights.
The problem with such an account is that it is not the case 
that the criminal's mere assertion that right is invalid 
could possibly have such an effect, unless that assertion 
has some efficacy in the world. If I assert that the world 
is flat, I may be wrong and it may be irrational for me to 
do so if I am confronted with evidence, but that assertion 
in itself can have little impact on the world, or on my 
ability to get around it, unless I refuse to travel past a 
certain point, despite my needing to, because I think that 
I will fall into a great void. In other words, if the 
criminal will must be annulled because it negates the 
sphere of rights which it requires to be itself actualised, 
then Hegel must defend this claim that it does indeed 
negate the sphere of rights to the extent that the criminal 
(and all other), wills no longer have the capacity to be 
actualised as concrete free wills in the world. On this 
interpretation, Hegel is saying that the criminal will is 
self-destructive because it destroys the conditions
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necessary for its own freedom. This is simply false, one 
criminal act is extremely unlikely to destroy a system of 
rights.25 It may, as I have said, be inconsistent for the 
criminal to claim rights which he has just denied to an 
identical other, but it cannot be the case that the 
criminal will must be annulled for the weak, and doubtful, 
contingent reason that it has the destructive capacity to 
invalidate the sphere of rights.
The second interpretation, which is closely related to this 
argument, is a great deal more cogent. This holds that it 
is not simply the criminal1 s will that is destructive of 
the system of rights, but the criminal will if combined 
with the acceptance of that will by others. In other 
words, whilst the criminal will on its own could not 
destroy the system of rights, if that will is not renounced 
by others the combined effect is to destroy rights.26 This 
latter claim is presented as an empirical one, as when 
Stillman writes that:
"In general, even outside the Hegelian context, it 
holds that, when rights are not enforced and denials of 
them not refuted, the rights fall into disuse and 
disappear; rights thus must be enforced..."27
25See Wood 1990, 112.
26I do not see how this claim can be taken to amount to the idea that 
"if nobody declares [a criminal act to be] wrong it's not." (Tunick 
1992a, 80) If that were the case the necessity for public
renunciations of the criminal will would be obvious, however, it 
clearly is not the case. What makes an act wrong is that it is 
contrary to right, not that it is declared to be contrary to right.
27Stillman 1976, 172. This claim is repeated by Tunick: "if the
state fails persistently to punish crimes its citizens are likely no
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According to Hegel crime is null, the denial of right is an 
absurdity, however, this does not mean that crime has no 
external manifestation. As Hegel puts it,
"when an infringement of right as right occurs, it does 
have a positive external existence, but this existence 
within itself is null and void." (§97)
Its positive external existence is, of course, the crime 
itself; in the case of car theft, the criminal does in fact 
appropriate your car. The criminal acts as if28 the car 
owner has no rights, and by extension as if no-one has 
rights to anything. The essence of the theory of just 
coercion is, then, that punishment is the reiteration or 
restoring of right; it "annuls" the crime and in so doing 
restores right. That is why Hegel calls it the "negation 
of the negation" (§97A). The crux of Hegel's argument is 
presented in the following passages
"The positive existence of the injury consists solely in 
the particular will of the criminal. Thus, an injury to 
the latter as an existent will is the cancellation of the 
crime, which would otherwise be regarded as valid, and 
the restoration of right." (§99)
longer to regard crimes as wrongs". (Tunick 1992a, 35) Cooper (1971) 
also makes a similar claim, see below §12.
28The "as if” is important because it is extremely unusual for 
criminals to be "intellectual anarchists" who in fact deny the 
existence of rights. (Cooper 1971, 166) Most criminals are perfectly 
happy to admit that their victims have rights of ownership over their 
property. Tunick makes much the same point. (Tunick 1992a, 29) See 
supra, note 23.
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This argument alters the emphasis from the criminal will 
itself to the reaction to that will by others. Above, it 
was claimed that an individual criminal will, acting as if 
it denied the existence of rights, was unlikely to have any 
important consequences, other things being equal, to the 
system of rights; more explicitly the claim that it would 
destroy the system of rights was denied. But the argument 
for the necessity of cancelling the crime is slightly 
different; what is at its heart, is the claim, not that the 
criminal will itself can be destructive of the system of 
rights, but that the primacy of right must be restored. 
Two questions immediately need to be addressed: Why? And
how?
12. Cooper and the Logical Relationship of Rights and 
Punishment
Before proceeding to offer a suggestion as to how Hegel 
addressed these questions, I want to pause to consider one 
given by David Cooper.29 Cooper's account of Hegel's 
theory of punishment represents the clearest attempt to 
show the necessity of punishment in order to protect 
rights. His much respected article is a classic example of 
what Nicholson calls "the terminology of modern Oxford 
philosophy".30 Cooper explicitly denies that the theory of 
punishment can follow from the actions of the criminal 
being "inconsistent", and he also claims to find Hegel's
29Cooper 1971.
30Nicholson 1982, 114.
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charge that the criminal will is 1 self-destructive" 
unfathomable.31 It might thus appear odd to categorise 
him, as I have done, with Nicholson and Stillman who base 
their arguments on Hegel's idea of crime. However, 
Cooper's argument is essentially similar, in that he argues 
from the idea of rights to punishment.
Cooper moves from rights to punishment without an 
intervening consideration of wrong because he believes the 
relationship between rights and their protection to be a 
conceptual one. As my concern is to show both that Cooper's 
analysis is not Hegel's, and that it is flawed as an 
independent attempt to justify punishment, I shall examine 
his argument in detail beginning by quoting the argument at 
some length.
"Legal rights", writes Cooper, "are performatees", by which 
he means that "whether or not a person has the right to do 
x is logically dependent upon some rule or convention by 
reference to which such a right may be ascribed".32 
Furthermore:
"There is one very important question to ask if we are 
trying to decide whether persons have rights-.. The 
question is: what happens to those who try to prevent 
these persons from doing what they have a supposed right 
to do? If nothing happens to them - if no attempt is 
made to apprehend and punish them - there is very strong
31Cooper 1971, 160-1.
32Cooper 1971, 162.
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reason to suppose that the persons had no such right at 
all."33
Cooper both strengthens and weakens this claim during the 
course of the article; strengthens, in that the "very 
strong reason" becomes (without further argument), a 
"logical" connection between rights and punishment;34 but 
he then weakens the claim, applying it not to rights per 
se, but "felicitous" rights.35 The closest he comes to 
defining "felicitous" is by arguing that "one way in which 
a performance may be infelicitous...is if certain subsequent 
behaviour does not take place".36 The example he gives is 
of the giving and then taking back a gift, but it is clear 
that punishment is going to justified through a similar 
mechanism. Crudely, the "subsequent behaviour" which makes 
one's rights felicitous, is punishment for anyone 
attempting to frustrate an individual in the using of their 
rights. Thus Cooper claims:
"Unless other people are generally apprehended and 
punished for preventing others doing x, there is reason 
to suppose that the latter do not have the right to do x 
- certainly not a 'felicitous' right- [thus]- the 
justification of punishment is very simple. It is the 
same as the justification of the rights which crimes 
violate. If it is important that men have legal rights,
33Cooper 1971, 162.
34Cooper 1971, 162.
35The two moves are obviously related. As I point out below, Cooper 
makes the relation between "felicitous" rights and punishment
tautologous.
36Cooper 1971, 161-2.
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it is important that there be punishment - for without 
the latter, there could not, logically, be the former".37 
In brief, "punishment must logically follow crime if we are 
to speak of there being rights and crimes at all".38
Cooper's argument can be addressed from two perspectives, 
that of whether it succeeds as exegesis, and of whether it 
is plausible as an independent argument. Beginning with 
the latter criterion, a number of points are immediately 
apparent. The first is that Cooper's argument, once the 
element of "felicity" is introduced, is circular. A 
felicitous right is one which exists both formally and 
commands certain subsequent action. Cooper does no more 
than assert that to possess felicitous legal rights is to 
possess rights which command "the attempt to apprehend and 
punish" anyone who acts so as to frustrate the rights 
holder in the exercise of his rights. If we follow Wood 
and replace the slightly ridiculous term "felicitous" with 
"socially guaranteed", the tautologous nature of Cooper's 
claim becomes obvious; the existence of socially guaranteed 
rights depends upon their being socially guaranteed.39
The second point, is that even if Cooper's argument were to 
work, it does not advance us very far. In essence we would 
be left with the claim that to possess a legal right, is to 
possess a right which has as a component part the
37Cooper 1971, 162-3.
38Cooper 1971, 163.
39See Wood 1990, 111.
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stipulation that the guarantor of that right will act (or 
attempt to act), so as to guarantee the legitimate use of 
it. This is quite obviously the case40 (whatever the 
relation between such rights and their enforcement), all it 
does is beg the question of why such rights exist and how 
do we justify enshrining them in law. The question, "what 
is the justification for punishment?" may very well be (and 
I believe it is), best answered by asking the question 
"what is the justification for having rules the 
contravention of which render the contravenor liable to 
harm imposed by the state?",41 but just stating that this 
happens does not get us very far. Of course, Cooper might 
claim that he has reduced the question to "what is the 
justification for rights", and this furthers the argument 
because Hegel (and possibly contemporary political 
philosophy), has a (more) plausible account of rights, but 
Cooper is not entitled to this on two counts. First, he 
has not reduced the question to one of rights, but to one 
of "felicitous" rights which are not, despite his 
occasional equivocation, simply rights, but are, rather, 
rights which carry a legal and social guarantor. Second, 
he has not shown that punishment is the only mechanism 
through which such rights could be guaranteed.
40Maurice Cranston makes Cooper's point in far fewer and more elegant 
words when he writes "to say that I have a [legal] right [to various 
things] ~ is to say that I live under a government which allows me to 
do these things, and will come to my aid if anyone tries to stop me. 
_ A positive right is necessarily enforceable; if it is not enforced,
it cannot be a positive right." (Cranston, 1973, 4-5)
41See supra, Introduction.
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But, if Cooper has done nothing to address the question of 
why the law guarantees certain rights through punishment, 
he has, it seems to me, done even less to further our 
understanding of Hegel. As Alan Wood has pointed out, 
there is simply an absence of textual evidence; Cooper's 
conceptual link between right and punishment is not to be 
found anywhere in Hegel.42 Cooper constantly makes 
reference to Hegel' s text and claims that his account is 
the only plausible framework within which Hegel's darker 
passages can be understood, but nowhere does he actually 
find a defence of his primary claim.
This is, however, not as serious as the second charge which 
can be brought against Cooper's interpretation of Hegel. 
Cooper, in support of his argument that legal rights 
require enforcement if they are, in some sense, to be real, 
cites the example of Jews in Nazi Germany prior to their 
rights being formally abolished. Presuming that the Nazi 
authorities did nothing to enforce the rights of Jews, 
Cooper makes the claim that therefore the Jews did not 
possess felicitous rights.43 As we have seen this is 
tautologically true, the question is, is this all that can 
be said about rights? Of course, it is entirely plausible 
that rights (understood as performatees - that is as part 
of a rule or convention governed practice), depend upon 
enforcement. Consider the case of a game of cricket; if 
the umpire consistently refused to allow the batsman to run
42wood 1990, ill.
43Cooper 1971, 163.
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when he struck the ball, the batsman would begin to 
question whether he had the right to run under the laws of 
cricket, or whether he was still playing cricket. But 
there is certainly another sense of rights that is commonly 
invoked in both philosophical and ordinary discourses. In 
this sense the Jews could have complained after the 
Nuremberg edicts abolished even their formal rights that 
such edicts infringed their "human rights". For Cooper, 
once the formal rights of the Jews had been abolished there 
was no question - they certainly no longer possessed 
felicitous or any legal rights, and this is again 
tautologously true. But if this is all there is to rights 
discourse then a great number of claims, including those of 
the declaration of the rights of man, are going to have to 
be amended.
Of course, Cooper's defence here is that I am committing a 
simple philosophical confusion, that is, between legal and 
some idea of universal rights (an idea which is possibly 
nonsensical). Cooper, remember, began his defence of Hegel 
by claiming that legal rights were performatees and 
everything follows from this. But this is especially 
bizarre when defending a Hegelian interpretation of rights, 
and furthermore, one located in the sphere of Abstract 
Right. Legal rights just are not the issue. The annulment 
of wrong - indeed wrong itself - is an infringement of 
right, and the last thing that right is for Hegel,
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especially at this stage of the argument, is dependent on 
"some rule or convention".44
Given that Cooper1 s contention that the idea of rights 
conceptually requires punishment for violators of rights is 
unsustainable, what other account can be given of the 
initial Hegelian claim that wrong calls forth its own 
annulment so that right might be restored?
13. The Objective Reason Reconsidered
The key objective reason for the annulling of the criminal 
will is that right must be restored and the nullity of the 
criminal will made manifest. It is important to note that 
punishment is addressed to the criminal will, and not to 
society or the positive act of the criminal.45 I have 
argued above that it is difficult to know quite how to 
conceive of the claim that the criminal will threatens the 
system of right, unless we endorse an empirical assertion 
that if the system is not validated then it will be 
endangered. In the sphere of Abstract Right the negative 
command to respect the freedom of others creates a system 
of (purely negative and incomplete), rights which the
44Cooper 1971, 162. This criticism is aimed merely at the claim that 
rights, for Hegel, are performatees. It could, therefore, be 
accepted by commentators on Hegel who take a different view of the 
status of rights in Hegel's philosophy (itself a controversial 
issue), from me; just so long, of course, as they do not endorse 
Cooper’s claim. For a good introduction to the debate on the status 
of rights in Hegel see Smith 1989.
^Although obviously it is necessary that the positive act be undone, 
and compensation provided.
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criminal will violates. This system, so the argument goes, 
must be held to be valid, and thus the criminal will 
negated. Thus, for example, Stillman argues that,
"with the injury of the particular will of the criminal, 
the positive existence of the crime no longer exists, the 
infringement of right is annulled, and right is restored. 
Conceptually, crime is nothing at all; with the annulment 
of crime in the objective world, crimes nullity is 
manifest. Criminals are punished in order to ratify in 
the objective world the truth within the conceptual 
worlds that crime is null."46 
But, even if we accept the necessity of publicly annulling 
the criminal will, that is of publicly denying that such a 
will is valid, does it follow that coercion is the best way 
to achieve such an end? Why could society not simply 
condemn the offender and his actions (combined with 
demanding compensation, as in civil wrong)?47 Such an 
expressivist response would satisfy the demand that the 
criminal will be publicly denied as valid, and the 
compensation element would negate the positive existence of 
the crime, that is, it would restore the situation to that 
which existed before the criminal act. Of course the 
compensation would have a coercive element - the offender 
must compensate the victim - but this coercion is not at 
the heart of the justification for punishment. Rather, the 
justification for punishment is the expression of the
46Stillman 1971, 172.
47For an interesting account of expressivist punishment, which has 
become standard, see Feinberg 1965. For an Hegelian account of 
punishment based solely on restitution see Day 1978.
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invalid nature of the criminal will, the compensation is 
merely an additional requirement. Yet, Hegel argues for a 
retributive theory of punishment and one that goes well 
beyond mere condemnation.
An expressivist interpretation of Stillman's argument is 
reinforced if one shifts from coercion to law and 
punishment. Consider a society in which petty burglary is 
largely unreported and, even when it is reported, the clear 
up rate for such crimes is extremely low. In short, 
punishment for petty burglary is proportionally very rare. 
Does this challenge a Stillman Hegelian? The answer surely 
is no, I take it that a defender of Stillman's thesis would 
argue that the fact that petty burglary is not often 
accompanied by punishment is less significant than the fact 
that the society has a law against burglary which condemns 
convicted burglars. The fact that there are few convicted 
burglars is neither here nor there, what matters is the 
expressivist content of the law.48
48lt is often taken to be the case that legislators should not allow 
the law to enshrine unenforceable rules, on the grounds that it 
brings the law into disrepute. That is why, for example, one might 
argue that the British law which makes it a criminal offence for a 
man to sodomise a woman in private (even if the act is consensual) 
ought to be repealed. It would be bizarre, however, to argue that 
one has the right consensually to sodomise one's female partner 
because of the absence of any convictions and punishments for those 
who engage in this act with the consent of their partners. If one 
did want to argue that this law was now "dead" the absence of 
punishments would surely be merely epiphenomenal - the important 
point would be that nobody had invoked this law (at least not in 
consensual circumstances) in the moral and legal discourse for many 
years. In other words, as I shall argue below, it would be the 
expressivist element of the law that would be more likely to ground 
one's argument, not the absence of criminal proceedings and 
punishments.
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14. The Subjective Reason: Punishment as the Right of 
the Offender
Hegel, as we have seen also appeals to a second, 
subjective, reason for the necessity of annulling the 
criminal will. This is that it is the right of the 
criminal:
"The injury which is inflicted on the criminal is not 
only just in itself (and since it is just, it is at the 
same time his will as it is in itself, an existence of 
his freedom, his right); it is also a right for the 
criminal himself. . (§100)
What sense can be made of this rather extraordinary 
"right"? As Ted Honderich has argued it is a very odd 
right when it is not in the power of the right holder to 
renounce the entitlement conferred by the right.49
The first, and most important, element of the subjective 
account of punishment is not, in fact, to be found in the 
claim that the criminal has a right to his punishment, but, 
rather, in the secondary claim that the criminal wills (or 
consents to), his own punishment. Clearly the consent of 
the criminal is not explicit, but Hegel argues, the 
criminal’s implicit will is in accordance with the justice 
of his punishment. Thus the passage quoted immediately 
above continues,
49"A right that cannot be escaped is an odd right." (Honderich 1984, 
47).
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that is, a right posited in his existent will, in his 
action. For it is implicit in his action, as that of a 
rational being, that it is universal in character, and 
that, by performing it, he has set up a law which he has 
recognised for himself in his action, and under which he 
may therefore be subsumed as under his right." (§100)50
Mark Tunick has attempted to make sense of these claims by 
invoking the idea of split-level self.51 Translating this 
into the language of contemporary theories of autonomy, the 
essential claim is that the criminal will is wanton in the 
technical sense of that term adopted by Harry Frankfurt.52 
In short, the criminal's real will is in accordance with 
the universal - it is a rational will - the criminal1 s 
actions are thus not his (in the sense that they are not 
what we might now call autonomous), although, other things 
being equal, the criminal is still responsible for his 
wanton actions. The criminal's actions are not in 
accordance with his second order desires, and his second 
order desires are a truer reflection of him, because he is 
a rational being participating in the universal will.53 In 
this sense the criminal is, according to Tunick,
50Stillman sums up the nature of Hegel's argument in the claim that 
the criminal "implicitly consents to the punishment and sees it as 
just" (Stillman 1976, 174).
51Tunick 1992a, S2.2.
52 See Frankfurt 1971.
53Tunick is right in saying that this is very similar to Rousseau's 
idea that a particular will can be coerced into acting in accordance 
with the universal (general) will because to do so is not to infringe 
upon the freedom of the particular will but rather to "force it to be 
free".
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"like the smoker who knows that smoking is bad, and who 
wants very badly to quit, but who nevertheless continues 
to smoke and enjoys doing so. This smoker's de facto 
will is to smoke, but his real will is not to smoke".54 
In the contemporary literature an account such as this 
would suffer from allegations that it relies on an 
intuition about second order desires being closer to the 
individual's "true self", or on unsustainable claims about 
rationality, or that it fails because it opens an infinite 
regress, or, finally, because it is incomplete.55
In Abstract Right, Hegel faces no such problems as the 
universal will is present; and right, which is the form of 
the universal will, commands a negative sphere of respect 
for the property and personhood of others. The question at 
issue is, rather, why annul the irrational will - or, why 
does the irrational will demand to be cancelled? Tunick 
sums it up as follows, "if the criminal's real will is not 
to commit the crime, then it follows, Hegel argues, that 
the criminal wills his own punishment".56 Since it is not 
at all self-evident that any such thing follows this is the 
claim that must be explicated. The first answer is the 
objective one; because otherwise right would not be 
restored. That has been considered above, what we are 
concerned with here is the subjective reason for
54Tunick 1992a, 30.
55Anyone wishing to follow up on the autonomy literature referred to
here can do no better than by beginning with the Introduction to 
Christman 1989, and the articles contained therein.
56Tunick 1992a, 30.
92
punishment. There is little doubt that the form of Hegel's 
subjective argument is Kantian - punishment supposedly 
treats the criminal's will as if it were rational by 
universalising it, by holding it as valid, and allowing it 
to return, or rebound, on the offender.57 It thus treats 
him as a free being.58
15. Hegel and Kant
On such an interpretation Hegel's view is very similar in 
form to the Kantian argument I examined above. Consider 
the following two passages:
"Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon 
another within the people, that you inflict upon 
yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you 
steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike 
him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill 
yourself.1,59
"If you rob someone, you rob yourself; if you kill 
someone, you kill yourself; the perpetrator may be 
subsumed under the manner of treatment he established."60
I have argued that on a Kantian interpretation the criminal 
wills a criminal act and is supposed thereby to make the
57see S7.
58See S99A.
59Kant 1797, 141.
60Hegel 1970, 244. Quoted in Tunick 1992a, 31; and Wood 1990, 113.
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same act permissible when it is employed against him. In 
Kantian terms, the criminal acts according to a maxim which 
rebounds upon him.61 This is the interpretation given to 
Hegel's theory by Alan Wood,
"when I commit a crime, I set up a law making it
permissible for others to violate my right to the same
extent that my crime violates the right of its victim".62 
But as Wood admits, this theory is incomplete, it merely 
makes it permissible for the criminal to be punished, not 
obligatory.63 Indeed, it is not at all clear why the 
existence of the irrational will should be regarded as 
establishing a right for others to punish the possessor of 
that will. The standard Kantian move here is to say that
we are obliged to respect the criminal will as if it were a
rational will and thus reapply that will to the criminal in 
the form of punishment, but we have seen that this is a 
very difficult claim to understand.
Fortunately, although it is very similar, this is not 
Hegel's argument, although at times his writing about 
respecting the criminal (especially when he is concerned 
with condemning utilitarian justifications for punishment), 
suggests otherwise.64 To understand the relationship
61See S7.
62Wood 1990, 114. Cf. Hegel: "For it is implicit in his action, as 
that of a rational being, that it is universal in character, and 
that, by performing it, he has set up a law which he has recognised 
for himself in his action, and under which he may therefore be 
subsumed as under his right." (§100)
63Again, see §7.
64See, e.g., §99A.
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between the crime committed by the particular will and the 
subjective reason for annulling that will, it is vital that 
one appreciate the role of that annulment in the transition 
of the particular will from the sphere of Abstract Right to 
Morality. The particular will, through its annulment, is 
brought back to the universal will - like Tunick' s smoker 
who in being denied cigarettes is forced to live in 
accordance with his "real" desires. But, unlike Tunick's 
smoker, this deepens the moral nature of the particular 
will; in being "forced to be free" the particular will 
makes the transition from the sphere of Abstract Right to a 
deeper understanding of itself in Morality,
In the transition from Right to Morality, Hegel says that 
the will
"-.first posits itself in the opposition between the 
universal will which has being in itself and the 
individual will which has being for itself; then, by 
superseding this opposition - the negation of the 
negation - it determines itself as will in its existence, 
so that it is not only a free will in itself, but also 
for itself, as self-related negativity. Thus it now has 
its personality - and in abstract right the will is no 
more than personality - as its object; the infinite 
subjectivity of freedom, which now has being for itself, 
constitutes the principle of the moral point of view."
(§104)
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Hegel claims, in other words, that in Abstract Right the 
will has an immediate relation to its content. That is the 
absolutely free will is contentless, it is unconstrained by 
any particular embodiment; in Abstract Right the will 
arbitrarily embodies itself in a content, (that is in 
desires, personhood and property), that is unmediated by 
Right. The will simply claims a content, which it 
identifies as itself. Given this, the will is capable of 
wrong - of claiming a content that rightfully belongs to 
another - and, in the annulment of such a wrong will, the 
abstract will must come to understand its actions as wrong, 
and thus come to realise the necessity of the mediating 
role of Right, and, thus, of the universal in its 
fulfilment as free. In other words, the will must come to 
understand itself as a self-determining will, that is, it 
must realise that it is free only insofar as its content - 
what it wills - is adequate to the idea of its freedom. It 
is coming to its understanding as self-determining (in 
accordance with Right), rather than merely as determined by 
its capricious desires:
"The immediacy which is superseded in crime thus leads, 
through punishment - that is, through the nullity of this 
nullity - to affirmation, i.e. to morality." (§104A)
The crucial claim is that it is coercion that makes this 
realisation possible, the particular will must be brought 
back to the universal and Hegel' s claim is that this is 
achieved through coercion; a coercion made permissible 
because it is implicit in the action of the criminal will
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as an inconsistent and irrational will. It is difficult to 
see what underlies this claim, as David Cooper puts it,
"no doubt inconsistent behaviour should be brought to the 
attention of the agent - this might be the job of a 
psychoanalyst - but I do not see how inconsistency per se 
merits punishment."65 
Cooper’s remark comes under attack in Peter Stillman's 
account where he asserts that
"Cooper ignores the universality of the person and of the 
rights of persons, the 'equality (identity) of men in 
terms of personality.' (Hoffmeister, 333.66); identity 
means that what is true for one person is true for all." 
Stillman adds, gleefully, that "since there are no 
intentions nor morality nor society, there are no 
psychoanalysts in 'Abstract Right.'".67 Of course there 
are no psychoanalysts in Abstract Right, however, it seems 
unlikely that Cooper was suggesting that there were; as 
with Hegel we can, I think, treat Cooper's aside as a 
remark which does not have to be strictly taken to apply 
only to Abstract Right. In fact, Cooper's case seems a 
little more damaging than Stillman allows, for if there is 
no justification for coercion in Abstract Right, then, once
65Cooper 1971, 160-1.
66This reference is to Hegel's marginal notes, published in 
Hoffmeister's edition of The Philosophy of Right, the number being
that of the page, not the section. (Hegel 1955)
67Stillman 1976, 171.
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society is established, the annulment of the crime may take 
the form of moral education or psychiatric help,68
Stillman's substantive point that coercion is justified 
because all are identical in Abstract Right is perhaps less 
funny than his comment on psychoanalysts, but is also 
considerably less perspicuous. The identity of persons has 
been taken into account above and yet no relation between 
the criminal will and coercion has so far bekn forthcoming, 
either for objective or subjective reasons. If the purpose 
of punishment viewed subjectively is to deepen the 
understanding of the particular will then the intuition 
lying behind Cooper's claim that this is likely to be 
achieved by something other than coercion holds. But more 
than this, even if it were true that coercion is the best 
method of correcting the will this would be a purely 
contingent truth, it just may be that certain particular 
wills respond differently to moral education, denunciation 
or coercion.
In short, the subjective reason for the annulment of the 
particular will is that the will must be corrected - it 
must be forced back to the universal; but neither this 
correction nor this forcing is identical to, nor perhaps
68lndeed, Jean Hampton in her excellent "The Moral Education Theory 
of Punishment" suggests that Hegel is best read as a believer in 
punishment as moral education. (Hampton 1984) J. McTaggart also, or 
so it seems to me, suggests that this is the best way to read Hegel 
see McTaggart 1896. Tunick writes that "_we might see punishment as 
a sign of affection, the community's expression of concern for the 
criminal's own well being." (Tunick 1992a, 88) He fails to see, 
however, that there may be an alternative to coercion implicit in 
such a view.
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best served by, coercion. To think that it necessarily is, 
is to confuse correction (in which education may be 
coercive), and coercion. (in which coercion is used to 
educate).
So far my discussion has centred on the annulment of the 
criminal will in Abstract Right, however, before concluding 
that Hegel fails to justify the coercive form of this 
annulment on either objective or subjective grounds, I want 
to move the argument forward to punishment and the State. 
This is clearly vital if we are to consider punishment in 
its final, true, form.
16. Punishment. Sittlichkeit and the State
The arguments from Abstract Right transfer to, and are 
completed in, the ethical realm of the State, and they thus 
suffer from the same flaws as in Abstract Right. The 
annulment of the criminal will becomes, in the modern 
state, punishment. The ethical community is to be 
understood as the form taken by a self-conscious and self- 
determining ethical whole. Further, as the ethical 
community shapes and moulds our ethical nature, so it is 
that in breaking the rules of the community we break our 
own rules. In other words the ethical community is that 
through which our own rational natures become fully actual, 
but at the same time as our own development as rational 
beings is dependent upon the ethical community, so the
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continued existence of the community is dependent upon our 
participation within it.
The self-actualisation of the ethical whole - that is the 
pursuit of its good - is expressed through its positive 
law; the legal system of rights which is denied by the 
criminal will. As in the sphere of Abstract Right, the 
primacy of the right - now expressed in law - must be 
asserted and the crime must be annulled. Likewise the 
criminal must be brought to see that his act is self­
destructive, in that in acting against the rules of the 
community he frustrates his own real will, as it is 
expressed in those rules. As Hegel puts it:
"We must accept that the absolute will of the criminal 
also is that he be punished. Insofar as he is to be 
punished, the demand is present that he understands that 
it is just that he be punished, and though he understands 
he can of course wish that he be liberated from 
punishment as from external suffering; but insofar as he 
admits that it is just that he be punished, his universal 
will is in agreement with the punishment."69
The argument is, briefly, as follows. In Hegel's 
philosophy we come to freedom, to full actualisation, when 
we comprehend the institutions and practices of the modern 
state as necessary, and as such, as in accordance with our 
own will. As Alan Wood puts it,
69Hegel 1970, 225. Quoted in Tunick 1992a, 30.
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"freedom is actual, therefore, only in a rational society 
whose institutions can be felt and known as rational by 
individuals who are 'with themselves' in those 
institutions"•70
It is in this sense that Hegel can be summed up in the 
aphorism, "I am at home in the world when I know it, still 
more so when I have understood it". Punishment is a 
necessary practice of the rational state and thus is in 
accordance with our own, universal will. The agent, as a 
member of the ethical community implicitly wills the 
practices of that community and thus wills his own 
punishment, a punishment that, furthermore, when inflicted 
restores him to that community and to his real will, from 
both of which his criminal action had alienated him. He is 
thus bought back to freedom, understood as living in 
accordance with his real will.
This is why Hegel applauds the ancient Athenian practice of 
demanding that the accused, once found guilty, should then 
participate in his own sentencing by proposing a just 
punishment,71 and why he argues in The Philosophy of Right 
for trial by jury.72 The argument is that whilst it is 
most desirable that the criminal confess, because "only 
when the criminal confesses does the judgement no longer 
contain anything alien to him" (§227A), the criminal may
70Wood 1991, xii.
71See Hegel 1974, Volume I, 440-441.
72S227A. It should be noted that trial by jury was not, by any 
means, universal at the time, and this makes Hegel something of a 
reformer in the modern sense.
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refuse to do so. In this case it is not satisfactory for 
the judge to be the final arbiter because this introduces 
too great an element of subjectivity - in this sense it 
would resemble revenge (carried out by a third person)73 - 
rather, the judgement must emanate from the criminal 
herself, and if she refuses then from a representation of 
the criminal conceived as part of the ethical community, 
that is, from a jury made up of members of that community: 
"If-the subjective conviction of the judge is to prevail, 
an element of harshness is again introduced, for the 
person in question is no longer treated as a free 
individual. The mediation [between confession and the 
judge] is the requirement that the verdict of guilt or 
innocence should emanate from the soul of the criminal - 
as in trial by jury.” (S227A)
Again the parallel with Abstract Right is apparent, as is 
the worry that nothing in this justifies coercion. The 
idea is that the criminal in being tried and punished 
realises that her deed was wrong, and that as an action 
against the ethical community it was also against herself, 
and her freedom. Punishment is supposed somehow to 
reinforce this realisation, to bring forth a sincere 
confession and a correction of the criminal will.74 
However, this is a realisation that might better be
73See §§101-102.
74It is interesting to compare this with Michel Foucault's claim that 
the judge, when asking whether the criminal has anything to say 
before he passes sentence, is asking for the criminal's confession so 
that he (the judge) may feel legitimised; in other words, it is a 
favour done by the criminal for the judge so that the latter may be 
reconciled to his use of coercion against another without, as 
Nietzsche put it, "even emotion to excuse [him]". Nietzsche 1967, 67.
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accomplished through the use of moral education not 
coercion, and again, even if coercion were the best method 
in some cases, this would be merely an empirical truth.
Of course, in the final argument - that is in the modern 
State - it is necessary to unite the two positions - that 
is subjective and objective. However, such an argument is 
in danger of collapsing the subjective into the objective. 
The argument would be this; not only does the punishment of 
the criminal reveal to the criminal the nullity of his 
will, but it is also in accordance with his universal will. 
That is the criminal as part of the ethical community wills 
the structures and institutions of that community, and one 
of those structures is coercive punishment. In other 
words, if the objective reason for punishing was such that 
the institution of punishing was shown successfully to be 
part of the necessary - that is rational - structures of 
the State, then the criminal as part of the State would, 
conceived as a rational being, consent to his punishment. 
This, however, depends upon coercive punishment being a 
necessary feature of the State, and I have shown above that 
Hegel cannot achieve this; rather, what is left is a 
powerful argument for the expressivist view of law and 
punishment, combined with a claim to the moral education of 
the offender.
In neither the work of Kant nor Hegel, then, have we been 
able to find a justification for the core of retributivism, 
the idea that the guilty deserve to suffer, and that this
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is what justifies the practice of punishment. This despite 
their calling upon three of the most powerful retributivist 
arguments, that the act of the offender rebounds upon her, 
that punishment is somehow entailed by the idea of rights, 
and that the offender wills her own punishment. However, I 
have not completed my analysis of retributivism. In the 
next Chapter I shall turn to consequentialism, first as a 
complete account of punishment and then as a general 
justifying aim which can be constrained by retributivist 
principles. In so doing, I shall consider what many take 
to be retributivism1s real contribution to the punishment 
debate, its role as a side-constraint on consequentialism. 
In Chapter 4, I will consider one further retributive 
argument, derived from the principle of fair play, as part 
of an analysis of the role of theories of justice in 
justifying punishment.
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Chapter 3: Consequentialist 
Justifications of Punishment
"All punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is 
evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all 
to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as 
it promises to exclude some greater evil."
Jeremy Bentham 1789, Chapter 13, SI, 2.
17. Consequentialisms
Consequentialism has had a hard time of it recently. Once 
philosophically dominant, it was still taken to be the 
theory to beat in Rawls1 s A Theory of Justice, yet now the 
philosophical opposition to liberalism is more likely to be 
made up of post-modernists of various descriptions, 
feminists, and communitarians.1 In this change, the sub­
field of the study of punishment acted as something of a 
harbinger; whilst in the post war years consequentialist 
justifications of punishment of one sort or another 
dominated, there is little doubt that, as Antony Duff puts 
it, "the 1970's saw a growing revolt against this 
consequentialist orthodoxy".2 This revolt was not simply a 
philosophical one, indeed, it was most notable not in 
academic journals but in political and judicial debates 
over sentencing policy. Put simply, there was a move away 
from indeterminate to relatively fixed sentences.
1,1 In Anglo-American philosophy, the prevailing way of looking at 
morality used to be consequentialist, with some qualms about lying,
breaking promises or killing innocent people in a good cause. It has 
now shifted towards absolutism, with residual doubts about 
catastrophic consequences." (Barry 1979, in Barry 1991b, 67-8).
2Duff 1993, xii.
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In this Chapter I intend to examine various 
consequentialist justifications of punishment. I shall 
argue, first, that in its traditional form, 
consequentialism cannot include a respect for rights, or 
more generally, for the special claims of individuals which 
underlie our intuitions about justice (and inform our idea 
of rights). I shall then go on to examine a number of 
arguments which purport to show how such claims can be 
accommodated in a consequentialist theory.
At the heart of consequentialism is the argument that 
punishment is to be justified only by reference to its good 
consequences, if it did not yield a net gain in whatever 
measure the particular consequentialist endorses, 
punishment would not be justified. The retributivist 
punishes, let us say, because to do so is morally required 
by the offending act, he may check after punishing that he 
has correctly performed the task, but he does not justify 
his punishing the offender by anything other than the 
relationship between the past act and morally deserved 
punishment. In contrast, a consequentialist punishes 
because it has good consequences, and, there is a net 
benefit (in terms of the measure the particular 
consequentialist endorses), compared with not punishing. 
Punishment is justified by reference to the benefits it 
yields, usually in terms of the benefits of preventing or 
reducing the incidence of crime.3
3For a standard account of this sort see Benn 1958. For a modern, 
'unreconstructed' consequentialist account of punishment see Walker 
1991.
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The usual, philosophical, approach to consequentialism 
(and, specifically, utilitarianism), is to distinguish 
between "act" and "rule". J. J. C. Smart contrasts them 
thus:
"Act-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is to be judged by the 
consequences, good or bad, of the action itself. Rule- 
utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness or 
badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone 
should perform the action in like circumstances."4 
Although this distinction has become standard in 
discussions of utilitarianism it seems to me to be of only 
limited use when applied to society rather than individual 
actions. This is because no society could possibly operate 
on an act-utilitarian level, that is without rules. The 
maintenance of a society needs more predictability than 
could be achieved if it were founded on an act-utilitarian 
theory. Where this distinction is of use is when 
considering the nature of the rules and the morality of 
rule following. This is because, even if a system of rules 
is necessary, there is always the question of whether, in a 
particular instance, it would be better to break the rule; 
that is, the question of whether act-utilitarian 
considerations can take precedence even given the existence 
of a system of rules that are supposed to be action 
guiding. I shall assume that an act-utilitarian theory
4Smart and Williams 1973, 9.
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applied to a society answers this question affirmatively, 
i.e., although the society has action guiding rules, it is 
morally obligatory to break a rule if doing so in that 
instance will yield a net increase in utility compared with 
keeping to the rules, taking into account the effect on 
rule following of breaking the rule in that instance. Let 
us, then, begin with this sort of theory as our subject.
18. Consequentialism, The Locus of Value and Punishment
Even given the plausible assumption made above that all 
societies need to have some systems - some rules - even if 
they can be broken when consequentially justified, (in the 
most consequentialist society perhaps they would be more 
like routines than rules), we can still ask whether a 
thorough going consequentialist society would have anything 
that looks enough like a system of criminal law and 
criminal sanctions to make asking the question of whether a 
consequentialist justification of punishment can be found, 
meaningful. I shall deal below with whether inflictions of 
"special treatment" justified by consequentialism count as 
punishments, here I want to ask whether a consequentialist 
society would generate anything remotely resembling the 
whole "penality"5 system.
5The term is borrowed from David Garland; "Penality _ refer[s] to 
the complex of laws, processes, discourses, and institutions which 
are involved in _ the whole process of criminalizing and penalizing”. 
Garland 1990, 10.
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The first point of divergence between our ideas and 
practices and the system that might emerge in a 
consequentialist society, would be that if the consequences 
that count are the reduction of certain anti-social acts, 
the past act of the offender would play little role in 
determining which individuals should receive special 
treatment and what that special treatment should be. If 
the point is to deter the offender from committing a 
similar act again, the important thing will be the 
particular psychological makeup of the person; if the 
purpose is to rehabilitate the offender, the same thing 
applies; and if the purpose is to deter others, the special 
treatment will be determined by certain empirical 
conditions in the society. Offenders convicted of similar 
offences, then, might - and probably would - receive very 
different treatment.
However, there is no reason to assume that special 
treatment will be confined to offenders, it might be the 
case that a criminal act alerts the society to the 
existence of a potential new offender6 but there is no 
reason to assume that this is the only, or even the best, 
way of identifying such people. Duff has suggested that a 
consequentialist society may instead opt for "Adult 
Panels11, tribunals that "would deal with anyone alleged to 
be in need of ... special treatment, whatever the grounds for
6By "new offenders" I do not mean people who have not offended but 
people who might offend again. They are, of course, by virtue of 
having committed a past criminal act also "old offenders" but this 
would not be relevant to a consequentialist society except, as I say, 
as one indicator of potential behaviour.
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that allegation".7 Such "diagnostic tribunals" may 
resemble criminal trials in presuming innocence and 
granting a right to be heard, not because these things are 
grounded in an account of justice, but because they are 
likely to reduce disutility through subjecting the wrong 
people to special treatment. On the other hand, in 
different - less stable - conditions, both of these 
procedures might be foregone and, indeed, a presumption of 
guilt might be required.8
This idea, that determining who should be the subject of 
what special treatment is a matter of diagnosing those who 
are dangerous or useful (in terms of being made an example 
of and deterring others), rather than discovering the guilt 
or otherwise of the individual for an offence, is part of a 
family of problems that is attached to any act-utilitarian 
theory. Other examples are well known and documented.9 
The core of the problem, in essence, is that in such a 
theory value is identity independent, (what matters is 
states of affairs), rather than identity specific, (that is 
attached to individuals), and this is the basis for Rawls's 
charge that "utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
distinction between persons".10
7Duff 1986, 104. See also 102-106; 164-72.
8See Duff 1986, 102-106.
9See, amongst many other things, Williams' contribution to Smart and
Williams 1973.
10Rawls 1971, 27.
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Punishment is one of the standard practices from which 
examples are drawn to demonstrate this, (and it is, 
therefore, one of the clearest precedents for what I shall 
try to do in the rest of this thesis, that is, use 
punishment as a concrete practice through which to examine 
accounts of justice). The examples are not so much well 
worn as exhausted and I shall spend little time elucidating 
them. In addition to the problems noted above concerning 
the distribution and nature of special treatment, a fully 
consequentialist society of the type I have been discussing 
could, for example, sanction the punishment of an innocent 
person, that is, an innocent could be tried, convicted, and 
punished with the full complicity of the authorities 
because there is greater benefit realised through his 
punishment than the loss of benefit felt by him and those 
who care about him.11 Second, it might be morally 
obligatory for a judge to sentence a convicted criminal to
1:LThis example is used in a great many discussions of both 
utilitarianism and punishment. If its philosophical fame can be 
attributed to anyone, it is, perhaps, H. McCloskey 1968. It has been 
objected that such "fantastic examples" do not aid moral argument, 
(see Anscombe 1957; Hare 1981, especially Chapters 1-3, 8-9; Sprigge 
1968; and the reply to these by Ten 1987, 18-32), however, it is not 
clear to me that such analysis is all that fantastic. The arguments 
are not quite analogous, but the following example, nevertheless, 
seems to me instructive. Lord Denning, who at one time was England's 
third most senior judge, was asked (in a BBC Television News 
interview), whether the quashing of the conviction of six Irishmen 
jailed for the bombing of a Birmingham pub (in which there were 
fatalities) because the police evidence was found to be unsafe, had 
altered his belief in the rightness of capital punishment. His 
answer included the argument that at least if the "Birmingham Six" 
had been hanged there would have been no campaign to re-examine the 
evidence, the conspiracy and failures of the judicial system would 
not have come to light, and the integrity of that system in the eyes 
of the public would have been maintained.
A variation on this example, which is less often cited, but 
which I have found students think more plausible, is the punishing of 
an offender's family. This was, apparently, a fairly strong 
disincentive to potential defectors from the Soviet Union, and 
remains so in contemporary China.
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an extremely harsh penalty in order to make an example of 
her and deter others.
The point is that in all these cases - the diagnostic 
tribunal, the punishment of an innocent, the exemplary 
punishment - the claims of the individual to equal respect 
are lost in the concern for the whole. The individual is 
simply a value carrier, and if greater value can be 
achieved by sacrificing this particular vessel, then that 
is what is morally required.
Consequentialists have attempted to rise to this challenge 
- and, in punishment theorising, to the resurgence of the 
"new retributivism".12 However, before I consider some of 
these developments in consequentialist theory, I want to 
dismiss two defences sometimes invoked by defenders of 
consequentialism.
Taking the example of punishing an innocent, it is 
sometimes claimed that, as a matter of fact, the 
consequences of punishing an innocent will always be worse 
than not doing so, because of the impossibility of keeping 
it quiet, because of the immense unhappiness caused to the 
innocent and her family, because of the uncertainty it 
might lead to in the society, etc., and that therefore a 
consequentialist society will never, in fact, punish an 
innocent. This defence, however, just misses the point. 
The problem is that the consequentialist could consider
12Honderich 1989, 208.
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punishing an innocent as a morally permissible - or, worse, 
obligatory - action. The fact that the empirical 
conditions in which this was required might never occur 
does nothing to alleviate the worry that such thinking is 
deeply offensive.13
The second defence offered by some consequentialists is the 
"definitional stop".14 In a well known paper,15 Anthony 
Quinton argued that there is a logical connection between 
punishment and guilt; punishment means the infliction of 
suffering by a duly constituted authority of an offender 
for an offence.16 Utilitarians, therefore, cannot be 
committed to punishing the innocent, although they may be 
committed to subjecting "innocents" to special treatment.17
There are two responses to this argument, the first is to 
deny that punishment means any such thing. This is 
sometimes implicit in revised definitions of punishment 
that build on the Flew definition; thus, Hart simply
13"The crucial charge is not that a consequentialist will in fact 
punish the innocent, but that she is ready to contemplate it as an 
open moral possibility." Duff 1986, 160.
14Hart 1959, 5, all page references are to the reprint in Hart 1968.
^Quinton 1954.
16The classic formulations from which these characteristics are drawn 
are Baier 1955; Benn 1958; Flew 1954; Hart 1959. See also Davis 
1983, 728.
17"Even if the world gathered all its strength, there is one thing it 
is not able to do, it can no more punish an innocent one than it can 
put a dead person to death." (Kierkegaard 1961, 85; quoted in Duff 
1986, 152.) Of course, relative to the "special treatment" the 
individual might not be "innocent" (which is why I have put that term 
in quotation marks, although they may be innocent of any past 
behaviour that requires punishment or special treatment).
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includes, as a "substandard or secondary case", the 
"punishment of persons ... who neither are in fact nor are 
supposed to be offenders".18 Alternatively it can be the 
explicit claim that punishment is not a simple practice 
that can be captured in any definition on the Flew model, 
and certainly it is not so simple as to allow the 
definitional stop. Something like this seems to be behind 
David Garland's, (and, for that matter, Michel Foucault's), 
sociological approach.19 At one point Garland cites, 
approvingly, the following passage from Nietzsche's The 
Genealogy of Morals:
"I would say that in a very late culture such as our 
present-day European culture the notion 'punishment' has 
not one but a great many meanings. The whole history of 
punishment and of its adaptation to the most various uses 
has finally crystallized into a kind of complex which it 
is difficult to break down and quite impossible to 
define. *'20
Garland's general point (like Nietzsche's and Foucault's) 
is that punishment is a deeply embedded social practice 
that functions at a number of levels and performs a variety 
of tasks (some, perhaps, unknown or unstated). Any attempt 
to capture it on something like the Flew model is, 
therefore, likely to yield only confusion, and likewise, 
any attempt to invoke a definitional stop is specious.
18Hart 1959, 5.
19Garland 1990; Foucault 1977.
20Nietzsche 1956, 212; cited in Garland 1990, 17
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Neither of these criticisms of the definitional stop seem 
to me to be appropriate, instead what must be asserted is 
that the definitional stop is true but trivial. The reason 
I think them inappropriate is that they give up too much, 
it is important that we maintain that punishment is "of an 
offender for an offence" because that is what it is, and it 
is only by remembering this that we can identify what is to 
count as punishment and what is a perversion. In other 
words we are not arguing just about the meaning of 
punishment but also about the way in which we must go about 
justifying punishment practices:
"Questions about the meaning of punishment are not merely 
terminological: they concern the justificatory criteria 
internal to the concept of punishment, which enable us to 
criticise, as well as to identify, punishments and 
systems of punishments; and an account of punishment must 
explain and justify these criteria."21 
Hart's addition of punishing the innocent as "a substandard 
or secondary case" must, therefore, be rejected, for 
otherwise we lose the central core of what it is that we 
are trying to justify and in so doing our idea of how to go 
about justifying it.
David Garland's argument is less simple, and there is no 
doubt that the work of sociologists, and sociological 
approaches to punishment, have a great deal to teach 
philosophers and criminologists about punishment. 
Nevertheless, no matter what role the practices that are
21Duff 1986, 151.
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called "punishment" play in any given society, we must, if 
we are interested in analysing and justifying them, 
identify what it is that is to be analysed and justified, 
A society may call some "special treatment" doled out on 
the basis of a witch-doctor's prediction of future actions, 
"punishment", but that does not mean it is justifiable as 
such; if we want to argue that it is not justifiable as 
punishment, or indeed, undertake any analysis of it, we 
must have an idea of what we are analysing and how it is to 
be justified. To repeat Duff's point, the meaning and 
justificatory criteria are intertwined. Garland, himself, 
unintentionally highlights the importance of this, within 
eleven lines of criticising "formulaic ... philosophers of 
punishment", he declares, "punishment is taken here to be 
the legal process whereby violators of the criminal law are 
condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specific legal 
categories and procedures".22
Nevertheless, although my criticism of Hart and Garland 
commits me to accept the premise that punishment means the 
infliction of suffering on an offender for an offence, I do 
not see that I am thereby committed to a definitional stop. 
There are two reasons for this, the first is that one 
question in which we are interested is whether a system of 
punishment, as against some alternative system, is to be 
preferred. Hart, for example, in dismissing the 
definitional stop, argues that it is hardly sufficient when 
asking whether a consequentialist society could inflict
22Garland 1990, 17.
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suffering on an innocent, or on the relatives of an 
offender, to be told that "that, by definition, would not 
be 'punishment'".23 The question we want to address to the 
consequentialist is would a consequentialist society have a 
system of punishment (which only - or attempts to only - 
punish offenders for their offences), or a some other 
system which did not include these constraints.
When asking other questions it is important what the system 
of "social hygiene"24 is called. Thus, if someone claims 
to be punishing an offender when he really knows the person 
to be innocent, or a society is claiming to punish when it 
is deliberately inflicting suffering on the family of an 
offender, then it is important both that what is being 
claimed is that the procedure is part of a system of 
"punishment" and that we have the idea of what punishment 
is; here the definition of punishment does not stop us, in 
fact, it allows us to judge what is going on and denounce 
it.2*
Having considered and dismissed the empirical and the 
definitional consequentialist ripostes, I now want to turn 
my attention to more serious attempts to get out of the 
problems that arise because of consequentialism's 
commitment to an identity independent locus of value. I 
shall begin with the most well known move, the adoption of
23Hart 1959, 6.
24Taken from Hart 1959, 6.
25See Duff 1986, 152.
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rule-utilitarianism, before considering some, perhaps more 
esoteric, developments in punishment theory.
19. Rule-Utilitarianism
Fortunately, the best defence of rule-utilitarianism, John 
Rawls's "Two Concepts of Rules" includes a detailed 
argument about the punishment - or "telishment" - of an 
innocent scapegoat, this makes it particularly useful and 
appropriate for my purposes.26 Rule utilitarianism, 
according to Smart, "is the view that the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness or 
badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should 
perform the action in like circumstances."27 Rawls gives 
this a concrete form by distinguishing between "justifying 
a practice and justifying a particular action falling under 
it".28 His argument is, essentially, that once a practice 
is up and running the participants cannot appeal outside of 
the rules that govern and define the practice, even to 
considerations that inform the structure of the practice 
itself.
26Rawls 1955, reprinted in Foot 1967, 144-70, page references are to 
this reprint. "Telishment" is the term Rawls adopts in order to 
avoid definitional problems. There are numerous discussions of rule- 
(or indirect-), utilitarianism, (e.g.. Smart and Williams 1973; Lyons 
1965); for a discussion which is historically informative, see Gray 
1989, Chapter 8.
27Smart 1973, 9.
28Rawls 1955, 144.
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Rawls's simplest example is of a game of baseball, he notes 
that if a batter asked whether he could have four strikes, 
this would normally be taken to be a request to have the 
rules clarified for him. If, when he was told that the 
rules only entitled him to three, he said that he knew 
this, but he thought that on this occasion it would be 
better for all concerned if he had four, "this would be 
most kindly taken as a joke".29 Of course, this does not 
stop the player trying to change the rules of baseball in 
the out season, if he believes that it would be a better 
game with four rather than three strikes allowed.
With respect to punishment, Rawls argues that instituting a 
practice of "telishment" - in which officials "have 
authority to arrange a trial for the condemnation of an 
innocent man whenever they are of the opinion that doing so 
would be in the best interests of society"30 - would be so 
hazardous that a "utilitarian justification for this 
institution [would be] most unlikely".31 Instead, Rawls 
believes, the practice most likely to receive utilitarian 
backing would be one similar to the practice of punishment, 
with all the checks of the right to audience, the 
presumption of innocence, etc., in place. "It happens in 
general", Rawls remarks, "that as one drops off the 
defining features of punishment one ends up with an
29Rawls 1955, 164.
30Rawls 1955, 151.
31Rawls 1955, 152.
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institution whose utilitarian justification is highly 
doubtful."32
Let us assume that Rawls is right, and that empirical 
conditions would mean that a consequentially justified 
system of rules for regulating society and dealing with 
offenders would include something which resembles a system 
of just punishment, although this is by no means clear.33 
Rawls's argument, then, is that having established the 
practice of punishment with rules governing who may be 
punished and how, those rules must take precedence over any 
direct appeal to the consequences in any particular 
instance. Here we have something that looks very much like 
Hart's "mixed account" in "Prolegomenon to the Principles 
of Punishment", in which the general justifying aim of 
punishment is consequentialist but the principle governing 
the distribution is retributive.34
At its simplest, the idea is that, e.g., given the 
circumstance in which an innocent individual comes up 
charged with an offence in a magistrates court,35 the 
magistrate is not at liberty to convict and punish that 
individual because, in this instance, there would be a net 
gain in utility, because she can only operate on the rules
32Rawls 1955, 152.
33See McCloskey 1972.
34See Hart 1959.
35The advantage of using a magistrate is that no jury is involved and 
the example is thus more simple.
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that define, and are thus internal to, the practice; she 
cannot appeal to the utilitarian grounding of the practice 
itself.
Rawls does not mean this to be taken in the practical 
sense, often ascribed to Kant's view on promise breaking, 
that if one allowed the breaking of the rules in any given 
practice, that practice would wither away because people 
would lose confidence in it.36 Rather, Rawls is making a 
logical claim, that if one does not follow the rules of a 
practice, one is simply not doing the same kind of thing, 
"the rules of practices are logically prior to particular 
cases". Thus, although one can swing a piece of wood at a 
ball and run if one hits it, one cannot play baseball 
unless one is engaged in the practice of baseball, and 
following the rules that define it. Similarly, then, the 
practice of punishment is defined in such a way as to make 
the statement "you are innocent but, for the benefit of 
society, I am going to punish you anyway", nonsensical.37
This looks right, but would anyone say such a thing. 
Consider the practice of promise keeping, Rawls's argument 
must be that if anyone said "I have no intention of doing 
X, but I promise to do X", they would be speaking nonsense, 
they would not understand what it is to make a promise. 
But, if one thought that all things considered it would be
36Rawls explicitly rejects this argument with reference to promise
keeping, Rawls 1955, 154-55.
37Cf. Duff 1986, 162-63.
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better to make a false promise would one say such a thing, 
or even describe one's actions in such terms? Surely not, 
what one would say is, "all things considered, it would be 
better if I pretended to promise to do X, even though I 
know that I will be unable to do X when the time comes." 
This is not logically incoherent, it is simply deceitful, 
and, of course, if one is trying to realise 
consequentialist ends it is likely that such deceit will be 
necessary. Similarly, the magistrate does not admit in 
open court, "I know you to be innocent, but for the good of 
society I am going to punish you", rather she says, "you 
are guilty and I eon going to punish you", although she 
knows the person to be innocent.38 As Mabbott puts it, 
"indirect utilitarian arguments can always be met by 'Break 
the rule and keep it dark'".39
There seems to be no logical conflict, then, in the agent 
pretending to be engaged in a defined practice whilst 
breaking the rules for consequentialist purposes. To deny 
that the agent should do such a thing introduces a moral 
schizophrenia, the agent knows that the right thing to do 
is to punish this individual given the meta-theory that 
defines what is right, but knows that the rule requires 
that she release him; if it is not logically incoherent,
38Cf. Duff 1986, 163. As Duff makes clear, the importance of this
argument is that it reminds us again that punishing the innocent 
violates criteria which are internal to the concept of punishment; 
deliberately punishing an innocent is a perversion of punishment, and 
this is why it must be accompanied by dishonesty and deceit on the 
part of the punishing authorities.
39Mabbott 1955, 128, see also Mabbott 1939.
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why should she give precedence to the rule instead of 
breaking it and "keeping it dark"?40
Logic, in fact, seems to work against the rule-utilitarian. 
This is because any practice justified on utilitarian 
grounds is clearly going to include acceptable exceptions 
to the rules, and these will be justified by the meta- 
consequentialist theory. Thus Rawls says, of promise 
keeping, that there are "various excuses, exceptions and 
defences, which are understood by, and which constitute an 
important part of, the practice".41 Simplifying the 
situation, let us take the rule, 'in circumstances A, do 
B'. If this rule is to be justified on consequentialist 
grounds, we must admit consequentially justified 
exceptions, so in cases C, let us say, it will always be 
better, all things considered, not to do B when A. Thus, 
the rule will now read, 1 in circumstances A, do B except 
when conditions C apply1. But, one can conceive of the 
possibility (although one could not hope to achieve it), of 
capturing all possible exceptions to the rule, that is all 
conditions when it would be better, all things considered, 
not to do B when A. But that means that the rule is now,
1 in circumstances A, do B except when conditions C - N
40See Ten 1987, 71. This argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
Hart's, 1959. The point is, that "mixed theories” of the Hart type, 
offer no account of how the different demands of yielding good 
consequences and matching moral desert can be reconciled. Instead 
they try to confine them to different spheres of punishment. 
However, since each appeals to a comprehensive moral theory, each 
makes claims that conflict with the other, see Goldman 1979; 1982,
62.
41Rawls 1955, 156.
123
apply' , and this is identical to the rule, 'in 
circumstances A, do B except when better consequences would 
be achieved by not doing B', in short, rule-utilitarianism 
logically collapses into act.42
The final objection I wish to levy against this kind of 
theory is that it is inappropriate in a way similar to the 
argument that a consequentialist society will be unlikely 
to punish an innocent because of empirical factors. As 
Rawls admits "a utilitarian justification for [the 
systematic punishing of the innocent] is most unlikely",43 
but "most unlikely" just isn't good enough; punishing the 
innocent is wrong for some reason other than that it is 
unlikely to yield good consequences.
20. Consent. Threats and Self-Defence
The failure of rule-utilitarianism and the problem of 
making consequentialism compatible with respect for agents' 
autonomy or rights has led consequentialist punishment 
theorists away from the traditional tripartite goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, and towards 
a more singular focus on deterrence. Deterrence has the 
immediate advantage of seeming to appeal to the agent as a 
rational being, in the sense that punishment, on such a 
justification, provides the agent with a prudential reason
42See, amongst many others, the discussions in Lyons 1965, Smart
1968.
43Rawls 1955, 152.
/
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not to commit the act he might be considering. The 
immediate disadvantage is that it seems that deterrence 
based punishment, if it aims to deter others as well as the 
offender from further infringements of the law, use the 
offender as a means of affecting the behaviour of others. 
The challenge, then, is to show that using the offender 
thus, nevertheless treats her as an autonomous agent.44
C. S. Nino has suggested that in committing an offence, 
given certain conditions, the offender consents to his 
liability to punishment.45 The argument is most easily 
understood through an example.46 When an individual gets 
into a cab and gives an address then, under normal 
conditions, that agent has consensually entered into a 
contract; "when [a] particular legal consequence of the 
voluntary act is known by the agent, we may say that he has 
consented to it".47 He is legally obliged to pay the 
driver on arrival, even if when the time comes he does not 
want to, or believes that it would be better all things
44See Duff 1993, xiii-xiv.
^Nino 1983.
46I am much indebted to Ted Honderich’s discussion of Nino's article 
(in Honderich 1984, 219-224). Honderich treats Nino as one of the 
"new retributivists", however, I think that he is wrong to do so. 
Nino clearly believes that the authorities should issue threats (in 
the form of punishments attached to certain actions) as a mechanism 
of social protection. Furthermore, his model of consent eschews 
moral desert, which is one reason not to treat him as a retributivist
- even a "new" one. In his own words, he is seeking "a line of 
argument which shows that the practice of punishment can be patterned 
after a commonly accepted principle of distribution that does not 
rely on the moral blameworthiness of people and does not require us 
to relinquish the conception of punishment as a measure of social 
protection". (Nino 1983, 293).
47Nino 1983, 296.
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considered if he did not do so, etc. This is subject to 
the important caveat that "the relevant laws be in some 
sense just",48 this is to avoid the claim of a contracting 
party "that the law coerces him into accepting the terms of 
an offer should he want something over which the offerer 
has legal power".49 Accepting the "legal normative" 
consequences of an act (e.g., getting into a cab), has 
moral consequences in that "the individual who ... consents 
to undertake some legal obligation is, in principle, 
morally obliged to do the act which is the object of that 
obligation",50 and, thus, others have a prima facie right 
to force the individual to meet his obligations. None of 
this is affected by the fairness or otherwise of the 
distribution of benefits and burdens that result from what 
the individual has consented to do, that is, it doesn’t 
matter whether the cab driver is an eccentric millionaire 
and his passenger relatively poor, this is what Honderich 
calls "the fairness owed to consent".51
The liability to punishment, Nino thinks, is to be 
understood on this model. The offender, when he 
voluntarily commits an offence (in the knowledge that it is 
an offence), knows that to do so has certain legal 
consequences, specifically, he loses his right to immunity 
from punishment. As with the cab passenger, this is
48Honderich 1984, 220.
49Nino 1983, 302.
50Nino 1983, 296.
51Honderich 1984, 220.
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independent of his desire, when the time comes, not to be 
punished or his belief that, all things considered, it 
would be better if he were not punished. Notice that the 
offender need not consent to the law, or accept the justice 
of the law, he need merely know that it is the law and that 
the action he has performed carries certain consequences. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary that the law be just, that it 
not be "discriminatory [or] proscribe actions that people 
have the moral right to do".52 The next step is pretty 
clear, as Honderich puts it, "given the fact of the 
offender's consent, the authorities have at least a prima 
facie moral justification for exercising their legal power 
to punish him",53 and this is unaffected by the justice or 
otherwise of the distribution of burdens that result from 
the offender's punishment. In summary,
"The justification of punishment defended [by Nino] 
relies on the consent to assume the liability to suffer 
punishment involved in the voluntary commission of an 
offence with the knowledge that the liability is a 
necessary consequence of it."54 
It is important to note that the offender does not consent 
to her punishment, but to her "liability to suffer 
punishment", this must be the case because the offender 
only consents to the necessary consequences of her actions, 
and punishment is not a necessary consequence.
52Nino 1983, 302-3.
53Honderich 1984, 221.
54Nino 1983, 305.
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There are a number of problems with Nino's account; Ted 
Honderich, for example, argues that the problem with the 
analogy Nino draws is that the offender might be said to 
deny the legal normative consequences at the time of 
committing the act with those consequences. Imagine, 
Honderich says, if an individual gets into a cab and gives 
an address and then says, ’I know that the normal practice 
is to pay cab drivers, but I have no intention of paying 
you for this ride. ' As Honderich says, it is certainly a 
moot question whether a contract has issued from the 
individual's actions, and it can only be more controversial 
still to claim that her actions issue "in a moral 
justification for [her] paying a fare".55 Honderich's 
general claim "that if we begin with an offence, and find a 
close analogy of it that might turn up in civil law, we do 
not find anything remotely like a clear case of consent and 
contract",56 seems to me to be right, and to cast doubt on 
the foundation of Nino's account.
The reader might feel, however, that this objection does 
not strike at the general idea that a contractual type 
consent might be the route to justifiable punishment, so it 
is necessary to address a second, more general, criticism 
of Nino's account. What is most ambiguous in Nino's 
account is the role of justice. Clearly justice is 
important; it is not enough to say to someone 'your money 
or your (claim to) life', and then to argue that they
55Honderich 1984, 223.
56Honderich 1984, 223.
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consented to losing their claim against being murdered 
because they knew that this was the necessary consequence 
of not handing over the money. Nino commits himself to a 
Kantian ideal of treating each person as having an equal 
claim to well-being and he sees as the burden of his theory 
the task of reconciling the equal claims of individuals and 
the requirement that punishment diminishes future crimes by 
means of "general and special deterrence".57 Nino says so 
little about the requirements of justice that his theory 
can most sympathetically be regarded as incomplete. 
However, his insistence that punishment is only to reduce 
the incidence of crime, and that it performs this function 
through general and special deterrence, does seem to open 
him up to Duff's attack that he does nothing to show that 
the use of threats is compatible with "proper respect for 
the potential criminal".58
What is surprising is that Nino does not regard the 
requirements of justice as affecting the fundamental 
consequentialist purpose of punishment. It may be that 
some degree of threat is compatible with respecting the 
offender as an autonomous being,59 but it is difficult to 
know without giving a fuller account of the requirements of 
justice. Likewise, Nino argues that no matter how unjust 
the consequences of punishing, if the laws are just and the
57Nino 1983, 292.
58Duff 1986, 180.
59See §43 for a further discussion of this, and of my differences 
with Duff.
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penalties known, then the fairness we owe to consent means 
that we should punish. The conflict between the 
requirement that the law distribute benefits and burdens in 
a just manner and the argument that a kind of consent can 
justify an unfair distribution of these things, is not 
addressed,60 and, although, as Honderich says, they are not 
"clear enough to be inconsistent",61 they do seem to pull 
apart in important ways. What is needed is a much better 
account of how we are justified in issuing threats, and how 
these threats can be compatible with the account of 
justice, for, as Daniel Farrell argues,
"we are supposing that despite the fact that a murderer 
had no right to murder, it is problematic as to whether 
or not we have a right to kill him in order to prevent 
other potential murderers from murdering. And if all we 
can say, by way of showing that we have this right, is 
that we have told him we would kill him if he killed, it 
seems we have no said nearly enough. For our question is 
exactly what makes us think we have the right to tell him 
this, meaning to do what we say we will do if he does 
what we have warned him not to do."62
Farrell believes that this right - to threaten and carry 
out our threats - can be generated from the more familiar
60Nino does see the problem, "following out these suggestions [about 
the justification of punishment] would lead to a discussion of the 
extent to which the consent of the person affected can justify 
measures and political arrangements which may imply inequitable 
burdens upon him" (Nino 1983, 305), but he doesn't pursue it.
61Honderich 1984, 224.
62Farrell 1985, 379.
130
right to self-defence, and this is a position which has 
also been advocated by Warren Quinn,63 In marked contrast 
to Nino, the 'self-defence thesis'64 construes the 
"direction" of justification to be "from the justifiability 
of the threats to the justifiability of imposing the 
threatened penalties".65 Both Quinn and Farrell begin with 
thought experiments; because Quinn's is the simpler theory, 
and the more enjoyable Gedankenexperiment, let us take his. 
Quinn imagines a system of mechanical (or m-) punishment. 
M-punishments are carried out by devices that can "detect 
wrongdoing,-, identify and apprehend those who are 
responsible, establish their guilt, and subject them to 
incarcerations (and perhaps other evils)".66 He assumes 
that we have "lost whatever taste we once had for 
retribution",67 and thus, the system of m-punishment is 
grounded in trying to deter certain conduct by constructing 
the "automated retaliation devices" (ARDs).68 Quinn sees
63See Farrell 1985; 1988; 1989; 1990; Quinn 1985. There are
important differences between them, see Farrell 1989.
64I shall use this phrase to denote the basic approach which is 
shared by Farrell and Quinn.
65Farrell 1989, 126, emphasis suppressed. As Quinn notes, this is 
structurally similar to the rule-utilitarian accounts of Rawls (1955) 
and Hart (1959). The crucial difference is that Rawls and Hart rely 
on the distinction between the practice and the act, the self-defence 
thesis relies on a distinction between a justified earlier threat and 
a later punishment.
66Quinn 1985, 337. The ability of these devices to administer a wide 
range of m-punishments is what distinguishes them from Alexander' s 
"Doomsday Machines" which merely imposed death for every 
transgression, (Alexander 1980). Cf. also Buchanan's "automatic 
enforcing agents" in Buchanan 1975, 95.
67Quinn 1985, 337.
68Farrell 1989, 127. See also 1989, 305.
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the creation of ARDs as analogous to the creation of 
"threats" whose function is to deter individuals from 
certain conduct, if we are to justify creating these 
devices then, we must give an account of our right to 
threaten in this manner.69 This account is based on 
drawing parallels with "other, more familiar, self- 
protective rights", such as the right to protect ourselves 
and our property, including with violence if necessary; to 
"erect barriers"; to arrange an "automatic cost" to 
"precede or accompany the violation of some right" and to 
confine those who show themselves to be both dangerous and 
uncontrollable by other methods.70
There are two questions that must concern us: First, can we 
show that from some general commitment to self-defence we 
are morally justified in creating ARDs? Second, if the 
creation of ARDs were morally permissible, can we 
understand the infliction of punishment as justifiable on 
the same grounds? Because I do not believe that the first 
question can be answered in the affirmative I shall not 
discuss the second in any detail.
The problem with the first question is that it is not clear 
what sense of "justifiability" is being appealed to. 
Quinn's thought experiment posits "a new community ... at
69As Farrell points out, this is a rather idiosyncratic use of the 
term "threat". In creating ARDs, we create "a situation where 
potential wrongdoers are at a higher risk of being harmed, if they 
wrong us, than they would otherwise have been." (Farrell 1989, 151). 
Cf. Quinn 1985, 335.
70A11 quotations are from Quinn 1985, 341, emphasis suppressed.
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some time in the future ... our social structures having been 
destroyed by earlier upheavals", and Farrell's "something 
like a Lockean state of nature".71 Since Farrell's is 
marginally the more informative let us follow the self- 
defence claim through as he offers it. In this 'almost 
Lockean' state of nature he asserts, "one right most of us 
would claim ... is the right to resist, directly, others' 
attempts to violate our rights".72 What strikes one here 
is the fact that there are a lot of rights kicking around, 
the grounding for which is entirely unaccounted for. Let 
us assume, and I take it that it is plausible to do so, 
that Farrell's state of nature is only something like 
Locke's because there is no reliance on a system of natural 
law, and accompanying natural rights, guaranteed by God. 
In such a case it seems to me that it would be much more 
honest for Farrell to say that his state of nature was 
"something like" Hobbes's. Differences might be that it 
involves a greater degree of social interaction, but this 
is a good deal less significant than the non-existence of 
what is possibly the most important feature of Locke's 
account.
Of course, the problem for Farrell in using Hobbes, is that 
the next claim, to the right of self-defence, would have a 
much more prudential, and a correspondingly decreased 
moral, ring to it. Indeed, once one claims a prudential 
grounding for the right of self-defence all sorts of things
71Quinn 1985, 337.
72Farrell 1985, 371.
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might follow, Hobbes' "warre ... of every man, against every 
man",73 is not a consequence (as is often thought by 
students), of man's brutal nature, but of prudential 
reason. Reason tells each person that, in the absence of a 
common authority, it makes sense to pre-emptively strike at 
others.74
Farrell describes the right of self-defence in terms of a 
principle of distributive justice, some version of which 
appears in all his papers. The principle states:
"When someone knowingly brings it about, through his own 
wrongful conduct, that someone else must choose either to 
harm him or to be harmed herself, justice allows the 
latter to choose that the former shall be harmed, rather 
than that she shall be harmed, at least if the harm 
inflicted on the former is roughly proportional to the 
harm that would otherwise be inflicted on the latter."75 
I have to say that I find it remarkable, that after four 
papers on the topic, in a paper entitled "The Justification 
of Deterrent Violence",76 Farrell adds to this principle a 
note, stating that,
73Hobbes 1651, Chapter 13, 185.
74See Barry 1968 for the best account of this interpretation.
75Farrell 1990, 303. Farrell is following Phillip Montague 1983, 31-
36. Cf. Scanlon 1988, 172: "Some have held that from the fact that a 
person is morally blameworthy it follows that it would be a good 
thing if he or she were to suffer some harm (or, at least, that this 
would be less bad than if some innocent person were to suffer the 
same harm)" Scanlon attributes this insight to Derek Parfit.
76Farrell 1990, emphasis added.
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"it will be obvious _ that I do not intend anything I say 
in the present paper as a defense of [this principle]~.
The point is simply to show how far we can go, in the 
justification of deterrent violence, if [this] principle 
is granted".77
I suppose this is, in a sense, a similarity between Locke 
and Farrell, the similarity being that if you start by 
assuming P, proving that P follows is made a great deal 
easier.
Farrell admits that Quinn does not appeal to such a 
principle but says that he assumes "Quinn would welcome the 
line of argument [and that] some such principle _ is 
implicit in Quinn's remarks1'.78 I have no idea whether the 
former is true, but the latter seems to me quite accurate; 
Quinn, like Farrell, has to get a moral right to self- 
defence from somewhere.
Perhaps I am being a little unfair, Quinn and Farrell 
between them do a great deal of interesting work in showing 
how an individual right to self-defence can, once granted, 
be used to explain certain aspects of punishment and 
Farrell does much to distinguish how this relationship 
changes between special and general deterrence, but the 
fundamental point remains; the answer to the question of 
whether one would be morally justified in constructing ARDs
77Farrell 1990, 303, 2n. Because of this, it is possible to read 
Farrell's argument from this principle rather than from any more
fundamental right to self-defence, see, e.g., Tamburrini 1992, 71-2.
78Farrell 1989, 131.
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depends upon the moral theory that one endorses, and it is 
not enough just to be given one principle, unexplained and 
out of any theoretical context. For instance, how might 
one address the sort of challenge that Duff's work 
exemplifies, that is, that any system that relies only on 
threatening the agent so as to alter her behaviour, fails 
to treat the agent with due respect as an autonomous member 
of the moral community? Farrell and Quinn, like Nino, are 
careful to include strong voluntaristic elements in their 
accounts, the offender must perform his actions knowingly, 
both in the sense of knowing what he is doing and knowing 
the possible consequences, and Farrell, especially, is well 
aware that simply announcing in advance that one is going 
to do a thing, is not sufficient to morally justify doing 
that thing,79 yet when the time comes all he offers is the 
argument that "if we suppose - that threats of harm are 
likely to reduce such violations [of innocent persons1 
rights] and, moreover, are necessary if we are to reduce 
them to a tolerable level, it would seem that such threats 
are perfectly justifiable".80
The second question, as to whether punishment can be 
understood as analogous to a morally permissible system of 
m-punishments, or on the basis of some other account of the 
right to self-defence, cannot be answered, because the 
conditions under which the right to self-defence is morally 
justifiable are not known. It may be, and almost certainly
79See Farrell 1985, 379.
80Farrell 1985, 380.
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is, true that under certain conditions one is morally 
permitted to harm another to defend oneself, but saying any 
more about that, and about what else may be understood on 
this model, requires an account of the conditions and the 
moral theory which informs them.
It may seem as if I have come a long way from 
consequential ism, and it, perhaps, is not too useful to try 
to make the self-defence thesis into some white knight 
riding to the rescue of consequentialist accounts of 
punishment. Yet, they do offer to take a right that many 
of us assume to have some grounding, and explain a 
deterrence based system of punishment. I have, as will be 
seen, a good deal of sympathy with this approach; as I said 
above, punishment theorising needs to start not with an 
offender but with the question of what justifies the system 
that includes such a category of persons.81 I also believe 
that a good deal of the purpose of the penality system can 
only be understood as there to deter actual and potential 
offenders. Farrell and Quinn try to show that to do so 
does not involve the problems associated with 
consequentialism highlighted at the beginning of this 
chapter, but their accounts are unpersuasive because they 
assume a non-consequentialist moral theory which they 
neither ground nor really examine. Of course, if we are 
obliged to treat people as "ends in themselves", or if we 
assume that each person is a rights bearing agent entitled 
to equal respect, then a consequentialist theory of
81See supra, Introduction.
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punishment will have to be constrained or replaced by such 
considerations.
Below, I aim to show both that we can give an account of 
the grounding of the equal value of agents, and that this 
is compatible with a punishment system partially justified 
by its deterring actual and potential offenders. To do 
this, I must first turn my attention to other attempts at 
grounding the claims of agents, and to the rationale of 
coercion that can be located in such theories.
Chapter 4: Playing Fair and Playing 
Rough
21. Fair Plav Theory
Despite the fact that political theory has been dominated 
in the last twenty years by the subject of distributive 
justice punishment theory has been slow in catching up, 
perhaps because the relationship between distributive and 
retributive justice is not at all a clear one.1 Yet a 
number of writers have responded to Ted Honderich's claim 
that the completion of punishment theorising is dependent 
on finding "a clear principle of distributive justice, an 
answer to the question of how all the benefits and burdens 
in society are to be distributed."2 In what follows below 
I shall begin by considering one justification for 
punishment based on the idea of reciprocity, or fair play. 
Fair play theory claims to give a justification for 
punishment which is independent of any substantive theory 
of justice or account of morality. I shall show, first, 
that there are insurmountable difficulties for fair play 
theory in attempting this, and second, that it in order to
^or a debate on the relationship of punishment and political theory 
see Philips 1986 and the reply by Davis 1989.
2Honderich 1984, 239. Honderich*s appeal is, in his case, motivated 
by a particular view of the free will/determinism debate, a view 
which is wholeheartedly determinist. (See Honderich 1988, 1993) A 
number of writers have recently attempted to use the language and 
techniques of distributive justice theorising in discussions of just 
punishment, notably Michael Davis (1983, 1986a, 1986b); David Hoekema 
1980; J. Narveson 1974; W. Sadurski 1989; Sterba 1977.
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overcome these difficulties fair play theorists rely on an 
implicit (and usually contractarian) account of morality. 
Fair play theory is, in short, incomplete and the 
theoretical resources needed for its completion cannot be 
found within the theory itself. In the final part, I shall 
examine the contractarian account of justice as mutual 
advantage, illustrate its relations with the theory of fair 
play, and examine its account of punishment.
In its modern form, fair play theory developed from H. L. 
A. Hart's seminal paper "Are There Any Natural Rights?" in 
which he argued that the obligation to obey the law was 
derived from a "mutuality of restrictions"; that is,
"When a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those 
who have submitted to these restrictions when required 
have a right to a similar submission from those who have 
benefited by their submission".3 
The idea is that fair play theory - the mutuality of 
restrictions - should be a new and independent mechanism 
for creating rights and duties; "independent" in the sense 
that it "differs from other right-creating transactions 
(consent, promising)."4 In fact, I shall argue below that 
punishment theorists have had to rely on ideas such as 
"consent" to bolster the claims of fair play theory. Even 
Hart, in the formulation given above, seems to indicate the
3Hart 1955, page references to reprint in Waldron 1984, 85. An
earlier statement of much the same view can be found in Broad 1915- 
16; a later, more influential, statement in Rawls 1964.
4Hart 1955, 85.
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incompleteness of the idea of reciprocity with his talk of 
"joint enterprises" and "rules". What is more, although 
Hart is concerned to distinguish obligations derived from 
fair play from those derived from consent, he nonetheless, 
in the sentence immediately before introducing the idea, 
states that he believes that "it is true of all special 
rights that they arise from previous voluntary actions".5
Hart's basic principle has been developed and debated at 
some length in the forty years that have followed its 
publication,6 but as Richard Dagger has recently pointed 
out,7 most of that debate has remained centred on the 
question of whether one has on obligation to obey the law; 
the application of the principle to the justification of 
punishment has had, by comparison, a relatively short 
popular life.8
The starting point for a fair play justification of 
punishment is with a conception of society as a co­
operative endeavour. Co-operation brings advantages to the
5Hart 1955, 85. Whether he means that the agent needs to have 
voluntarily joined the "joint enterprise" or voluntarily accepted its 
benefits is unclear. On this point see Simmons 1979, 108; this
criticism is pursued in Barry MS.
6See, broadly in support, Arneson 1982; Becker 1986; Dagger 1985, 
esp. 443-46; Fishkin 1992, S3.3; Gibbard 1991; Klosko 1992; Sadurski 
1989; Sher 1987. Broadly against, Nozick 1974, 90-95; Simmons 1979, 
Chapter 5; Smith 1973. Other references appear below.
7Dagger 1993, 474.
^he two most influential versions applied to punishment were Morris 
1968, and Murphy 1973. Other contributions have been made by Finnis 
1972; von Hirsch 1976; Sadurski 1989; and Sher 1987, Chapter 5. Both 
von Hirsch and Murphy have since expressed dissatisfaction with the 
theory; von Hirsch 1985, 57-60, 1990, 264-5; Murphy 1985, 1990.
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members who compose the society, however, these advantages 
can only be realised if the members of the society interact 
on the basis of shared rules that govern the co-operation. 
The basic idea, then, is that insofar as each enjoys the 
benefit of the co-operative enterprise, each is obliged to 
co-operate on the basis of the shared rules,9 This of 
course means that each member is obliged to undertake 
activities which he finds burdensome - paying taxes for 
example - if such activities are commanded by the rules of 
the co-operative enterprise.
The law - which is to be thought of as the form given to 
the norms governing co-operation - provides enormous 
benefits to the participants, most notably in attempting to 
provide conditions of "peace, security and freedom".10 It 
protects the individual from unwanted interference by 
others, and thus allows her to formulate and attempt to 
carry through her chosen desires or plan of life in 
conditions in which her legitimate expectations are likely 
to be fulfilled and in which she will be free from unwanted 
and unwarranted interference from others. The law secures 
these benefits for the individual, however, only by 
imposing on her a burden; the burden of self-restraint. 
That is, the individual must restrain herself should she
9At this stage I am trying to keep the characterisation of fair play 
theory to a minimum because, as I said above, I think there are 
various versions each relying on different background assumptions 
about the nature of justice. As it stands here (without an element 
of consent) this claim has been challenged by Nozick. (Nozick 1974,
90-95)
10Duff 1986, 206.
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desire to interfere with others in ways which are illegal; 
she must respect the prohibitions of the law and moderate 
her behaviour accordingly.11
Characteristically the next move in fair play theory is to 
say that in a just society the distribution of the benefits 
of the law and the burdens of having to keep the law are 
distributed fairly; the law protects everyone and provides 
the benefits of peace, security and freedom for everyone. 
Likewise, the burden of having to obey the law falls 
equally on everyone; that is, the rule of law applies. 
There is, then, a pattern of distribution of benefits and 
burdens that is just, and when this pattern is disturbed it 
is a requirement of justice that it be restored. This, it 
is claimed, is the role of punishment: to restore the 
status quo ante.
If we are to find a moral justification for punishment in 
the idea of restoring the distribution of benefits and 
burdens it must be the case that for punishment to be 
justified the pattern of distribution must be just in the 
first place. What a just distribution is, however, is not 
a question that fair play theory need address. Indeed if 
it is to retain its character as a justification of 
punishment based on Hart’s simple idea it must not do so. 
To see this it is merely necessary to examine the claim 
that is needed by fair play theory: "in a just society the 
distribution of benefits and burdens is just"; such a claim
1]-See Duff 1986, 206; 1993, xii; Sadurski 1989, 355-6.
143
tells us nothing about the nature of that distribution, it 
is, in fact, tautological. All that fair play theory needs 
is to posit a just starting point and advantage from 
participation for all members of the society. This is 
important because fair play theory essentially holds that 
given a just society it can justify punishment as a second, 
independent, stage of moral theorising. That is, given 
just and non-coercive norms, punishment is justified 
through the ideas of fair play. The derivation of the 
norms (and their legal analogue, laws), and the question of 
whether they are just is a different matter from the 
derivation of just punishment. Below, I shall argue that 
this position is both untenable and uninteresting (and that 
it undermines any attempt to found justice on ideas of 
reciprocity), what is of interest and what must be 
considered if we are to justify punishment12 is the 
derivation of just and necessarily coercive laws.
Before addressing this concern - of whether the fair play 
project is a sensible one - I want to consider whether fair 
play theory works on its own terms. Does it, in fact, 
justify coercive punishment? To do this we need to examine 
the argument in more detail.
The argument is that punishment is a requirement of 
justice, for (given a just starting point), it is just that 
each carry out his share of the burdens, and should someone
12Without reference to God or some other variant of moral realism and 
whilst avoiding the pitfalls of utilitarian justifications.
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fail to do so, a situation of injustice results that has to 
be rectified. The criminal disturbs the just distribution 
by refusing to mediate the pursuit of his self interest by 
the norms of the society; that is, the criminal does not 
bear his burden of self restraint.13 The benefit to the 
criminal is not the property he steals or the pleasure he 
gets from raping someone, the benefit is, in Duff's word, 
"intrinsic",14 it is the evasion of self restraint. The 
justification for punishment is that it imposes on the 
criminal an extra burden, in some way equivalent to the 
burden which she evaded, and thus it restores the balance 
of benefits and burdens in the society. Punishment is this 
restoring of the balance, just as the crime was the 
disruption of that balance. On this account, then, 
punishment is a demand of justices it falls on those who 
fail to shoulder their burdens or those who claim a greater 
share of benefits than that to which they are entitled. 
The correct distribution, the status quo ante, is restored 
through punishment. As Richard Dagger has put it in a 
recent articles
"Criminals act unfairly when they take advantage of the 
opportunities the legal order affords them without 
contributing to the preservation of that order. In doing
13ln Murphy's rather hard hitting prose, "The criminal is a parasite 
or freerider on a mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation". 
(Murphy 1985, 7)
14Duff 1986, 207. Of course, the criminal does benefit from the gain 
in property or from the pleasure of raping someone. What is being 
claimed here is that the benefit which the fair play theorist - as 
against, for example, a restorationist - is concerned with is that of 
the offender not mediating his behaviour in accordance with the norms 
the obeying of which by others leads to benefits for the offender. 
This argument is set out in greater detail below.
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so, they upset the balance between benefits and burdens 
at the heart of the notion of justice. Justice requires 
that this balance be restored, and this can only be 
achieved through punishment or pardon."15 
It is important to get clear that this is a retributive 
conception of punishment. Justice demands that the 
criminal be punished, that the just distribution of 
benefits and burdens be restored. This might have 
deterrent effects - presumably co-operators will know that 
the society operates a system of punishment and this will 
thus make it less plausible that they will find it in their 
interests to break the law - but the reason for punishing 
is not that it serves to increase or decrease the 
likelihood of disobedience, the reason for punishing is 
that it is just to do so.16
^Dagger 1993, 476, emphasis added. See also Morris 1968, 478.
16Andrew von Hirsch has argued that fair play theory generates a 
prima facie reason for punishment based on the desert of the 
offender. Against this prima facie reason he argues is a 
"countervailing moral obligation of not deliberately adding to the 
amount of human suffering". To get to justified punishment he thinks 
that one needs the assumption that punishment has deterrence effects, 
and thus in fact punishment reduces rather than increases the total 
of human suffering. Although these extra steps are interesting they 
do not, it seems to me, change the basic justification for punishment 
offered by von Hirsch as being based on desert generated by fair 
play. "Step 3", the deterrence argument, merely makes "Step 2" 
(subtract from rather than add to human suffering) irrelevant; "the 
prima-facie case for punishment ~ based on desert - stands again.” 
(von Hirsch 1976, 54) This is the theory that he has since
retracted, see supra, note 8. Dagger thinks that the general 
justifying aim of fair play theory is deterrence (see Dagger 1993), 
but this is because he fails to distinguish fair play theory from 
contractualist accounts of justice.
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22. Two Objections
There are a number of problems with this account considered 
strictly from the perspective of whether it succeeds in 
justifying coercive punishment,17 however, I want to 
consider only two.18 The first is that fair play theory 
cannot provide a sufficient reason for coercive punishment. 
The second goes far beyond the problem of punishment and to 
the heart of theories based on reciprocity or fair play; it 
claims that the fair play thesis fundamentally misdescribes 
the nature of law and the character of moral actions.
The first problem is that it is unclear why coercive 
punishment flows from the requirement of fairness to erase 
the debt owed by the offender. Punishment is supposed to 
restore the balance of benefits and burdens, but it is 
difficult to see how it does this. In the ordinary 
language of morals "two wrongs do not make a right" and it 
is not clear that in this case punishment (a prima facie 
harm), can achieve the desired end. If the offender has 
claimed greater liberty than is compatible with the demands 
of the co-operative enterprise, how does removing his 
liberty restore the balance? The intuition being traded on 
here is clearly that the criminal has taken more liberty 
than that to which he is entitled, and in punishing him -
17That is, even assuming that fair play theory correctly 
characterises society and the nature of obligation (which, I shall 
argue below it doesn't), can it justify punishment?
18For extended discussions see Duff 1986, Chapter 8; Dolinko 1991; 
Fingarette 1977; Wasserstrom 1980. Replies to some of the criticisms 
can be found in Burgh 1982; Dagger 1993.
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in taking away some of his liberty - the situation is 
restored. But the liberty the criminal has taken is the 
liberty of not regulating her behaviour in accordance with 
the law, in punishing her we do not make her sacrifice her 
self-interest to the interest of the co-operative venture, 
nor in punishing her is there any obvious repayment of 
liberty to the other members of the co-operative venture. 
If punishment were conceived on a model that attempts to 
capture this simple intuition it would surely have to take 
the form of the criminal contributing to the co-operative 
venture whilst being deprived of the benefits. It might be 
possible to conceive of punishment as contributing in such 
a way by thinking of it as a contribution by the offender 
to the system of deterrence, however, this seems a little 
odd, and in any event the criminal certainly benefits from 
the deterrence effects of the system of punishment.
If it is not obvious quite how punishment restores the 
status quo ante neither is it obvious that it is the only 
mechanism for approaching such a goal. One alternative, 
admitted by fair play theorists such as Herbert Morris, may 
be pardoning;
"Forgiveness - with its legal analogue of a pardon - 
while not the righting of an unfair distribution by 
making one pay his debt is, nevertheless, a restoring of 
the equilibrium by forgiving the debt. Forgiveness may 
be viewed, at least in some types of case, as a gift 
after the fact, erasing a debt, which had the gift been 
given before the fact, would not have created a debt.
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But the practice of pardoning has to proceed sensitively, 
for it may endanger, in a way the practice of justice 
does not, the maintenance of an equilibrium of benefits 
and burdens. If all are indiscriminately pardoned less 
incentive is provided individuals to restrain their 
inclinations, thus increasing the incidence of persons 
taking what they do not deserve."19 
This is not pardoning as traditionally understood. 
Traditionally pardoning is not an alternative to 
punishment, but is something done once it has been 
established that the offender is deserving of punishment; 
it is, in the strict sense, an act of grace.20 Morris, 
however, is accepting that pardoning restores the balance 
of benefits and burdens rather than is (as it would be on 
the traditional picture) an acceptance of the 
disequilibrium as the new status quo. But on Morris's 
account, pardoning is an alternative to punishment (both 
being justified only by appeal to their efficacy at 
restoring the status quo ante) and this makes Morris's 
distinction between the righting and restoring of an unfair 
distribution (and, by extension the difference between "the
19Morris 1968, in Gross and von Hirsch 1981, 95. Quoted in Duff 
1986, 216.
20It is no doubt true that sometimes there are calls for pardoning 
when it is thought that there are mitigating circumstances, such as 
that the offender is young or naive. In such cases the offender is 
said to "deserve pardoning". Such calls, it seems to me, are in fact 
motivated by something like the thought that the criminal justice 
system has failed to take such things into account (perhaps because 
of a mandatory sentencing policy) but rather than amend the system to 
meet a particular need it is easier to circumvent it by means of an 
extrinsic intervention such as a pardon. In such cases, the offender 
may be legally pardoned but in fact the offender deserved less 
punishment, and pardoning is being used to achieve this, it is still 
not the case that the offender deserved pardoning.
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practice of pardoning" and "the practice of justice") 
difficult to understand- Morris's argument for coercive 
punishment as the unique solution to the disequilibrium 
caused by the criminal act is, in fact, explicitly 
consequentialist and thus is unacceptable if fair play 
theory is to retain its retributive character. For Morris 
we must punish because the indiscriminate use of pardon 
would not deter individuals from "restrain[ing] their 
inclinations..."21 In short, the theory provides a necessary 
but not sufficient reason for coercive punishment.22
The second objection - that fair play theory characterises 
law and moral actions in entirely the wrong way - is more 
difficult to get to the heart of, and will develop into the 
criticism that fair play theory is radically incomplete. 
To start, consider three criticisms of fair play theory. 
First, given by Fingarette, that fair play theory fails to 
capture the nature of legal prohibitions:
"On [Morris's] view — I would seem to have two equally 
legitimate options - paying my debts earlier in cash, or 
paying later in punishment. But surely that is not the 
intent of the law prohibiting stealing. The intent is
21Morris, quoted above. See Duff 1986, 216.
22Dagger appears to accept this: "Justice requires that this balance 
be restored, and this can only be achieved through punishment or 
pardon" (Dagger 1993, 476 emphasis added). Dagger has open to him 
the extra claim - which is the subject of part III of his paper - 
that punishment is justified because pardon would not prove 
sufficient a guarantee to solve the assurance problem, although 
nowhere does he make this explicit. In fact, pardon doesn't reappear 
in Dagger's article, although he spends some time considering whether 
punishment is the best response to crime.
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precisely to deny us a legitimate alternative to paying 
the storekeeper for what we take-"23
Second, that fair play gives rise to a theory of 
compensation or restitution but not punishment. Again 
Fingarette provides such a criticism when he says, going on 
directly from the quote above:
"And even if I restore the balance by returning the 
stolen goods, and by paying back any incidental losses 
incurred by the storekeeper, it still remains 
intelligible and important ~ to ask whether I should also 
be punished."24
If it were the case that the balance could be restored 
solely by this kind of restitution, the critic claims, the 
theory would be severely undermined. Apart from the 
obvious difficulties with crimes such as rape, it would not 
even be satisfactory in cases such as car theft. If a 
criminal steals your car and is caught, it would not be a 
punishment for him to be forced to return your car, paying 
you for any wear and tear, petrol used and inconvenience 
caused; that is not punishing the criminal it is making the 
victim into an (unwilling) car hire firm.25
23See also Fingarette 1977, 502.
24Fingarette 1977, 502.
25This example, which convinced me as an undergraduate of the 
unsatisfactory nature of justifications of punishment based solely on 
compensation, I owe to a political philosophy lecture given by John 
Charvet.
151
Third, in what sense does the rapist owe a debt to the law 
abiding members of the society? Duff has claimed that the 
fair play theorist has it that the rapist has done 
something that we (law abiding members of society), all 
would want to do, but which we don't, because we mediate 
our acts in accordance with the demands of the norms of co­
operation. Duff argues that it is simply not true. We - 
or most of us - do not wish to rape or murder; obeying 
those laws just isn't a burden:
"talk of the criminal's unfair advantage implies that 
obedience to the law is a burden for us all: but is this 
true of such mala in se? Surely many of us do not find 
it a burden to obey the laws against murder and rape, or 
need to restrain ourselves from such crimes: how then 
does the murderer or rapist gain an unfair advantage over 
the rest of us, by evading a burden of self-restraint 
which we accept?"26
The response to all three of these objections (and it 
should be obvious that without a response the theory would 
be fatally undermined) can be encapsulated in the claim 
that all three rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the ideas of benefits and burdens in fair play theory. 
Fair play theory understands the benefits to be intrinsic 
to not obeying the law - what one gains is not having to 
obey the law. The burdens, likewise, are to be understood 
as those of having to mediate the pursuit of one's self
26Duff 1986, 213. A similar criticism appears in Wasserstrom 1980, 
143-146.
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interest by the demands of the norms governing the co­
operative enterprise.
Thus, the fair play theorist can respond to the first 
criticism that it is not that the criminal may either pay 
for his goods now in cash or later in punishment (if he 
steals the goods), because the debt he owes if he steals 
the goods is not for the goods. Likewise, to address the 
second, the benefit (to be considered in justifying 
punishment), is not the illicit gains of material 
possessions, or the pleasures of rape; it is the benefit of 
not having to obey the law, that is, of not regulating 
one1s actions by the norms of co-operation established in 
law.27 Again, the criminal would not "restore the balance 
by returning the stolen goods" because those are not the 
goods that punishment addresses.28 Finally, Duff's 
argument that most of us do not find the prohibition on 
rape burdensome can likewise be rejected; it is not the 
case that what the criminal has done that the law abiding 
members would want to do is rape or murder, but that they 
have acted as free-riders, and this is something that law 
abiding members would also want to do, but don't because 
they recognise their obligations. That is, what the rapist
27See Sadurski 1989, 360-2. Clearly from the criminal's point of 
view the benefits of crime are primarily the material or physical 
gains achieved in robbing or raping someone. A fair play system of 
punishment would presumably advocate the restoring of possessions and 
compensating of the victim (insofar as it is possible), this would be
in addition to punishment, however, the punishment itself must be 
conceived in the terms given above if fair play theory is to avoid 
the objections being met here.
28See Dagger 1993, 478 & 484-87.
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has done that the law abiding members of the society want 
to do, is not rape but free-ride.29
This defence seems to me the only one available to the fair 
play theorist to meet three otherwise devastating 
critiques. It can, however, only do a certain amount of 
work for the fair play theorist, because although it is 
clear that the balance of benefits and burdens could not be 
restored by simply restoring the distributive pattern of 
goods that held before the crime, it is not clear that 
coercive punishment can magically restore the distribution 
of benefits and burdens either, and it seems even less 
likely that punishment will be the only way to do so.
Far more important, however, is the fact that the 
characterisation of benefits and burdens that is at the 
heart of this defence is such that it reinforces the view 
that fair play theory fails to capture what it is that is 
wrong in many criminal activities. It may be true that 
some crimes can be understood as taking unfair advantage of 
others, (mala prohibits), but others are surely wrong in 
some more fundamental sense. To return to the examples of 
rape and murder, these acts are wrong in some other way 
than because they violate a principle of fair play.30 It 
is not the case that what is wrong with rape is that it is
29This defence is given by Dagger 1993, 479-480; Sadurski 1989 offers 
something similar caged in the language of choice options, 357-360.
3°The precise nature of such wrongness depends, of course, on the 
grounding that one gives to morality. I shall argue for a particular 
moral theory below in Chapter 6.
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an example of someone not playing fair, what is wrong with 
it is that it is rape.31 Fair play theory reduces all 
crimes to the non-mediation of one's self interest by the 
duty of fair play,32 and this is problematic for a theory 
of punishment because, in the absence of any additional 
argument, it seems that if there is only one crime then 
there should be only one punishment.
Richard Dagger has attempted to give an answer to this 
problem by arguing that whilst, of course, crimes such as 
rape and murder are mala in se they are also crimes of 
unfairness.33 He goes on to argue that it is for their 
character as crimes of unfairness that they must be 
punished. The additional wrongness of an act might be the 
subject of "punishment of the gods" or "revenge"34 but the 
law has no business replicating the former and once society 
has come into being the right to private revenge is 
replaced by the rule of law. But does this mean, as it 
seems to, that all crimes are equivalent in terms of the
31See Duff 1986, 212.
32This reduction of all crimes to a single offence mirrors Klosko’s 
argument that one has a duty to obey all laws (including those whose
function is to provide discretionary goods) because (if the principle 
of fair play applies) one has an obligation to play one’s part in the 
provision of the presumptive good of the rule of law. Klosko 1992, 
101-3
33,,All crimes, I have said, are in some sense crimes of unfairness. 
They may be more than crimes of unfairness, as rape, robbery and 
murder surely are, but they must be at least crimes of this sort." 
(Dagger 1993, 479)
34Dagger 1993, 479.
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punishment they are to receive?35 Dagger answers no, and 
his answer appears to unravel the case for fair play 
theory:
"This is not to say that the murderer and the tax cheater 
should receive the same punishment tout court. For the 
murderer has committed two crimes, in a sense, but the 
tax cheater only one. The murderer has simultaneously 
committed a crime of unfairness (a malum prohibitum) and 
a crime against her particular victim (a malum in se).
For these two offenses, as it were, she must suffer two 
punishments. The first serves to discharge her debt to 
society by restoring the balance of benefits and burdens 
under the rule of law. The second punishment must be 
justified and established on other grounds."36 
This passage seems to deprive fair play theory of much of 
its force as a justification of the practice of punishment 
in any form with which we are familiar because it seems a 
"considered conviction" (to employ a phrase from Rawls37), 
that different crimes deserve or merit (for whatever 
reason), different punishments, (and that more morally 
serious crimes merit more severe punishments). Further, 
such an account separates the offence (or, at least one
^Or, perhaps even more damaging, that crimes are to be punished in 
proportion to how great the burden is on the average person not to 
commit that act. This problem is discussed in Burgh 1982, 209. The
reason such an outcome would be unsatisfactory is that it seems
likely that most people find it harder not to fiddle their tax
returns than they do not to commit murder; tax fraud, on this scheme,
would then be more serious and punished more seriously, than murder.
36Dagger 1993, 484.
37Rawls 1971, 19.
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description of the offence) and the moral character of the 
act.38
Even ignoring questions about whether fair play theory can 
account for our obligation to obey the lawf then, it cannot 
convert its account of obligation into an account of 
justified coercive punishment. The problems are twofold; 
on its own terms, it cannot explain why the debt owed to 
society needs to be repaid in the form of coercive 
punishment. Viewed from the outside, it characterises the 
debt owed in a manner that is unsatisfactory. This second 
problem is a variation on a wider theme; as I noted at the 
beginning of my remarks, fair play theory is silent on the 
content of justice, it begins "in a just society...". The 
problem with this is that it separates the account of 
justice from the account of punishment. Such a theory is 
formal; any and all violations of the positive law are 
conceived of as benefits and all actions in accordance with 
the positive law as part of a scheme of burdens. The 
content of the positive law is open.39 This is 
unsatisfactory both because it has not been shown that fair 
play theory can account for punishment, and because it 
separates the account of moral wrongness from the account 
of punishment.40
38See Duff 1986, 212.
39This mirrors the objection given by Brian Barry (amongst others),
to theories of justice based on the idea of reciprocity, such as that 
offered by Gibbard. See Barry 1995a, Chapter 2; Gibbard 1990.
40See Sadurski 1989, 368.
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Fair play theory must, then, provide something more 
substantive in its characterisation of "benefits and 
burdens" and we have seen that it cannot do this without 
appealing to arguments which go well beyond its initial 
claims and which, I believe, threaten to negate its own 
role. To return to the question I left hanging some time 
ago: most fair play theorists begin much as I did with the 
statement "assuming that the benefits and burdens are 
distributed in a society in a just manner...'1, they then go 
on to consider punishment as a response to a disruption in 
the pattern of distribution, and then perhaps say something 
at the end about how this makes just punishment only 
possible in a just society.41 What has become apparent is 
that this is not sufficient, because fair play theory 
cannot even complete the intermediate stage of showing that 
punishment is necessarily to be understood in this way. It 
needs completing, and in what follows I aim to show that 
the theory that informs the first claim (as to the justice 
or otherwise of the distribution of benefits and burdens) 
generates the understanding of moral wrong and punishment; 
fair play theory, if it has any function at all, has a mere 
fragmentary role at a much later theoretical stage than has 
been recognised by its supporters.
41See, e.g., Murphy 1973.
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23. Contractualism and Consent
The contention of this section is that fair play theorists 
have relied on an implicit contractualist account of moral 
wrong. Indeed, often this commitment is made explicit.42 
The advantages of contractualism for the fair play theorist 
are numerous: First, contractualism offers an account of
morality that is different from the traditional options of 
intuitionism, Kantian deontology or some version of 
consequentialism. Second, contractualism is often thought 
to involve consent, and if consent can be worked into the 
theory then the worry of people such as Robert Nozick that 
the foundational claim of fair play theory43 is itself 
unsustainable, can be met. One is obliged to contribute in 
accordance with the demands of the joint enterprise because 
one has agreed so to do. Third, a further advantage of 
invoking consent is that it bolsters the claim that 
punishment is not the prima facie harm, or invasion of the 
offender's autonomy, that it is thought to be. This is 
because the offender can be said to have consented to his 
punishment. In considering contractualist accounts of 
morality I want to address two questions: Is it true that 
contractualism embodies consent in such a way as to allow 
the punishing authorities to claim that the offender has
42See Murphy 1973; Dagger 1993 represents his position as a summary 
of fair play theory, but in fact relies on two not terribly well 
integrated arguments, a contractualist account of the general 
justifying aim of punishment and a fair play account of the 
distribution of punishment.
43That is, that advantageous membership of a joint enterprise obliges
one to do one's bit.
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consented to his own punishment? And, second, what type of 
punishing system would emerge from a contractualist account 
of morality?
One of the most important statements of fair play theory - 
Jeffrie Murphy's 1973 article "Marxism and Retribution"44 - 
is explicit in claiming precisely these advantages. The 
fundamental problem, Murphy argues, is to reconcile 
individual autonomy - individual rights - and legitimate 
punishment: "Even if punishment has wonderful social
consequences, what gives anyone the right to inflict it on 
me?"45 Murphy's answer to this question is to invoke a 
mixture of contractarianism, consent and fair play theory. 
His first move, and the one that is of concern here, is to 
say that "one fairly typical way in which others acquire 
rights over us is by our own consent." In what follows I 
want to examine the nature of consent in Murphy's article 
before turning to different contractarian accounts of 
justice and analysing whether consent has a role in any of 
them. I do not follow Murphy's account of the 
contractarian theories of Kant and Rawls because I believe 
he is fundamentally mistaken in his account of both of 
them.46 In short, what I want to consider first is the 
question of whether it follows from a contractarian account 
of morality that an offender can be said to have "willed
^Murphy 1973.
^Murphy 1973, 223.
46For Kant on willing one's own punishment see S6; for Rawls on 
justice and punishment §27; Appendix A.
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his own punishment". Murphy begins with the following 
example:
"If a neighbor locks up my liquor cabinet to protect me 
against my tendencies to drink too heavily, I might well 
regard this as a presumptuous interference with my own 
freedom, no matter how good the result intended or 
accomplished. He had no right to do it and indeed 
violated my rights in doing it. If, on the other hand, I 
had asked him to do this or had given my free consent to 
his suggestion that he do it, the same sort of objection 
on my part would be quite out of order-even if, at the 
time of his doing it, I did not desire or want the action 
to be performed."47 
Murphy believes that it "is obvious [how] this applies to 
our problem",48 but as it stands this example is too open 
to draw any conclusions. Let us say that on Monday I ask 
my neighbour to lock my drinks cabinet on Tuesday. Between 
Monday and Tuesday I do not get drunk, nor in any other way 
impair my mental or physical faculties. On Tuesday my 
neighbour comes around and I tell him that I have changed 
my mind and that I no longer want him to lock the cabinet. 
If he does so now, the intuition on which Murphy is trading 
seems undermined; one is entitled to change one's mind, and 
there is no reason why precedence should be given to the 
desires an individual expressed at one time over the 
desires the individual expresses at any relevant later 
time. A second story could have it, however, that on
47Murphy 1973, 223. Cf. Duff's example of Jane. (Duff 1986, p220)
48Murphy 1973, 224.
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Tuesday I am going to an important evening meeting about 
which I am very nervous. I know that when I am nervous I 
tend to drink to excess to fortify myself with "Dutch 
courage" but that this is unlikely to impress the business 
partners with whom I am meeting. I therefore ask my 
neighbour to come around on Tuesday and lock up the cabinet 
because I am aware that if he does not I will get drunk. 
My neighbour comes around and I tell him that I have 
changed my mind. I have, however, forewarned my neighbour 
that I would do this and told him to ignore my expressed 
wishes and go ahead and lock the cabinet.
In some sense I have given my consent to my neighbour' s 
actions - but to what have I consented? I have surely 
agreed to his subverting my autonomy; that is, given that I 
am self-reflective being capable of understanding and 
acting upon reasons, but that I know that I am likely to 
suffer weakness of will in this particular context, I 
abrogate responsibility for my actions to my neighbour - I 
ask him to be responsible for me. If I wished to retain my 
autonomy and yet seek help, I could ask my neighbour to 
come around on Tuesday and reason with me, pointing out all 
the arguments I have given him for why I should not drink, 
why the meeting is important to me, etc. If I simply tell 
him to come around and lock the cabinet irrespective of 
whether I concur with these arguments or not, then I 
consent to the sacrifice of my autonomy because of a 
concern for my business future, that may well be sensible 
but it is still a sacrifice of autonomy.
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There is one further development of the example that may 
aid us in getting to a position in which acting against the 
express wishes of an agent is compatible with respecting 
his autonomy. That is by removing the stipulation that the 
agent is still capable of self-critical reflection and 
rational action. It is possible to amend the given example 
to illustrate this, by say assuming that "I" am a chronic 
alcoholic. However, an intuitively stronger example is 
provided by Murphy, and so as to take on this argument at 
its best let us turn to this case - that of the psychotic 
depressive.49 Let us say that I am a friend of a psychotic 
depressive, call him Richard, who, when not in the throes 
of depression shows no suicidal tendencies. He otherwise 
lives a normal, full human life with a job he values and a 
wife and children for whom he cares very deeply.50 When he 
is in the depths of his depression, Richard is incapable of 
rational self-reflection and rational action and he is 
prone to attempt suicide. He asks me forcibly to stop him 
from committing suicide when he is depressed and to 
accompany him to a hospital. Now, it is not clear to me 
that in so doing I would be respecting his rational will;51 
however, it is the case that in interfering with Richard's
49Murphy 1973, 230.
50I am not adding these details simply to make the example more
interesting, rather it is necessary that one has at least prima facie 
evidence that Richard does not, when capable of rational action, 
desire to commit suicide. I take it that there is nothing that makes 
suicide necessarily irrational. (For a fascinating, if idiosyncratic 
study of suicide see the case of Ellen West. Binswanger 1958; M. 
Foucault 1976, 54-55; 1984-5, 62.)
51This is a claim made by Duff. (Duff 1986, 221)
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suicide attempt I am not acting so as to remove his 
autonomy. Given that at that time Richard is incapable of 
autonomous action, autonomy simply does not arise as an 
issue; it is, rather, analogous to stopping a goldfish from 
eating so much food that it kills itself.
Having established three models of consent I want to turn 
to contractarian accounts of morality. What Murphy argues 
is that if we understand moral injunctions and the nature 
of society in contractarian terms then the criminal when 
punished will retain his autonomy because he will have 
willed his own punishment. Murphy believes that this 
combines with fair play theory because the contractarian 
story he tells is one based on reciprocity, but that does 
not have to be the case. Contractarian accounts of 
morality, however, do aim to tell us the nature of wrong 
acts. Whether they need a fair play account of punishment 
in addition to this account of wrongness is something that 
will be considered below. I now want to turn to 
contractarian theories and ask what kind of consent they 
embody, specifically what kind of consent can be imputed to 
an agent who appears to do anything but consent to his own 
punishment; in fact, who does everything he can to avoid 
capture and punishment. In addition, I want to consider 
the question of what type of punishing systems would emerge 
from differently constituted contractarian accounts. 
First, then, it is necessary to describe the purpose and 
main features of contemporary contractarian accounts of 
justice.
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24. Contractualism Considered
Contractarian accounts of justice have dominated the 
landscape of political theory since the 1971 publication of 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Contemporary contractarianism 
can be distinguished from its more traditional 
Enlightenment versions (of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) 
because the latter were embedded in non-contractarian moral 
theories; they explained how political authority could be 
made legitimate - why we should obey the sovereign - in 
terms of promise keeping. The terms of the contract and 
the moral force given to it, however, both stemmed from 
background theories of natural law. The traditional 
contract theorists, in short, claimed that one ought to 
obey government because one had promised so to do - one had 
given one's word - however, as Hume put it, such theorists 
'find [themselves] embarrassed when it is asked, Why we are 
bound to keep our word?'"52 Contemporary contractarianism 
asks a different question and does not rely on the analogy 
with promise keeping. The question upon which it has 
focused has not been that of political obligation but of 
justice. In short, it addresses the question "What is 
justice?" Beyond this, it is difficult to say anything of 
contemporary contractarianism as a whole because of the 
numerous varieties that have been suggested over the past 
twenty years. What the approach embodies, however, is a
52Hume "Of the Original Contract", quoted in Kymlicka 1991, 188
citing, incorrectly, Barker 1960, 229. The correct page number is 
161.
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commitment to the idea that moral realism in any of its 
traditional forms is unsustainable and that we are to 
understand morality as the norms which govern the co­
operative practice of some group (from small societies to 
the human species depending upon the theorist), and in 
accordance with which individuals should regulate their 
actions. Its starting point is not with an historical 
account of the genesis of society but with the question of 
how we are to understand and (de) legitimate the norms which 
currently govern society. It is thus a reflective 
practice, requiring that the theorist distance himself from 
the practices and norms current in his society and question 
how they are to be understood.
Such a characterisation of contemporary contractarianism is 
what leads thinkers such as Murphy and Sadurski to think 
that punishment must be understood on some fair play model. 
If society is a co-operative endeavour and morality the 
voluntarily agreed rules that govern the co-operative 
endeavour, they ask, how else is punishment to be 
understood except as restoring the balance of benefits and 
burdens which are distributed in accordance with the agreed 
rules? Further, if the agreed rules are to be understood 
as voluntarily accepted by the members of the society, how 
can punishment be contrary to the offender's will? The 
first of these questions has been partially addressed 
above, and in what follows I shall examine whether it is 
necessarily true that contemporary contractarian thought 
yields fair play type justifications of punishment. The
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second question immediately brings back into focus the role 
of consent in contemporary contractarianism, or more 
plausibly, it questions the motivation contemporary 
contractarianism gives to the agent for theorising his 
relations with others in this manner. To consider this a 
better, more detailed, account of contemporary 
contractarianism is needed.
Contemporary contractarianism is sometimes referred to as a 
species of constructivism, perhaps because John Rawls 
adopted that term when describing his own approach.53 The 
clearest statement of what is meant by constructivism can 
be found in Brian Barry's Theories of Justice, and because 
of its clarity and importance it is worth quoting in full. 
Barry sets two conditions in defining constructivism:
"First — there must be a theory to the effect that what 
comes out of a certain kind of situation is to count as 
just. "What comes out" might be a principle, a rule, or 
a particular outcome. Justice can be predicated of any 
of these, and the point is that we can derive its justice 
from its having emerged from the situation. A 
"situation” is specified by a description of the actors 
in it (including their knowledge and objectives) and the 
norms governing their pursuit of their objectives: what 
moves are to be legitimate. And the "emergence" is to be 
a particular kind of emergence, namely the result of the 
actors in the situation pursuing their given objectives 
within the given constraints.
53See Rawls 1980; 1993a, 111:1 89-99, 110-116, 111:3, 111:5.
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That is a necessary condition of a constructivist 
conception of justice but not a sufficient one. The 
second requirement is that the constructing is to be done 
by a theorist and not by the people in the situation 
themselves.54
I shall argue in Chapter 5 that impartialist theorists 
build in to the situation sufficiently substantive moral 
claims to make the agreement component of constructivism 
redundant, and I shall call such a position, faux 
constructivism. In other words, if the theorist constructs 
the situation in such a way as to determine the outcome, 
then the construction is left to be nothing other than a 
heuristic device. The importance of that here (apart from 
introducing the idea of constructivism), is that in order 
to bolster the claim that the offender has willed his own 
punishment, the Murphyan contractualist theorist needs to 
show that the offender is in some way committed to the 
contractualist scheme that justifies his punishment. This 
brings up the important question of the motivation posited 
by contractualists, and it also reveals a problem faux 
constructivism poses for Murphy's argument.
If, as I have claimed, faux constructivism embodies a 
commitment to a particular version of morality, then the 
offender might be thought to embody a different account, 
and we are returned to the seemingly arbitrary imposition 
of punishment, or, if justified in some other manner,
54Barry 1989, 266.
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certainly not a punishment imposed with the offender's 
consent. This is why Murphy attempts to portray Rawls (and 
Kant in his political theory), as deriving his conclusions 
from rationality alone.55 Murphy converts the Rawlsian 
contract into a meeting of noumenal selves in "the kingdom 
of ends":
"On this theory, [the social contract theory of "Kant and 
Rawls"] a man may be said to rationally will X if, and 
only if, X is called for by a rule that the man would 
necessarily have adopted in the original position of 
choice - i.e., in a position of coming together with 
others to pick rules for the regulation of their mutual 
affairs. This avoids arbitrariness because, according to 
Kant and Rawls at any rate, the question of whether such 
a rule would be picked in such a position is objectively 
determinable given certain (in their view) 
noncontroversial assumptions about human nature and 
rational calculation. Thus I can be said to will my own 
punishment if, in an antecedent position of choice, I and 
my fellows would have chosen institutions of punishment 
as the most rational means of dealing with those who 
might break the other generally beneficial social rules 
that had been adopted."56
55This is why I said earlier that I would not be particularly 
concerned with Murphy's own characterisation of Rawls on the grounds
that it was wrong. The portrayal of Rawls as attempting to ground 
his principles of justice on rationality alone was one which had some 
currency but which is based, as Brian Barry has put it, "on a reading 
of Rawls that is pure fiction". (Barry 1995a, Chapter 1).
56Murphy 1973, 230.
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Two issues, then, still concern us: first, whether
contractarian accounts of justice do, in fact, embody 
Murphyan type consent, and second, on a more coherent 
account of the contractualist scheme, the question of what 
kind of moral injunctions and punishing practices would 
emerge from differing characterisations of the initial 
situation.
Murphy is clearly not appealing to the type of explicit 
consent found in the liquor cabinet example, rather what he 
is saying is that his version of contractarianism includes 
the claim that all rational beings (including the offender) 
would will the system of punishment (that was agreed, 
ignoring for the moment what its particular form would be) 
and thus the offender can be said to have willed his own 
punishment. Let us for the moment grant Murphy's 
characterisation of the contractarian scheme, is it true 
that the offender has willed the system of punishment? 
Clearly not. Murphy's strongest claim cannot be that the 
offender has willed his own punishment but that punishment 
is not an infringement upon the offender's autonomy because 
autonomy is to be understood as living in accordance with 
one's rational self, and one's rational self would commit 
one to the principles agreed in the initial situation, 
including a principle of punishment. To substantiate such 
a claim, however, it needs to be shown that the initial 
situation and the moves permitted within it are generated 
from rationality alone. This is not plausible, but to see 
why we need to embark on a closer examination of
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substantive contractarian theories of justice and in so 
doing approach, as well, the second question: what type of 
punishing system would emerge from a contractarian starting 
point?
The answer to this second question, unfortunately but 
unsurprisingly, is going to depend upon the theorist who 
performs the task of constructing the initial situation, 
for just as there is an initial situation for every theory 
of distributive justice so there is one for every theory of 
punishment. Thus, Jan Narveson has argued that if one 
removes (from a Rawlsian starting point) the Rawlsian 
stipulation that the people in the original position suffer 
from extreme risk aversion then the social contract will 
yield utilitarian principles for punishment.57 On the 
other side, so to speak, James Sterba has argued that from 
the contractual situation one can generate "a morally 
adequate form of retributivism" ,58 the particular form of 
which has been challenged (in my view successfully) by T. 
M. Reed.59
57Narveson 1974. This argument is employed by Harsanyi to show that 
average utility, rather than the difference principle would be chosen 
as the principle of distributive justice, once risk aversion has been 
removed. (Harsanyi 1982)
58Sterba 1977, 352.
59Reed 1978. For a discussion of both the problem of willing one's 
own punishment and of deriving any determinate theory of punishment 
from a Rawlsian scenario see Duff 1986, 217-228. On the general 
problem of the derivation of profoundly different results from small 
changes in the construction of the original position see Fishkin 
1993, 79-81. What Fishkin overlooks is the other side of the
reflective equilibrium equation - our considered convictions - which 
would eliminate most of the alternatives, a possibility which as I 
point out here is not available to punishment theorists. (See M. 
Matravers 1995) Another notable attempt to apply Rawlsian theorising 
to punishment can be found in Hoekema 1980.
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At this stage, however, my primary concern is with the 
nature of contractarianism and especially with the 
motivations imputed to the parties in the initial situation 
and thus it is not necessary to examine each and every 
version of the contractualist argument. Following Barry 
and Kymlicka60 I shall rather look at two general forms of 
contractarian theorising, one embodying justice as mutual 
advantage in this Chapter and, in the next, two versions of 
justice as impartiality.
25. Justice as Mutual Advantage
Contract theories embodying justice as mutual advantage 
assume that society is to be conceived as a co-operative 
endeavour; each individual theorises his relations to the 
norms of the society from the point of view of furthering 
his own interest and nothing else. Each realises that the 
unconstrained, independent, pursuit by all of their own 
goods is likely to result in conflict and that, therefore, 
agreeing to a common set of constraints is likely to result 
in greater success for all. The motivation for
participation is that it is in one's interest to do so, and 
that is all. In Barryan terms, the actors in "the 
situation" are concrete individuals, aware of the details 
of their lives - such as their talents, abilities,
60Barry 1989; Kymlicka 1991.
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conceptions of the good etc. - and motivated by furthering 
their interests.61
In such a situation what "emerges" is likely to be in 
conflict with our moral intuitions because the strong are 
in a position to exploit their strength to the point where 
those with whom they want to co-operate are only just 
better off than they would be outside of co-operation but 
far less well off than the strong.62 Those in a position 
to contribute little or nothing, with whom the strong will 
have no reason to desire co-operation, will be excluded 
altogether; "beyond the pale of morality", in the words of 
David Gauthier, a recent exponent of justice as mutual 
advantage.63 Any set of principles which mirrored relative 
bargaining strength, then, would hardly be recognisable as 
a theory of justice; perhaps, as Kymlicka suggests, it is 
not really a theory of our moral experiences and practices 
but an entirely alternative morality.64 Of course, amongst 
groups with relatively equal bargaining power the outcome
61The locus classicus is, of course, Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan 
(Hobbes 1651). For extended discussions of the theory of justice as 
mutual advantage see Barry 1995a, Chapter 2; Hampton 1986; Kymlicka 
1991, 189-91.
621 am here allowing that justice as mutual advantage would settle on 
a particular determinate answer to the distribution of goods 
(liberties etc.); that is, one which reflects relative bargaining 
power. As Brian Barry has pointed out, however, there is no reason 
to think that in a world in which information is anything but perfect 
this will be the case. Barry 1995a, Chapter 2.
63For an indication of just how such a theory might effect the weak 
see David Gauthier's discussion of the "congenitally handicapped and 
defective." (Gauthier 1986, 286, 18 note 30) For a discussion of 
Gauthier on this point see Barry 1995a, Chapter 2; Buchanan 1990,
230-2.
64Kymlicka 1991, 190-1.
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would better approximate to our convictions about justice, 
but this is similar to Socrates1 claim that thieves must 
recognise justice amongst themselves, it does nothing to 
address the fact that the relations between the thieves and 
the powerless traveller are not likely to be just. I can 
think of no more eloquent statement of the problem than 
that made by Ouray, the chief of the Ute indigenous 
American tribe which is cited by Brian Barry:
"The agreement an Indian makes to a United States treaty 
~ is like the agreement a buffalo makes with his hunters 
when pierced with arrows. All he can do is lie down and 
give in." 65
But, if justice as mutual advantage doesn't match our 
considered convictions about justice, nor is it clear that 
it can succeed on its own terms; that is, as a method of 
ensuring stability. In the first instance, any agreement 
arising from mutual advantage is inherently unstable given 
that relative bargaining powers are liable to change. The 
moment one group increased its relative power it would be 
in its interests to re-negotiate the terms of agreement.66 
In addition, there is in such a theory a free-rider 
problem: given that each member co-operates on the basis of
65Barry 1995a, Chapter 2, quoting from Dee Brown 1971, 368.
66This, of course, is reflected in the experience of indigenous 
Americans; as soon as the settling whites found themselves in a 
position to further increase their territory at the expense of the 
American "Indians" they did so, first tearing up the relevant treaty 
- "treaties of perpetual peace" - then renegotiating another 
agreement after securing their territorial goals. See Barry 1995a, 
Chapter 2. David Hume, it seems, admitted this element of justice as 
mutual advantage. (See Barry 1989, 162 for a discussion of this 
point).
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the 'moral' norms because (and only because) it furthers 
his interest to do so, he will be motivated when he 
believes that he can get away with it to break the terms of 
co-operation and free-ride.67 This, in addition, gives rise 
to an assurance problem; it is only in the interests of 
each member to regulate his actions in accordance with the 
norms that emerge from the initial situation if every other 
contracting party does so, and if he is sure that they will 
do so.
This, of course, is why the co-operative practice to which 
each agrees much contain a coercive element. The coercive 
element is necessary to deter the individual who, in this 
instance, would be better off by breaking the norms of co­
operation, from so doing. If it does this effectively, it 
provides the condition of "sufficient security",68 (it 
answers the assurance problem), by convincing each party 
that the others will not free-ride. But what are the 
chances of a coercive element succeeding? Justice as 
mutual advantage yields prohibitions that can in a sense be 
best characterised as legal - they are prohibitions against 
which one's self interest strains - it does not yield
67As Brian Barry puts it; "Suppose you accept that some set of rules 
would advance everybody's conception of the good (including yours) if 
generally complied with, in comparison with a situation in which each 
person pursued his conception of the good independently. The 
question is: why does that give you a reason for complying with the 
rules on an occasion when you believe that you could advance your 
conception of the good more effectively by breaking the rules?" 
(Barry MS, 10)
68Hobbes 1651, Part I, Chapter 15, 215. It should be noted that I am 
assuming that a system of coercion (and, where appropriate, 
punishment), does have deterrent effects. I defend this in §39, see 
Chapter 7, note 17.
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authoritatively binding moral norms through which one comes 
to understand o n e ’s self interest.69 This is 
unsatisfactory because, in addition to yielding counter­
intuitive results, it does not even yield the stability 
which is the point of the contract: whereas some simple 
societies may have succeeded in remaining relatively stable 
without separating moral from legal injunctions, no society 
could (or has) relied exclusively on legal sanctions. The 
reason is clear: coercion can be effective only if the 
majority of the people comply with the law because they 
believe it to be just, or legitimate, or just because it is 
the law. If the majority decided whether to obey the law 
on the basis of furthering their interests, albeit that the 
cost of being caught would be factored into their thinking, 
coercion would have little hope of succeeding in ensuring 
stability. Even if the sanctions for crimes with low rates 
of conviction (such as those against property) were 
extremely stringent it would be unlikely that the society 
could hold together. The problem is that what is missing 
is a recognisably moral (and not necessarily legal) 
element; the fabric of any advanced society is largely 
maintained by non-legal, moral, approbation and 
opprobrium.70 This is just to restate what I said above: 
justice as mutual advantage fails to yield authoritatively 
binding moral norms.
69This understanding of morality is given fuller consideration in 
§32.
70Hobbes recognised this, men, he says "need to be diligently, and 
truly taught; because [civil society] cannot be maintained by _ 
terrour of legal punishment". (Hobbes 1651, Part II, Chapter 30, 
337).
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On such a theory, then, the coercive element - which for 
the moment let us assume takes the form of a system of 
punishment - has as its justification the deterring of 
potential offenders and, if successful, the solution to the 
assurance game. The parties to the initial situation 
believe that it is generally in their interests to co­
operate in accordance with the laws if every co-operating 
party does so; if punishment is to guarantee compliance 
what would the system of punishment have to look like? 
Given the failure of justice as mutual advantage I shall 
not examine this in too much detail here, confining myself 
to a few general remarks71.
Punishment, then, is to be conceived as nothing more than 
an extra cost, a payment that one has to make if one 
commits an act contrary to the terms on which co-operation 
is to be undertaken.72 Given this, the system of sanctions 
would have to be extremely harsh; each individual is 
motivated to break the law when it is to his advantage to 
do so and the only countervailing motivation is provided 
by the system of legal sanctions. Second - given the 
plausible assumption that people are more likely to be 
motivated to break tax laws, commit motoring offences etc., 
than commit murder or serious bodily harm, and given that 
conviction rates for the former type of offences is far
71The outcome of what I take to be a correctly characterised
contractualist account of justice for punishment is examined below in 
Chapters 6 & 7.
72Cf. Rawls 1971, 215.
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lower than for the latter - the punishments for the former 
offences may have to be relatively more severe compared 
with the latter.73 It may still be that people contracting 
on the basis of mutual advantage may wish the penalties for 
crimes against the person to be more severe than for crimes 
against property (given that they fear the greater harm of 
crimes against the person) but it is still likely that the 
penalty for crimes against property (and minor offences 
such as motoring offences) would have to be much more 
severe than they are even in present day Britain, and thus 
relatively more severe when compared with the penalties for 
crimes such as murder. Finally, it is worth noting, that 
in the implausible world of a society based on justice as 
mutual advantage, the scope of the law would have to be at 
least as wide as that employed by the more "totalising1 of 
totalitarian regimes. This is because, without effective 
moral sanctions - that is without sanctions that appeal to 
the agent being condemned in such a way as to get him to 
reconsider his understanding of his self-interest - the 
society would have to rely on legal sanctions.
The only appeal available to the those doing the 
condemning, then, is to say that the society taken 
generally would be better off if people were not successful
73As J. F. Stephen put it, "surely it is at the moment when 
temptation to crime is strongest that the law should speak most 
clearly and emphatically to the contrary." (Stephen 1883, Vol. 2, 
107). Cf. Bentham: "The strength of the temptation (ceteris paribus) 
is as the profit of the offence: the quantum of the punishment must 
rise with the profit of the offence: ceteris paribus, it must
therefore rise with the strength of the temptation". (Bentham 1789, 
Chapter 16, S9).
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when performing whatever action is being condemned. This 
casts some illumination on the question of whether it can 
be said that the offender willed his punishment. Whilst it 
is clear that the starting point would be to say that to 
the offender that he benefits from the co-operative scheme 
and that the co-operative scheme is only possible if non- 
compliance with the laws is kept to a manageable level, the 
offender can concur with this but claim that in this 
instance it was in his interests to ignore the law, and 
given that he is a single individual it is not the case 
that he endangered the co-operative practice itself. He 
calculated the risks, both to himself and to the practice, 
and the benefits and chose to break the law. In some sense 
his argument suggests that he accepts his punishment; it is 
just a factor to be included in the calculation of whether 
the criminal action was worthwhile, but it surely extends 
the meaning of the term too much to say that he willed it, 
rationally or otherwise. I certainly accept that if I 
drink too much in an evening I will suffer a hang over, and 
I consider this cost when I decide whether to have 
a(nother) drink, but I would balk at the suggestion that I 
willed my hang over.
The idiocy of attempts to ground morality solely in terms 
of mutual advantage, then, explains why theorists of 
justice as mutual advantage are keen to import the 
motivation I identified above in theories of fair play, or 
reciprocity. That is, that one should be motivated to 
behave fairly; not to free-ride. This is not available in
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a theory of mutual advantage, but the combination of an 
agreement reached by justice as mutual advantage and a 
motivation of acting justly has recently had something of a 
revival in the work of Alan Gibbard.74 As I noted above, 
however, fair play or reciprocity leaves the content of the 
principles of justice open, and if these are given by an 
agreement based on mutual advantage then the theory is 
susceptible to all the objections formulated against the 
content of such theories above. But, further, if the 
content of justice is given by mutual advantage the 
proposition that the motivation the agent has for 
compliance - to behave fairly - will be sufficient to meet 
the objections formulated above is fantastical.
Consider the argument: justice as reciprocity is more
stable because the motivation for complying with the norms 
of justice is not that penal sanctions apply to free­
riders, but that the participants are motivated by the 
desire to act fairly. Is this plausible? The stability 
problem arose from two sources: the more powerful press for 
re-negotiation if their relative power increases; and the 
weak (like everybody else) are constantly motivated to 
break the norms when it is in their interests to do so 
(and, of course, given that the norms are constructed to 
benefit the strong, the weak, presumably, will often be in 
such a position). The motivation to act fairly does 
nothing to address the first problem, and, it seems to me, 
can only plausibly address part of the second. Perhaps the
74See Alan Gibbard 1990, 1991.
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motivation to act fairly may convert the norms of mutual 
advantage into authoritatively binding moral norms for 
those who feel that the system benefits them in relative 
terms, but it seems odd (to say the least) to say that the 
motivation to act fairly will act in such an efficacious 
way for the less advantaged;75 we are being asked to 
believe, say, that after the initial agreement has deprived 
the American Indians of much of their territory and
condemned many of them to poverty and starvation, they have
a good reason for keeping the agreement given the 
motivation to act fairly. Rather, I would have thought, 
tell them that they should keep the agreement to avoid 
complete destruction (which after all is the motive for 
their signing the treaty) as would be the case in a pure 
theory of mutual advantage.
Of course, as I noted above, theories of punishment which 
depend upon this motivation to play fair, begin with a 
commitment to a fair starting point. But, as I pointed out 
there, they cannot do this without importing a moral theory 
to give them this fair starting point. We have seen that 
justice as mutual advantage cannot be that moral theory. I 
now wish to turn to the remaining category of
contractualist theories, theories of justice as 
impartiality, and see whether they can be any more 
successful, and whether fair play has any role in
justifying punishment within such theories.
75This is the point made by Jeffrie Murphy in "Marxism and 
Retribution" (1973).
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Chapter 5: Impartial Justice and 
Punishment
"If the original position is to yield agreements that are 
just, the parties must be fairly situated and treated 
equally as moral persons.” Rawls 1971, 141.
26. Justice as Impartiality
In Chapter 4 I claimed that recent contractarian accounts 
of justice could be understood best in the light of Brian 
Barry's definition of constructivism. I then identified 
one set of contractarian theories, theories of justice as 
mutual advantage, and discarded them both because they led 
to outcomes fundamentally at odds with our considered 
convictions about justice and because they failed to ensure 
stability by providing authoritatively binding moral norms. 
In this chapter I want to consider theories of justice as 
impartiality, again from the perspective of punishment and 
again trying to use this perspective to examine the cogency 
of the theories themselves. I shall begin with some 
general reflections on the nature of such theories and then 
turn to a closer examination of the function of punishment.
To anticipate the conclusion of the chapter: justice as 
impartiality is an example of what I shall call faux 
constructivism, that is, it builds the answer into the 
construction in such a way as to leave the construction to 
do little work in the theory. As a consequence, the 
coercive element must be justified by a second, 
independent, argument of the form of one of those examined
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and rejected in the preceding chapters; a metaphysical (and 
pre-institutional) appeal to desert; a two level 
consequentialism; or a fair play theory.1
Justice as impartiality differs fundamentally from theories 
of justice based on mutual advantage. This is not only a 
matter of coming to different conclusions about the content 
of justice, it also uses the contractualist procedure to a 
completely different end. As Kymlicka puts it in his 
review of contractarian approaches, justice as 
impartiality:
"uses the device of a social contract in order to 
develop, rather than replace, traditional notions of 
moral obligation; it uses the idea of the contract to 
express the inherent moral standing of persons, rather 
than to generate an artificial moral standing; and it 
uses the device of the contract to negate, rather than 
reflect, unequal bargaining power."2 
Kymlicka's characterisation of theories of justice as 
impartiality makes clear that although what emerges from 
the contract is, indeed, justice, what goes in to the 
initial choosing situation is a commitment to the moral 
equality of human beings.3 We know that people must be 
treated as (in Kantian terms) ends in themselves or (in
■^Indeed, in one case - John Rawls's A Theory of Justice - all three 
of the above appear at various points in the argument to justify 
punishment, see Appendix A.
2Kymlicka 1991, 191.
3The original position "represents equality between human beings as 
moral persons." (Rawls 1971, 190)
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more modern terms) with "equal consideration". What we are 
unsure of is what, precisely, this means. The idea of the 
contract is that it is a procedure for determining the 
content of our moral duty to treat others with equal 
consideration. This is, in my view, a faux constructivism; 
the construction does not ground morality but merely 
explicates currently shared moral convictions. The 
"situation" is determined by the outcome - by what 
"emerges" - rather than the other way around. Thus, as 
Rawls admits, "for each traditional conception of justice 
there exists an interpretation of the initial situation in 
which its principles are the preferred solution".4 Such 
faux constructivism is then some mixture of coherentism 
grounded (in the cases in which I am interested) in liberal 
post-enlightenment intuitions. The construction is left 
with a considerably less ambitious function than the 
grounding of justice; as Brian Barry has put it:
once we admit that substantive intuitions have to go 
into the specification of the original position if we are 
to derive definite implications, the case for saying 
constructivism is something different from intuitionism 
becomes weaker. But it seems to me that there is still a 
good case for saying the construction is doing some real
4Rawls 1971, 121. This understanding of the role of the contract is 
the context in which Rawls's often quoted and equally often 
misunderstood statements about the principles of justice being the 
outcome of rational deliberation (or, the theory being an example of 
"moral geometry") need to be read. For example, Rawls says that to 
"say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the 
original position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberation 
satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain 
conclusion". (Rawls 1971, 138) It is vital to remember when reading 
such quotations that the "certain conditions" and "restrictions” 
guarantee the "conclusion".
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work provided what is put in is more general than what 
comes out."5
The easiest way to further unpack the idea of justice as 
impartiality is to consider examples of such theorising; I 
shall begin with the most famous recent attempt, John 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice6 I shall try to be brief, 
however, as I take it that the basic tenets of Rawls's work 
are familiar and I am trying to make quite specific points 
and not to provide a general overview of the main arguments 
of A Theory of Justice. I shall then go on to discuss 
Scanlon's development of Rawls.
27. Rawls
If what I have said above is right then the function of the 
Rawlsian contract is to capture and make more specific some 
basic "considered convictions" we share about morality.7
5Barry 1989, 275. The belief that this is all there is to
constructivism is what allows Barry to derive the difference 
principle without reference to the contract argument, see Barry 1989, 
Chapter 6.
6Much work has gone into seeing whether Rawls's more recent 
statements on justice, and indeed on A Theory of Justice (see Rawls 
1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1993a, 1993b) are
compatible with his statements made earlier in that book. I am 
concerned here just with one - although I think the right - reading 
of A Theory of Justice. This is because I am not particularly 
interested here in Rawlsian scholarship, or in Rawls's answer as 
such, I am interested in a particular account of justice, one I think 
is embodied in A Theory of Justice. An analysis of recent 
developments can be found in Mulhall and Swift 1992; Barry 1995a, 
1995b.
7Rawls 1971, 19. I take it that the question of who "we" are is not 
controversial, we are modern liberals (using that term in its 
broadest, political, sense). It does not follow from that, however, 
that what emerges from is necessarily relativistic. It is true that 
impartialist justice is ours in the sense that it is according to us,
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Most importantly, it is to embody and reflect the 
fundamental equality8 of moral agents. The contract, then, 
must be negotiated from such a position, and this is 
ensured by placing the contracting parties behind a "veil 
of ignorance".9 The people in the original position - in 
the contracting situation - are to choose principles of 
justice from a position of ignorance about their talents, 
abilities and infirmities, their position in society and 
the position of their society. They are to be motivated by 
a concern to further their conception of the good through 
maximising their access to social primary goods (liberty 
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self- 
respect10). The veil of ignorance, here, is clearly the 
key; it commits each individual to choose principles as if 
he were anyone, indeed, in removing all the differences 
between people in the original position it removes the need 
for there to be people rather than a person,11 all that
it does not follow that it applies only to us. As Scanlon has put 
it, "the fact that in the method of Reflective Equilibrium we begin 
with 'our' considered judgements does not make that relativistic, 
because the fact that others, beginning with different judgements, 
would arrive at different conclusions through the same method does 
not mean that we must regard their conclusions as just as valid as 
ours. 'Our' considered judgements and the principles they lead to 
can include judgements about what is right and wrong 'for them', 
including judgements about the correctness or incorrectness of their 
starting points." (Scanlon 1992, 22) It must be said that Rawls has 
since become considerably more relativistic in his interpretation of 
the claims made by his own theory, see especially Rawls 1993a, Rawls 
1993b.
8I shall use "fundamental" as a term of art denoting that individuals 
are to be treated as abstract selves, and thus as identical for the 
purpose of initial distribution of resources.
9See Rawls 1971, §24.
10See Rawls 1971, 62.
11 "To begin with, it is clear that since the differences among the 
parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational and
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matters is that it ensures that the principles are chosen 
from an impartial standpoint; an impartial standpoint which 
is built in to the theory.12
Rawls in fact goes even further than this, in "defin[ing] 
the original position so [as to] get the desired 
solution",13 "we work from both ends",14 that is, we 
characterise an initial choosing situation and then see 
what emerges from it. Should the principles that emerge 
conflict with our "considered convictions of justice ... we 
can either modify the account of the initial situation or 
we can revise our existing judgements." "By going back and 
forth", argues Rawls, "eventually we shall find a 
description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our 
considered judgements duly pruned and adjusted." This is 
the now famous condition of "reflective equilibrium".15
The final point that should interest us is the congruence 
of Rawls1s two arguments for the principles of justice 
presented in Chapters II and III of A Theory of Justice. 
That is between the "intuitive argument" from equality of
similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. 
Therefore, we can view the choice in the original position from the 
standpoint of one person selected at random." (Rawls 1971, 139).
12Consider the entry for "Rawls" in The Philosophers' Lexicon; 
"Rawls: A fishing line baited with a few apparently innocent
intuitions about fairness but capable of bringing in such big fish as 
Pareto Optimality and God knows what." (Dennett 1987).
13Rawls 1971, 141.
14Rawls 1971, 20.
15All quotations from Rawls 1971, 20.
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opportunity and the argument from the veil of ignorance.16 
The "intuitive argument" develops the conviction that 
whilst persons are deserving of equal consideration they 
are not deserving of much else;
"it seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered 
judgements that no one deserves his place in the
distribution of native endowments, any more than one
deserves one's initial starting place in society."17 
This, of course, finds its place in the argument from the
original position in the thickness of the veil of
ignorance.
Before turning to impartiality and punishment I want to 
look at one other impartialist theorist, T. M. Scanlon. 
The reason for this is that it is important to remember 
that, although Rawls is an exemplar of the approach, 
justice as impartiality is a broader position than Rawls's 
theory. In addition, Rawls's account of punishment is ill 
worked out and often confused. Scanlon, on the other hand, 
attempts to formulate a coherent account of distributive 
and retributive justice, one which I shall examine below. 
I shall discuss Rawls's account of punishment in an 
Appendix (for reasons elaborated there).
16For more on the idea that Rawls is best understood if one separates
out these two arguments see Barry 1989, Chapter 6, especially 213-14; 
Kymlicka 1990, 50-76. For a summary of the argument from equality of 
opportunity, see infra 43n.
17Rawls 1971, 104; the whole of §17 is relevant to this argument.
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28. Scanlon
Tim Scanlon's version of the original position is presented 
in his 1982 article, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism".18 
According to Scanlon:
"An act is wrong if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules 
for the regulation of behaviour which no one could 
reasonably reject as the basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement. '*19 
The motivation given to the agent for theorising his 
relations with others is given as a psychological fact: 
"According to contractualism, the source of motivation 
that is directly triggered by the belief that an action 
is wrong is the desire to be able to justify one's 
actions to others on grounds that they could not 
reasonably reject."20 
This psychological fact is not "natural", it is a 
consequence of "moral education" and thus it resembles 
Rawls's concept of the "sense of justice".21
In Scanlon's alternative formulation the parties to the 
contractual arrangement are aware of their identities and 
interests, so equality is not guaranteed, as it is in
18Scanlon 1982.
19Scanlon 1982, 110.
20Scanlon 1982, 116.
21See Scanlon 1982, 117; Rawls 1971, §86; 1993a, 19; Appendix A, §C.
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Rawls, by a "veil of ignorance", and this is why the 
motivation of "the desire for reasonable agreement"22 is so 
important. In other respects, the Scanlonian formulation 
is not, or so it seems to me, a significant departure from 
the Rawlsian project. This is not to say that there are no 
substantive differences between Rawls and Scanlon - I have 
identified two important ones above - but merely that Rawls 
and Scanlon are engaged on doing much the same type of 
thing. Rawls's original position and the veil of ignorance 
collapse the plurality of individuals into the view of a 
single person, and thus lose the idea of different points 
of view being represented in the (thus, nominal) contract. 
Scanlon retains these points of view but still wants to 
guarantee impartiality. This is achieved through the 
conditions which surround the agreement; it is to be 
"informed", "unforced" and the content is to be subject to 
individual veto (so long as that veto is "reasonable"). 
Examining these conditions makes it clear how impartiality 
is built in.
By "informed", Scanlon means to "exclude agreement based on 
superstition or false belief about the consequences of 
actions, even if these beliefs are ones which it would be 
reasonable for the person in question to have."23 This is 
a strong requirement, it is clearly intended to rule out 
agreements based on beliefs about such things as the 
catastrophes which will be visited on any society which
22Scanlon 1982, 115n.
23Scanlon 1982, 111.
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does not give proper place to the worship of God. In the 
form that Scanlon has it, however, it requires that we give 
some account of truth, a task that might be at least as 
difficult as providing an account of morality.24
The condition of being "unforced" is, Scanlon asserts, not 
simply meant to rule out coercion, but also the 
exploitation of the weak by the strong; that is, it is 
meant to rule out the agreement mirroring relative 
bargaining strength, (the outcome of justice as mutual 
advantage). This, however, can only be the case if one 
assumes an initial base line of equality. If the powerful 
present the mutual advantage argument to the weak - that 
the agreement should benefit both groups, although given 
relative bargaining strengths, it should favour the 
powerful - and the weak assent to this argument, then it 
can hardly be objected that this agreement is illegitimate 
because it is "forced". The normative strength of the 
"unforced" condition, therefore, comes only with the 
assumption that there is a base line of equality which the 
weak would only leave (to the advantage of the strong), if 
they were forced to do so. Equality, in short, is 
presupposed as the initial position if Scanlon wants the 
"unforced" condition to do what he clearly does want it to 
do, which is rule out agreements based on relative 
bargaining strengths.
24Scanlon's requirements are reminiscent of Susan Wolf's that 
autonomy is acting rationally, where the latter is defined by being 
action based on true beliefs about the nature of the physical and the 
moral worlds. A requirement justifiably criticised in the literature 
for being unreasonably strong. (See Wolf 1989; Christman 1989, 12)
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Nonetheless, despite these requirements, one is still left 
with the feeling that the real work is being done by the 
condition of reasonableness. The idea, "is to exclude 
rejections that would be unreasonable given the aim of 
finding principles which could be the basis of informed, 
unforced general agreement". "It would be unreasonable", 
Scanlon tells us, "to reject a principle because it imposed 
a burden on you when every alternative principle would 
impose much greater burdens on others".25 Scanlon is 
saying, or so it seems to me, that one's rejection of such 
a principle would not be absolutely unreasonable but 
contingently so; it is unreasonable because one could not 
expect others to shoulder the extra burdens consequent to 
one's rejection of the principle. It seems clear how this 
might work for something like political rights; to take an 
example, let us say Rawls's first principle26 is suggested, 
could it be reasonably vetoed?
There seem to be two grounds for saying no; first, the 
grounds on which an agent might veto such a principle might 
be subject to the requirement that the agreement be 
"informed". That is, if I attempt to veto the principle on 
the grounds that apostates ought not to have freedom of 
expression because they are unworthy in the eyes of God, 
then my veto could be declared invalid because it is based
25Quotations from Scanlon 1982, 111.
26"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all." (Rawls 1971, 250)
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upon a "superstition or false belief". This objection 
might sit uncomfortably with a number of liberals, notably 
those with a sceptical turn of mind.27 The second ground 
upon which my veto might be overturned is that it is not 
reasonable; I could not expect apostates to accept the 
characterisation of themselves as unworthy in the eyes of 
God. This is clearly similar to the moral argument of 
Rawls that those who do worst have to be able to accept the 
reasons for their position as valid, otherwise they will 
find the "strains of commitment" too great to bear.28 But, 
if reasonable is to be separated from truth then what is 
the content of this condition? As Allan Gibbard points out 
in a review of Barry's Theories of Justice, a great deal of 
emphasis is being put on the idea of "reasonableness".29 
Clearly if the rejection of a system of rules has to be 
reasonable it is going to be the characterisation of 
reasonable that does the work in the argument, rather than 
the idea of agreement.
Before considering quite how the condition of 
reasonableness might be filled out let us look at a further 
example, both because in more controversial areas it 
becomes clearer how much is being rested on the notion of 
reasonableness, and because the idea of desert is destined
27See for example Brian Barry's commentary on Scanlon's "informed" 
requirement, Barry 1995a, Chapter 3 MS.
28See Appendix A, SB.
29Gibbard 1991. Russell Hardin has put it another way, describing 
"reasonable agreement" as "the 'open sesame' of much of contemporary 
moral theorising". (Hardin 19*91, 667).
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to reappear later in this chapter. Is it reasonable for 
those who are more advantageously naturally endowed (with 
talents and abilities, advantageous character traits etc.), 
to veto principles which ignore these features as relevant 
to the distribution of, say, income? Here the truth claim 
does not seem as easy to invoke. The question of whether 
it is false that genetically determined features of an 
individual merit greater reward is amongst the questions 
that the contractual situation is supposed to answer; to 
claim that it is uncontroversially false in advance is, 
therefore, unsatisfactory. It is, then, the condition of 
reasonableness that is going to have to do all the work. 
The claim, of course, must be that it is unreasonable to 
expect others not genetically advantaged to accept that 
there is some pre-institutional sense of desert relevant to 
genetic endowments.
The connection with truth, then, cannot be completely 
broken in giving some content to the notion of reasonable, 
instead it must find a role in the idea of a good reason.30 
What must be at the heart of reasonableness is the idea 
that the participants to the contractual situation have 
good reasons to accept the veto. The thought is that I 
have no reason to accept that I am less worthy of "equal
30Brian Barry has attempted to give a fully worked out Scanlonian 
theory in his Justice as Impartiality. (1995a) in terms of a limited 
scepticism. This amounts to the idea that it is unreasonable to veto 
any rule - given the fact of pluralism - on the grounds of one' s 
personal conception of the good because one has to admit the 
possibility that one might be wrong in one's beliefs about the good 
life. One cannot, therefore, legitimately expect anyone who 
disagrees with you to live in accordance with your views on the 
nature of the good life.
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consideration" because I am a woman, or black, or disabled. 
The others in the contractual situation accept that this 
constrains their veto on equality because they are 
motivated by "the desire to be able to justify [their] 
actions to others on grounds [that the others] could not 
reasonably reject".31
Although it is clear that this is how the reasonable 
condition is supposed to advance the argument, it is not 
clear why these particular constraints should apply. If I 
hold that it is reasonable that those who contribute more 
to the co-operative enterprise should receive greater 
rewards, even if they are only able to contribute more 
because of natural or social advantages, then I can still 
claim that everyone receives equal consideration if the 
basis on which rewards are distributed reflects these 
advantages. As with the "unforced" condition, the 
reasonable only does the work that it is supposed to if a 
base line of equality is built in to the theory. It is 
unreasonable to demand that justice rewards natural or 
social advantages only if it is unreasonable not to treat 
everyone as fundamentally equal.
The psychological motivation likewise fails to perform the 
necessary conjuring trick to get equality out rather than 
having to put it in. The "psychological fact" that people 
"desire to be able to justify [their] actions to others on 
grounds they could not reasonably reject" and that this
31Scanlon 1982, 116.
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motivation "is directly triggered by the belief that an 
action is wrong" is no doubt "strong in most people11,32 at 
least if we count those to whom we have the desire to 
justify ourselves, to be those in "our" community (or, 
perhaps, those who are recognisably "like us"33), but, 
returning to the example above, if I hold that desert is a 
relevant and reasonable basis for reward, then I will feel 
that demanding more for those who contribute more is 
perfectly compatible with my desire to justify myself to 
others on the terms specified by Scanlon.
Scanlon recognises this fact in his Tanner Lectures.34 
Here he says that the disagreement between Rawls and Nozick 
is not over free will, and its compatibility or otherwise 
with the truth of causality, but is a moral argument about 
"doing enough" for people. "Of course", he says,
"Rawls and Nozick disagree over what constitutes 'doing 
enough' for a person. For Nozick, one has 'done enough' 
as long as the person' s Lockean rights have not been 
violated; for Rawls, the standard is set by the 
principles which would be accepted behind the Veil of 
Ignorance." 35
32Scanlon 1982, 116; see also Scanlon 1988, §5.
33That is, I think it would be difficult to maintain that we have 
this desire with respect to those who are beyond our immediate 
experience; for example, do we feel that we have to justify the 
developed West's greater share of the Earth’s resources to people in 
the third world?
34Scanlon 1988.
^Scanlon 1988, 187.
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Scanlon is explicit in accepting that this is a moral, not 
a factual, argument; "it locates the disagreement in what 
seems, intuitively, to be the right place - in a question 
of justice rather than in a separate (and I believe 
spurious) question of causal determination".36 The problem 
is, however, that Scanlon still does not explain why we 
ought to "do enough" for people or, indeed, the grounding 
for his Rawlsian sympathies as to what that entails. That 
is, "doing enough", rather than giving content to the idea 
of reasonable, simply becomes its synonym. It is 
unreasonable to reject principles that do enough for you 
precisely because they do enough, but what it is to do 
enough is to do that which couldn't be reasonably rejected. 
Nozick can, at least, say why he believes what he believes 
about the content of doing enough - we have inalienable 
rights and it is doing enough when we respect those rights 
and do not invade them - albeit that he cannot explain 
where the rights come from. Scanlon can only exclude 
justice as mutual advantage if he builds in an equally 
substantive moral commitment such that mutual advantage is 
not "doing enough" for the individual.
The basic problem, in summary, is that "reasonable" and 
"doing enough" are not sufficiently defined to exclude 
relative bargaining strengths. When they are defined so as 
to exclude relative bargaining strength or, for that 
matter, utilitarianism, it becomes clear that they come to 
mean "from a position of fundamental equality". However,
36Scanlon 1988, 187.
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if this impartialist moral stance is built in then it seems 
to eradicate the role of any deep moral reflection; in this 
moralised form this is precisely the motivation for which 
the individual is trying to find a grounding.
In Scanlon's account, the contractualist procedure remains 
a reflective practice, a method of distancing oneself as a 
self-reflective agent from the norms and practices of one's 
community. However, the agent is not asking why she should 
live in accordance with such norms as much as she is 
enquiring into the precise (or more precise) content of her 
obligations. The moralised contract means that the agent 
is never in a position to question the most fundamental 
moral commitment, to treat others as fundamentally equal. 
This is surely unsatisfactory even for a faux 
constructivism, for in such a position the agent can still 
ask whether this motivation is one which she wants to 
endorse. Even if the contract is simply a heuristic or 
coherentist device, then, this moralised motivation cannot 
be accepted unconditionally by the agent when reflecting on 
justice or else the answer seems to flow too directly. If 
we know that we cannot justify truth claims beyond limited 
scepticism, and we know that to treat others with equal 
consideration means to treat them as fundamentally equal 
then most of the work of moral theory has been done.
I shall return to the question of "doing enough" for an 
agent, when I consider just how far impartialist theory can 
take the idea of responsibility and how this informs the
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account of punishment. Before I do so, however, it is 
necessary to make some preliminary remarks about the 
rationale of coercion in any theory which builds in the 
impartialist element prior to the construction.
29. Faux Constructivism and Punishment
The consequence of the faux nature of Scanlon1s and Rawls's 
constructivism is that the individual has a reason to be 
just which is independent of the construction. This 
follows from the independent grounding of justice; if 
justice is treating people as fundamentally equal then 
(presuming that one takes an internalist position on the 
relationship between morality and individual motivation), 
one has a reason to treat people in this way independently 
of any other consideration. The construction functions 
merely to tell one the precise nature of this obligation.37 
This means that faux constructivists are in the position of 
having to find a justification for punishing an offender 
which is not entailed by the theory which defines him as an 
offender, that is unless they endorse a metaphysical 
retributive theory in which the mere fact of transgression 
justifies the imposition of punishment.
37It might be objected that it is unfair to use "merely" in this 
sentence insofar as telling us the content of our moral obligations 
to others is hardly to be thought of as an easy task. I am prepared 
to accept that this is the case; the "merely" is only justified given 
that I believe that we can ground morality through the constructivist 
procedure. Faux constructivism, thus, "merely" does less than this. 
If it were the case that this is all we could ask of moral theory, 
the "merely" would become ridiculous.
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John Rawls, who I have treated as an exemplar of such 
theorising, gestures in the direction of such a retributive 
theory, however, he does not present any detailed argument 
for it. He also makes use of a second option, a fair-play 
theory, although again the argument is not fully worked 
out, and insofar as it is, it relies on elements of Rawls's 
account that bring out his proximity to theories of justice 
as reciprocity rather than impartiality. I have relegated 
the examination of punishment in Rawls to an Appendix both 
because his account is so confused and because it is not 
helpful to my task which is considering the role of 
punishment in justice as impartiality considered as a broad 
position rather than as a particular individual's theory. 
The only remark I will make here is that Rawls seems to me 
to canvass all the possible options available to the faux 
constructivist. In committing themselves to a 
justification of punishment which is independent of the 
derivation of the moral norms, impartialist theorists have 
to rely on the three options of metaphysical retributivism, 
fair-play theory or a complicated two level theory (two 
level, presuming that justice as impartiality does not 
yield consequentialist principles of justice).
I have considered and dismissed as inadequate the first two 
of these options - metaphysical retributivism and fair-play 
theory - however, I have not adequately considered the two 
level theory that underlies, I think, both the impartialist 
account of distributive justice and offers the best hope 
for the impartialist of providing a justification of
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punishment. In so doing I will also re-examine Scanlon's 
idea of "doing enough" for someone. The easiest way to 
approach this will be to look at the economic realm in 
which the theory is most clear; the question, then, will be 
whether the distribution of economic rewards and punitive 
sanctions are analogous.38
30. Impartiality, Legitimate Expectations and Desert
The liberal commitment to fundamental equality has 
sometimes been taken as a response to liberalism having 
embraced a naturalist understanding of the universe, 
including social life.39 It is assumed that liberals have 
given up on individual responsibility because of the 
perceived truth of what Scanlon calls "the Causal Thesis". 
"This is the thesis that the events which are human 
actions, thoughts, and decisions are linked to antecedent 
events by causal laws as deterministic as those governing 
other goings-on in the universe. According to this 
thesis, given antecedent conditions and the laws of 
nature, the occurrence of an act of a specific kind 
follows, either with certainty or with a certain degree 
of probability, the indeterminacy being due to chance
38Rawls specifically denies that distributive and what he calls 
"retributive" justice are analogous, at other times, however, he 
appears to endorse the view presented below. See Appendix A.
39See for a subtle and informative account of this type Scheffler 
1992.
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factors of the sort involved in other natural 
processes."40
On one such reading, then, one could claim that to "do 
enough" for someone requires that one ignore all factors 
that distinguish one person from another because such 
factors are not under the control of the agent, thus 
generating a Rawlsian type position of fundamental 
equality. Rawls, at times, seems to suggest just such a 
reading; crucial to his whole theory is the claim that,
"it seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered 
judgments that no one deserves his place in the 
distribution of native endowments, any more than one 
deserves one's initial starting place in society."41 
From this claim - that natural endowments are "arbitrary 
from a moral point of view"42 - the argument for the 
difference principle from equality of opportunity 
follows.43 The important question, though, is to ask what 
it means to say that something is "morally arbitrary". 
Scheffler and those who believe that liberalism endorses 
naturalism at some deep level, interpret this claim as
40Scanlon 1988, 152.
41Rawls 1971, 104.
42Rawls 1971, 72.
43Barry summarises the argument thus, "(1) the (liberal) ideal of 
equality of opportunity is that all environmental differences that 
affect occupational achievement should be eliminated; (2) this will 
entail that all remaining differences are of genetic origin; but (3) 
if (as is assumed) the case for eliminating environmental differences 
is that they are morally arbitrary, all we should be doing is making 
occupational achievement rest on genetic factors which are (in 
exactly the same sense) morally arbitrary; therefore (4), since what 
is morally arbitrary should not affect what people get, differences 
in occupational achievement should not affect incomes." (Barry 1989, 
225).
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following from the truth of the Causal Thesis, but this is 
fundamentally mistaken. If it were the case that moral 
arbitrariness followed directly from acknowledging the 
truth of the Causal Thesis then one could make no sense of 
Rawls’s use of primary social goods as the "currency of 
justice",44 or the answer he gives to the problem of 
expensive tastes (in which the agent is held responsible 
for his preferences and, thus, not deserving of a greater 
share of resources because she has preferences for goods 
which are more expensive45), or, indeed, the lexical 
priority of the first principle.
It is certainly not exactly clear how Rawls combines his 
basically anti-choicist starting point with his choicest 
conclusions,46 in the end it seems to depend, rather 
implausibly, on the idea that "people’s tastes, aspirations 
and beliefs are always open to modification, so people can 
properly be held responsible for them",47 but quite how 
this is done is, as I say, never clear. Nevertheless, the 
best interpretation of Rawls, and certainly the most 
coherent, is to claim that he relies neither on the
44The term is taken from Cohen 1989.
45See Rawls 1982b, 168-9; cf. 1975, 553; 1980, 545; 1978, 63; 1985, 
243-4.
46The language of "choicism" and ”anti choicism" is taken from Barry 
1991a. A choicist is "someone who wants to show that it is 
consistent with justice to give the principle of personal
responsibility a lot of scope at the expense of the principle of 
compensation", an anti-choicist "holds that people cannot be held 
personally responsible for their tastes, aspirations, or beliefs and 
this entails that they cannot be held responsible for the outcomes of 
actions that flow from them.” (Barry 1991a, 144, 150).
47Barry 1991a, 155.
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subversion of responsibility nor on a crude idea of pre- 
institutional desert (and in that claim Scheffler is 
right), but on a model of legitimate expectations. If this 
is right it brings Rawls into line with Scanlon; in any 
event, as I am not concerned with Rawls exegesis but 
justice as impartiality, and since I believe legitimate 
expectations offers the most coherent model for both 
distributive and retributive justice within that approach, 
I shall now turn to what, precisely, this means.
The legitimate expectations model takes the form of a two 
level theory; the principles of justice are derived from an 
independent account of justice, once that theory has 
established the rules of justice then the provisions of 
those rules apply even if they seem to conflict with the 
fundamental convictions that inform the derivation of the 
rules themselves.48 This is clearly the argument that 
underlies Rawls's comments on the differential economic 
rewards sanctioned by the difference principle:
"It is perfectly true that given a just system of 
cooperation as a scheme of public rules and the 
expectations set up by it, those who, with the prospect 
of improving their condition, have done what the system 
announces that it will reward are entitled to their 
advantages. In this sense the more fortunate have a 
claim to their better situation; their claims are 
legitimate expectations established by social
48This characterisation should make it clear how close this view is 
to Rawls’s 1958 article, "Two Concepts of Rules", see §19.
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institutions, and the community is obligated to meet 
them. But this sense of desert presupposes the existence 
of the cooperative scheme; it is irrelevant to the 
question .. [of how] in the first place the system is to 
be designed."49
This is a very different conception of desert from that 
which informs our brute intuitions. If we tried to capture 
our intuitions we would design institutions so as to reward 
desert; on the account given above such an appeal to pre­
ins titutional desert is avoided, "the only notions of
desert which [are] recognized are internal to institutions 
... the notion of desert is replaced ... by the idea of
legitimate (institutional) expectations.1150
The basic idea, here, is that liberal institutions are 
justified through an independent notion of justice, in the 
impartialist theories of Rawls and Scanlon, a notion of
justice that gives no role to desert. Once these
institutions have got off the ground then individuals are 
held responsible for how well or badly they do within the 
institutional system. Within the scheme, agents are held 
responsible in that where they end up (economically) is a 
consequence of their choices; they are "entitled to their 
advantages". But, the system has been set up to reward
49Rawls 1971, 103.
50Scanlon 1988, 188. As Scheffler says of this understanding of 
desert "the idea that social institutions should be designed in such 
a way as to ensure that people get what they deserve makes about as 
much sense as the idea that universities were created so that 
professors would have somewhere to turn in their grades-." (Scheffler 
1992, 306).
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these talents not because they deserve rewards, but because 
differential rewards are to the benefit (in the Rawlsian 
case) of the least advantaged. Those who do least well 
cannot complain that the others do not deserve their 
benefits because the system does not reward desert, so to 
speak, but rewards in accordance with a principle of 
justice that is in accordance with reasons that no-one can 
reasonably reject or which would emerge from the original 
position.
It is important to understand how this theory differs from 
that which would follow if one read the claim of "moral 
arbitrariness" as derived from a commitment to a world 
without responsibility; on the legitimate expectations view 
if I have natural talents and abilities, (which, if we 
admit the truth of the Causal Thesis, are at some level 
arbitrary), then not only can I take pride in my talents 
and abilities - they are, after all, mine - but it may be 
the case that I am entitled to greater income than someone 
with fewer natural assets. Whether I am or not will depend 
entirely on whether a just system would reward me, and a 
just system is one that "does enough" for everyone.51
The basic structure of the legitimate expectations view, 
then, is relatively straightforward. By building in
51The link with the theories of punishment examined at the end of 
Chapter 3 should be clear. Nino’s consensual view comes very close 
to this kind of argument, and again, what is crucial is not whether 
the offender has "free will", but whether the system is just and did 
enough to make the offender's choice one of which we may posit 
responsibility, see §20.
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impartiality one gets the requirement that everyone should 
be treated as fundamentally equal in the initial 
distribution of resources, (including political rights). 
Beyond this distribution, the system announces that certain 
activities will gain greater rewards and those that 
undertake those activities are thus entitled to the greater 
rewards they receive. The fact that those that reap the 
greater rewards are only capable of doing so because of 
talents that are theirs by chance does not matter, for 
those that do not gain the better rewards have still had 
enough done for them in design of the system.
It should be clear, then, that the introduction of 
legitimate expectations has not cleared justice as 
impartiality of the charge of being a faux constructivism, 
for no account is offered of the building in of 
impartiality. There is, however, one outstanding question; 
why does the system include a role for choice and 
differential rewards?
Differential entitlements might be justified simply because 
they improve the position of the worst off, and it is 
possible that the role of choice could be justified in a 
similar manner. Rawls certainly, on occasions, seems to 
endorse this view, as when he writes that "the function of 
unequal distributive shares is «. to attract individuals to 
places and associations where they are most needed from a 
social point of view",52 and this dismissal of the
52Rawls 1971, 315.
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importance of choice has led to one of the most important 
criticisms of Rawls's theory; that it is not "ambition 
sensitive".53 But this is not the whole answer as endorsed 
by Rawls and Scanlon; choice is important not just because 
the position of the least well off (or of everyone) will be 
better if choices are allowed, but also because we value 
choice, and we value having the world such that a 
proportion of our lives is subject to our own decisions.54 
It is simply implausible to claim of a theorist who writes 
that a person's "highest order interest" is their capacity 
"to frame, revise and rationally to pursue"55 their 
conception of the good, that he is only interested in 
choice as it affects the society as a whole.56
The fact is that Rawls, Scanlon, and Barry build in the 
impartialist element because of a commitment to the 
fundamental equality of persons; this commitment does not 
stem from a view of persons as equally capable of feeling 
pain or any such thing, but from a Kantian type endorsement 
of a view of each human as a potentially rational, self- 
directing chooser.56 In order to hold this view, however,
53See, e.g., Kymlicka 1990, 73-76.
54See Scanlon 1988, Lecture Two. Scanlon differentiates three 
grounds upon which we value choice; instrumental (because if we 
choose for ourselves this, in most cases, will ensure that our 
preferences are met); demonstrative (because in choosing I may 
demonstrate some feature of oneself); and symbolic (because the act 
of choosing symbolises that one is competent, just as to be deprived 
of choice, even on paternalistic grounds, might represent a judgement 
that one is not capable of choosing, or choosing well).
55Rawls 1982, 16.
56Percy Lehning has argued that liberal neutrality is grounded in the 
idea that other people are shown equal respect by virtue of their
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impartialist theory needs an account of responsibility 
which does not commit them to implausible Kantian 
metaphysics, and which is compatible with the truth of the 
Causal Thesis.57
If we grant that such an account can be given, and I think 
it can, the question is, can the legitimate expectations 
view be applied to the distribution of retributive justice, 
thus generating an account of morally justified punishment?
31. Legitimate Expectations and Punishment
Scanlon clearly believes that the answer to this question 
is yes, he argues for a direct analogy between the cases of 
distributive and retributive justice:
"In approaching the problems of justifying both penal and 
economic institutions we begin with strong pretheoretical 
intuitions about the significance of choice: voluntary 
and intentional commission of a criminal act is a 
necessary condition of just punishment, and voluntary 
economic contribution can make an economic reward just
capacity to work out their own conception of the good life, see 
Lehning 1991.
57As I noted in the Introduction, (note 15), I am presupposing such 
an account. In fact, liberal theorists have been slow to develop 
such a theory, although the literature has recently shown signs that 
they are coming to realise its importance (see Barry 1991a; Ripstein 
1994, but cf. Scheffler 1992; Scanlon 1988). So far, liberal 
autonomy theory has followed a fairly standard Dworkin/Frankfurt line 
(see Frankfurt 1971; G. Dworkin 1981), but without taking into 
account the problems associated with that approach, notably its 
tendency towards infinite regress or incompleteness (see Friedman 
1986, but cf. Christman 1987; Thalberg 1979; for a general review see 
Christman 1989, Introduction). As I noted in the Introduction, 
liberal hesitancy could be related to the likely tensions an adequate 
theory of autonomy would cause in the general approach impartialist 
liberals take towards distributive justice.
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and its denial unjust. One way to account for these 
intuitions is by an appeal to a preinstitutional notion 
of desert: certain acts deserve punishment, certain
contributions are just if they distribute benefits and 
burdens in accord with these forms of desert.
The strategy I am describing makes a point of 
avoiding any such appeal. The only notions of desert 
which it recognizes are internal to institutions and 
dependent upon a prior notion of justice-.".58 
There seems to be something right about this argument. If 
we have a system of sanctions established and justified by 
a theory of justice, then if someone voluntarily and 
intentionally performs a criminal action they become liable 
to the sanctions which are specified; or to some sanction 
from a range depending upon certain other considerations.59 
The argument, however, does not get us far, the questions 
remain: What justifies the system of sanctions? And, how 
do we "do enough" for the individual in the distribution of 
punishment?
Nowhere does either Scanlon or Rawls say a great deal about 
the purpose of punishment, and what Rawls does say 
conflicts with the rest of his theory;60 Scanlon (in a 
lecture on punishment), offers only half a sentence:
58Scanlon 1988, 188.
59Again the link between Scanlon's view and those of the 
consequentialist theorists examined at the end of Chapter 3 should be 
clear, the problem there was that no account of justice was given, 
the problem here is that the account of justice is ungrounded and the
account of punishment underdeveloped.
60Rawls's account is examined in Appendix A.
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"protecting ourselves and our possessions".61 Scanlon's 
answer is a consequentialist one, the institution of 
punishment is a necessary means to achieving this "public 
goal",62 in other words, having established a society based 
upon the rules of justice, punishment is needed to keep the 
society going. This raises a question about the analogy 
between economic justice and the system of sanctions. In 
the economic sphere impartialist theorists "do enough" for 
an individual by organising the system of rewards so that 
differential rewards are to the advantage of the worst off, 
or are such that no-one could reasonably reject them given 
a starting point of fundamental equality. In other words, 
distributive justice starts from a conviction that everyone 
is to be treated as fundamentally equal, and the principles 
which allow deviations from that equality must be at least 
sanctioned by the worst off. The less talented do less 
well than the more talented, but not less well than they 
would under an initially equal distribution; one can do 
better or worse but one cannot do so badly that one has 
grounds for not accepting the reasons for one's position.63 
In punishment, however, the situation seems to be 
different. In short, the punished may have reason to 
suspect that they are being sacrificed to the benefit of 
others. Why?
61Scanlon 1988, 201.
62Scanlon 1988, 201.
63This is the "strains of commitment" test in a nutshell. See 
Appendix A, SB.
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The reason is, in a sense, encapsulated in the language we 
would have to use to describe what had happened to the 
offender. In addressing the offender, the punishing 
authorities would say, "You [the offender] voluntarily and 
intentionally chose to do X, although it was made clear 
that if you did X you would suffer Y". Therefore, "you are 
now entitled to Y". This might strike the offender as 
pretty bizarre, as indeed would the next step; when asked 
by the offender why Y's are attached to X's, the answer 
would have to be "because without the system that includes 
the rule that Y's are attached to X's the consequences for 
everybody would be bad".
This raises two problems; the first is one commonly 
attached to two level theories;64 the point is that there 
is a fundamental division between the theory that grounds 
the norms of co-operation and the theory that grounds 
punishment. Up to the point where the individual "chooses 
badly" and commits an offence, the system "does enough" for 
her. Having chosen badly, the system sacrifices her to the 
good of the whole, and can do so without constraint; it 
could, for example, use her as an example, imposing a 
disproportionate punishment for her offence.65
The impartialist theorist would like to claim that 
constraints of justice apply to the system of punishment,
64See supra, Introduction; S8; §19.
65I shall claim below that this is not really moral punishment, at 
best, if correctly justified, it is justified coercion, see §§37-38.
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but there is no reason why they should protect against such 
abuse. Justice requires that we treat everyone as 
fundamentally equal in the distribution of, say, primary 
social goods, but the theory of legitimate expectations 
then allows deviation from this equal distribution where it 
is to the advantage of the least well off (or could not be 
reasonably vetoed), and in recognition of agency. In the 
economic case, constraints on how badly the agent can do 
are built in to the system. In the case of punishment, 
however, the constraints which define "doing enough" do not 
seem to restrict how badly the offender may be treated, 
that is determined by the needs of the society.
To see this, consider Scanlon's account of "doing enough" 
with respect to punishments To do enough we must have 
"requirements of due process" to "protect those who choose 
to stay out of the affected area";66 and to "make it less 
likely that people will choose to enter [this area]", we 
must provide,
"education, including moral education, the dissemination 
of basic information about the law, and the maintenance 
of social and economic conditions which reduce the 
incentive to commit crime, [finally, we must provide] ~ 
restrictions on entrapment by law enforcement 
officers".67
66By "affected area", Scanlon means those "activities which have been
declared illegal". (Scanlon 1988, 202).
67Scanlon 1988, 202.
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From here the argument is clear, having done enough for the 
agent, if she "voluntarily and intentionally" commits a 
criminal act, we have "done enough", she may be coerced so 
as to maintain public order. Of course, given the deep 
arbitrariness that underlies the legitimate expectations 
view, we should not feel "'You asked for this' but 'There 
but for the grace of God go I.' "68
The offender seems to be sacrificed to the whole on the 
basis that it is in everybody's interests (except her own) 
and, if she complains, she is told that a just system of 
laws with the normal checks and protections, which is 
announced in advance, "does enough" for her; her choice was 
a bad one, but having made it she cannot legitimately 
complain about the consequences, no matter how harsh. 
"There but for the grace of God", indeed.69
The problem is, as I have said, that by building in the 
requirements of impartiality, the theory separates the 
account of justice from the account of punishment. Justice 
is not only groundless on this theory but toothless. 
Punishment, then, has to be given some other rationale, and 
the most obvious is consequentialist. However, the
68Scanlon 1988, 216.
69In a sense the problem is the reverse of that encountered by rule- 
utilitarians. Rule-utilitarians know what the right answers are in 
defining the practice of punishment, but they are let down by the 
normative theory which is supposed to ground these answers. Scanlon 
has an ungrounded normative theory of justice, but he cannot bridge 
the gap between it and the account of punishment. Thus, whilst he 
gets pretty much the right answers in distributive justice, he cannot 
get the right ones on retributive questions.
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requirement to maintain public order may demand exemplary 
punishments, or even (in a well ordered society), only the 
punishing of a proportion of the convicted offenders. The 
demands of justice to treat everyone equally do not apply 
because we have already done so in "doing enough" for the 
person before she chose to offend.
If we are to overcome this problem, the rationale of 
coercion must follow from the account of justice itself, it 
must not be an extra argument tacked on at the end to 
explain the necessary but disconcerting social practice of 
punishment. If it is linked to the account of justice, 
then the offender can be put in a position where, as a 
moral being, she accepts her own punishment, and thus 
coercion is converted from a, perhaps justified, act of 
societal self-defence into a moral practice. To show this, 
it is first necessary to give an account of justice, and in 
the next chapter I will argue for a true constructivism, 
which does not build in the requirement of impartiality 
prior to the construction. Such a theory, I believe, can 
yield the necessarily coercive terms of agreement that can, 
in turn, yield a justified system of moral punishment.
Chapter 6: A Constructivist Theory of 
Justice
32. The Aspirations of Constructivism
In the two chapters which preceded this one, I argued 
first, that if the pursuit of one's own advantage 
(understood from an individualist perspective) was the sole 
motivation for the agent in choosing principles to govern 
his relations with others, then those relations would 
neither be recognisably moral nor particularly stable. I 
insisted that if moral principles were to emerge from the 
constructivist procedure then some way must be found to 
reconcile individual interest and an impartial standpoint. 
I then turned to impartialist theories and argued that, in 
their drive to turn out the right answers, such theories 
build in the impartialist element. In so doing they open 
up an unbridgeable gap between the individual and moral 
standpoints. From the individual perspective the demand 
for impartiality appears as alien and serving only to 
frustrate the fulfilment of the agent's good.1 The 
arguments that are offered as to how the two standpoints 
can be satisfactorily combined are specious, taking the 
form of doubtful empirical claims about moral motivation or 
Kantian claims that in acting justly we fulfil our natures 
as free beings. This gap is replicated in the account 
impartialist theorists give of coercion, for the theory
^or a good introduction to these perspectives and to the problems 
they give rise to, see Nagel 1986, and Nagel 1991, Introduction.
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commits them to the view that morality is individually 
binding on the agent independent of any agreement by others 
to likewise adhere to moral norms. A separate 
justification, then, has to be found for coercion, either 
in bridging the motivation gap for everyone's advantage 
(i.e., in consequentialism) or in a metaphysical 
retributivism.
In this Chapter I want to present a constructivist account 
of morality, one which is neither grounded solely on mutual 
advantage nor in a prior commitment to fundamental 
equality. To do so I first need to address the question of 
what I mean by "moral". Morality is normally taken to be a 
system of rules, norms or standards which distinguish what 
is acceptable from what is not in the pursuit of one's 
aims, or in a society's pursuit of its aims, or, indeed, 
that of a species pursuing its.2 Morality is thus often 
thought of as either an independent constraint upon the 
pursuit of self-interest or as justified because in the 
long run "crime does not pay" (i.e., over time moral 
behaviour serves self-interest). In the latter case the 
theory is not really a moral one as it subordinates 
morality to self-interest; if I behave in accordance with 
accepted moral standards only because not to do so will 
lead to punishment, my actions are not moral, and if the 
theory that grounds those standards is of this modus 
vivendi type then it is not moral either. For example, the 
injunction to do unto others only that which you would have
2Cf. the entry under "ethics" in Speake 1979.
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them do unto you, could be understood in purely prudential 
terms, that is, it might be read as saying do unto others 
only that which you would have them do unto you only 
because there is a good chance that they will get to do 
back to you what you have done to them. This, however, 
would not be a theory of morality but of prudential 
rationality and, insofar as it informed the structure of 
relations between a group of individuals, of co-operation.3
In the former case, where morality is thought of as an 
external constraint on the pursuit of self-interest, some 
reason must be given to the agent as to why he should 
accept such a constraint. The problem here, of course, is 
that such a reason can either be a moral one, in which case 
the theory seems to be going around in circles, or one 
which appeals to the agent's self-interest, in which case 
the theory's credentials as moral seem to be undermined. 
Thus, for example, if we posited a set of norms established 
by a God which claimed to bind the pursuit of self-interest 
- that is which made the claim of being moral norms - then 
the agent, reflecting on his relationship with that God and 
those norms, could ask for reasons as to why he should 
limit the pursuit of his self-interest in the manner 
prescribed. If we were to say to the agent that he ought 
to behave morally because that is the right thing to do we 
have offered a moral reason and the agent would be 
justified in returning us to square one by asking why he
3It is, of course, the underlying motivation in accounts of justice 
as mutual advantage, see §25.
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should "do the right thing". However, if we were to argue 
that he should obey the commands of God only because 
otherwise he would burn in hell for eternity (or, for that 
matter, only because he would otherwise not get to live in 
perpetual peace and tranquillity in heaven) then we seem to 
have given a prudential not a moral account.
The alternative route is to say that if there is an 
objective - or realist - account of the good (which we can 
assume there is in a theistic theory), then we have reason 
to be good because in so doing we flourish as moral beings, 
that is in accordance with our (externally given) good. 
For the purposes of this thesis I am largely ignoring such 
a possibility, however, because there are no good reasons 
to accept a realist account of the good and several for 
rejecting it. What I aim to show below is that an anti­
realist account of morality can be given and the dichotomy 
between the moral and personal perspectives (what Nagel 
calls the "personal" and "impersonal standpoints"4), 
overcome. Nagel, himself, regards giving a rational basis 
for combining these perspectives as impossible given the 
"disenchanted" world we now confront as inheritors of the 
Enlightenment. I aim to show in this Chapter that such 
moral pessimism is largely (but not completely), 
unwarranted.
4,'The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces _ a powerful 
demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal 
standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements 
which produce obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such 
ideals.” (Nagel 1991, 4); see also Nagel 1991, Chapter 2; 1986.
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If the personal and moral perspectives are to be combined, 
the moral must not be grounded in a manner independent of 
human self-interest but rather must take the form of norms 
through which the agent comes to understand and pursue his 
own flourishing. This is the argument I shall offer below. 
The aspirations of such a constructivist scheme are not 
modest; I intend to give an account of justice grounded in 
human reason and will, an account which will allow us to 
evaluate the ethical standing of a community1s rules and 
practices. In so doing, I shall argue that political 
obligation and the rationale of coercion are not to be 
understood and accounted for as separate moral arguments 
once justice is established, but as intimate elements of 
the account of justice itself.5 In one sense, however, the 
claims made in this Chapter are modest, for in arguing that 
morality is possible only as the form given to the norms 
which govern the co-operation of a community of rational 
self-reflective agents, I shall argue that the precise 
content of the moral norms is a subject for the agreement 
of the co-operating members of that community. Thus, the 
analysis of the content of morality that can be undertaken 
in the abstract is necessarily limited to identifying the 
general claims that must find embodiment in the practices 
of such a community.
5I am following Rawls in regarding justice as "the first virtue of 
social institutions" (Rawls 1971, 3). Thus, although I shall
sometimes talk of morality, justice should be taken as the highest 
order concept in the application of morality in political philosophy.
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The starting point for a constructivist moral theory, then, 
must be with the personal perspective. A moral theory must 
address the question of what morality is from the 
perspective of a self-reflective agent; it must address the 
question, "given that I have value for myself what is the 
nature of my relations with others?".6 It must not only 
give an account of the content of morality, however, but - 
if it is to answer the question, "why should I do the right 
thing?" - it must also provide the agent with good reasons 
to find moral injunctions compelling.7 We begin with a 
self-conscious social agent possessed of language who is 
already a member of a community. The agent stands back 
from his social ties and questions the norms and practices 
of the community of which he is a member. Thus, although 
there is a sense in which "the constructing is to be done 
by a theorist",8 it is done from the perspective of an
6That is, each person must consider her relations with others in the 
reflective stance not from a position of objective value, but from a 
subjective one, in which although the individual claims value for 
herself he does not claim value in herself and is thus not committed 
to recognise the value of others, (see Charvet 1981, 157-61; Charvet 
1995). Assuming that the agent in the reflective stance claims 
objective value is the mistake made by Gewirth (1978). For a good, 
brief, account of Gewirth's argument see Moore 1993, Chapter 2. 
Moore makes a similar criticism of Gewirth: "It does not follow from 
the fact that something is good from a subjective standpoint, i.e., 
good from the standpoint of subjective desire-fulfilment, that it is 
good from an objective (or inter-subjective) standpoint; for example 
that it has the characteristics or qualities which make it 
objectively valuable or worthwhile. And it is the latter kind of 
claim which Gewirth needs in order to claim that their are duties 
incumbent on each person to enable or ensure that others secure the 
goods of freedom and well-being". (Moore 1993, 24). Nagel likewise 
commits this error: "some of the most important [things in your life] 
have to be regarded as mattering - so that others beside yourself 
have to take them into account". (Nagel 1991, 11).
7A point emphasised in the title of Nelson 1990: Morality: What is in
it for Me?
8Barry 1989, 266.
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agent reflecting on his commitments, interests, etc. Any 
answers must, then, take the form of answers for such an 
agent.9 It is important to note that the agent is already 
engaged in social interaction, he is asking what the 
content of his moral commitments is, and whether it is 
rational to acquire commitments that he does not already 
recognise, and maintain and cultivate those that he does.
Of course, such a question is only available to a self- 
conscious individual able to distance himself from the 
community which formed him. An individual formed without 
social interaction (should one exist) could not take up 
this question not only because, ex hypothesi, questions of 
his relations with others would not occur, but also because 
he would be incapable of determining his conception of the 
good as a self-conscious rational being without either 
language or standards of rationality both of which are 
socially engendered; he would not in fact be a self- 
conscious rational being. Likewise the individual, even if 
brought up in a society, has to be capable of formulating 
the question, of achieving the distance between self and 
community. The absence of an external authority 
distinguishes the theory presented here from the classical 
contractarianism of Locke, and less explicitly, Hobbes and 
Rousseau,10 and the achieving of distance between the agent 
and the community distinguishes it from some recent
9Cf. Williams 1985, Chapter 1.
10Kant could also be included in this list although he replaces 
natural law and the reliance on God with the claims of transcendental 
reason.
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communitarian thought.11 In the past (and perhaps in 
certain very simple societies), either the gap between the 
individual and moral perspectives was insufficient for the 
individual to question the norms and practices of the 
community - his identification with the community was, in 
Hegel's term, "naive"12 - or the source of authority for 
the community's norms and practices was posited in an 
external authority, God. In the former case the motivation 
problem does not arise13 and in the latter it can be 
overcome by arguing that the agent, as possessor of an 
immortal soul, has good reason to be moral because of the 
chance of posthumous rewards and punishments.14 As
^Something like the claim that the individual cannot escape his 
community so as to reflect upon it is often, and perhaps rightly, the 
interpretation given to the "embedded self" arguments of some 
communitarians (most notably Sandel 1982, see, e.g., 150). If the 
claim is this strong we surely have good reason to reject it, as 
Kymlicka puts it, Sandel ”violat[es] our deepest self-understandings 
_ . We do not consider ourselves trapped by our present attachments, 
incapable of judging the worth of the goals we inherited or ourselves 
chose earlier." (Kymlicka 1990, 213). It is a matter of reasonable 
dispute, however, whether Sandel or other leading communitarians 
(Taylor, MacIntyre and Walzer), are really making so strong a claim, 
see infra, note 13, although if they are not it is difficult to see 
what their criticism adds up to.
12See esp. Hegel 1977, SS464-476; also Hegel 1974, Vol. 1. As Alan 
Wood puts its "until the rise of the subversive idea of subjective 
freedom in fifth-century Athens, the distinction between different 
interests, as something that might be mutually opposed, was not a 
natural one to draw for people living in the naive harmony of Greek 
culture." (Wood 1991, 57)
13It seems to me fantastic to suggest that any society (past or 
present) could be so monistic as to eradicate the individual 
perspective. Rather, the motivation problem does not arise because 
when conflicts between individual interest and the interests of the 
community occur the agent gives precedence to the community. If this 
is a goal of communitarianism - and my suspicion is that it is more 
often imputed to communitarians by critics than expressed by 
communitarians themselves - we have good reason to reject it, for the 
outcome would be a society of unreflective moral cripples.
14ln order to avoid the claim that one's reason to be moral is fear 
of punishment or desire for reward, an additional claim might be that
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inheritors of the Enlightenment we have to recognise that 
the source of moral authority does not lie with God, and 
that morality and the motivation to be moral both have to 
be grounded in human reason and will.
33. The Personal Perspective
I have suggested above that if the separation of the moral 
and personal perspectives is to be overcome, the agent must 
come to understand and pursue his self-interest through, 
rather than in opposition to, the moral norms. I intend 
now to show how this is possible by presenting a "true” 
constructivist theory,15 that is, a theory that does not 
rely on a prior commitment to a substantive moral position. 
In accordance with the nature of constructivist theory and 
the characterisation of morality given here, I shall 
present this in the form of a contractualist argument. 
This is not to say, of course, that we are to imagine 
society and morality as having come about through a 
contract, or that anything like a state of nature from 
which a moral community emerged has ever existed. The 
original position is not an historical event but a thought 
experiment; specifically, as I have argued above, the agent 
needs to distance himself from the community that formed 
him and question the nature of his attachments. It is this
the agent better flourishes, or fulfils his own nature, by behaving 
in accordance with his creator.
^To be compared with the faux constructivism of Rawls and cognate 
approaches.
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self-reflective stance that can be characterised as putting 
oneself into an original position.16
Let us, then, begin with the personal perspective. If the 
agent is to overcome the separation of the moral and 
personal perspectives, and endorse and maintain himself as 
a moral being, it must be the case that the identification 
of his self-interest with that of the community is, in the 
first instance, in his interest as this can be conceived 
independently of the community. That is, when the agent 
takes up the reflective stance he must first ask himself 
whether it is in his interests to enter co-operation at 
all. Of course, if he is to do this, he must conceive of 
his interests as if he were not engaged in co-operation, 
that is independently of his social formation. In such 
terms the only sense that can be given to the individual's 
interests is to consider the acquisition of goods which are 
themselves independent of social formation; that is, goods 
which are naturally required by the individual qua human 
being. These are broadly the goods of food, sex, shelter, 
etc., and the freedom necessary to gain access to these, 
which are required by humans to flourish as separate 
individuals. A necessary condition for the agent's
16The question the agent asks is whether she should endorse, maintain 
and cultivate her moral dispositions, and this can be read in a 
manner that introduces the idea of consent; a notion that is often 
confused in the contractarian literature. In this sense the agent's 
consent is a running endorsement or rejection of certain dispositions 
she has as the person she is and given the type of person she wants 
to be, see §40. Rawls's strains of commitment test can, likewise, be 
read in this manner, that is, as a running demand on the agent that 
she be able to say ''yes”, (see Appendix A, §B) Ivison MS makes a 
similar point and I am indebted to his discussion in formulating my 
own ideas.
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identifying her self-interest with the communal interest 
must, then, be that the community provides secure access to 
a greater share of these goods than the individual could 
obtain on her own. This is clearly the case for most 
individuals in many societies and for others the co­
operative surplus, in terms of both quantity and security 
of access, is of enormous proportions.
The agent's self-interest, however, cannot be adequately 
understood in these narrowly individualistic terms. The 
agent, taking the reflective stance, realises that her 
flourishing depends upon the co-operation of others in that 
it is only insofar as there is mutual recognition of terms 
of co-operation to govern interaction between persons that 
co-operation and the co-operative surplus can be realised. 
The agent has reason to will the existence of terms of co­
operation through which the co-operative surplus and her 
self-interest is served, and in doing so her self-interest 
becomes tied to the interests of her co-contractors. This 
is because in willing the existence of terms of co­
operation she wills the existence of terms which are to the 
benefit of all the co-operating members (if organising the 
pursuit of their good through the terms of co-operation 
were not in their interests they would have no reason to 
co-operate). This, then, provides the idea of a common 
good through which the self-interest of each is aligned 
with that of every other. The terms of co-operation are 
not moral terms, however, the agent's self-interest merely 
coincides with the self-interest of other agents; each
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views the terms as a necessary means to the realisation of 
her ends.
The idea of agents coming from the personal perspective to 
will terms of co-operation can be contrasted with the 
Lockean (and Nozickean) idea of individuals coming to the 
contract as possessors of absolute rights17 and the ensuing 
problem of finding a mechanism through which to mediate the 
claims of each individual with respect to those rights. 
The Lockean scenario cannot overcome the problem that when 
conflicts arise between rights holders in the use of their 
rights each has a well grounded claim in his possession of 
absolute and natural rights. Any mediation of those rights 
claims through a collective determination of the content of 
the rights undermines the individualist core of Locke's 
account. If we reject the external account of rights as 
guaranteed by God, or derived from transcendental reason, 
then the terms which govern co-operation must be grounded 
solely in the wills of the contractors; each has reason to 
will the existence of terms of co-operation and to 
understand their self-interest as tied to the maintenance 
of these terms, and this is the theory I am proposing here.
This is only a necessary condition, however, because whilst 
it provides a good reason for the individual to co-operate, 
it provides good reason to enter co-operation on the best
17"Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group 
may do to them (without violating their rights)." Nozick 1974, ix. 
There are, of course, the Lockean provisos, however, I do not take 
these to alter the fundamental character of the natural rights to 
life and liberty. See Locke 1960, §§25-51.
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terms available, and if this is the case then the community 
could only organise around principles of justice as mutual 
advantage, an outcome I have shown to be unsatisfactory in 
Chapter 4. The idea that the agent's self-interest is tied 
to the interests of others through the existence of terms 
of co-operation cannot exclude those terms being based on 
mutual advantage because it does not tell us about the 
content of the terms beyond that they should be to the 
benefit of everyone.
One reason for the contractors to reject principles based 
on mutual advantage might be the instability of justice as 
mutual advantage discussed above;18 if adherence to the 
terms of co-operation is contingent upon its being to the 
advantage of the agent compared with free-riding, then the 
system of co-operation would be unstable as each considered 
in every case whether her self-interest would be better 
served by acting in accordance with the terms of co­
operation in that case. If these terms are to be stable it 
must be the case that they appear to the agent not as 
injunctions against which her self-interest is constantly 
pressing, but in the form of authoritatively binding norms. 
That is, they must be such that the agent comes to 
understand her self-interest as best pursued in accordance 
with the terms of co-operation. Stability cannot be 
achieved if the individual conceives of these terms as only 
contingently binding, the decision to obey being determined
18See §25.
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by self-interest in each case, and stable co-operation is 
in the self-interest of each co-operator.
In order to realise the self-interest of each through the 
founding and cultivation of stable terms of co-operation 
such terms must be accepted by all co-operators. This 
means that they must exclude the use of force and fraud to 
improve relative bargaining strengths. To avoid the 
instability of mutual advantage and to arrive at an 
agreement to co-operate on moral terms, therefore, each 
must agree to conceive of his self-interest in abstraction 
from his relative bargaining power, and, thus, to agree to 
terms from a position of impartiality; the powerful must 
not exploit the weak and the weak must not band together in 
an attempt to become a powerful and exploitative class.19 
Under such terms the contractors will base their agreement 
on a principle of fundamental equality.20
19I am assuming that no fundamentally hierarchical society could 
remain stable over time because the oppressed class would eventually 
rebel. To an extent this relies on one of the other conditions of 
constructivism - that the agent is able to distance himself from his 
community - as I take it that the most successful hierarchical 
communities are those in which the oppressed class believe that the 
hierarchy is legitimate because determined by God or nature or some 
such external authority. Once the oppressed group realise that the 
grounds of the norms governing co-operation lie only in human will 
they will reject their oppression.
20John Harsanyi (1982) has suggested that the outcome of the 
impartiality requirement (with respect to Rawls's theory), will be 
maximising average utility (Rawls considers this in A Theory of 
Justice (1971), §27). Average utility cannot be accepted here,
however, for two reasons. First, average utility is unstable because 
it cannot meet what Rawls calls the "strains of commitment test" (see 
Appendix A, §C for a discussion of this test); that is, it asks some 
"to accept the greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason to 
for lower expectations" and this is "an extreme demand". (Rawls 1971, 
178) Second, we will see that the requirements of moral agency 
include the endorsing of a deeper sense of equality than is 
compatible with treating some less well, in order to benefit others.
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Precisely what this commitment entails is discussed below, 
however, for the moment it should be clear that the appeal 
to stability is going to be insufficient motivation for the 
agent to ignore his relative bargaining strength and 
endorse a principle of equality. In the appeal to 
stability each agent is still in a position where he 
understands his self-interest from an individual 
perspective, best served when free-riding subject to the 
limit that such free-riding should not threaten stability. 
In short, we have not yet managed to give the agent a 
decisive reason to integrate the moral perspective into his 
personal conception of his good. It cannot be a sufficient 
reason for the agent to maintain himself as a moral being 
that the society is more stable if he, and everyone else, 
does so. Indeed, it could not be, because the agent would 
have to accept that he is maintaining himself as a moral 
being - that is as a being whose his self-interest is 
formulated through, and mediated by, the principles of 
justice - for purely self-interested reasons. The agent 
would be acting in "bad faith".21
It is, of course, a necessary condition of the agent's 
contracting that his self-interest is better served, as it
21This is the issue that dogs Hobbes. Hobbes has the basic structure 
of the problem right, or so it seems to me, however, he cannot 
explain that motivation of the agent to commit himself to the 
agreement without recourse to an implausible summum malum - the fear 
of violent death - and to a God who works through natural laws and 
sanctions. A contemporary Hobbesian, David Gauthier, facing the same 
problem is similarly reduced to an implausible empirical claim; that 
human motivations are sufficiently transparent to others to provide a 
sufficient reason to act morally, see Gauthier 1986, Chapter 4.
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is that the society is stable. I shall argue below that it 
is also necessary that the society take the form of a 
coercive community, because the agent's participation is 
conditional on the agreement of others to commit themselves 
in a like manner. Taken together, however, these do not 
provide a sufficient reason for the agent to maintain 
himself as a moral being through theorising his relations 
with others in accordance with a principle of fundamental 
equality. What else can we offer?
34. Be Moral1
The motivational question we are facing is what decisive 
reason can be offered to the agent to theorise his 
relations with others on a basis of fundamental equality? 
I have argued that self-interest and the stability problem 
provide necessary but insufficient reasons. Is there an 
additional reason that can be offered to the agent which 
will be decisive for that agent? The negative answer we 
have to give to this question is no doubt disconcerting, 
however, it must be faced if we are to avoid importing 
false metaphysical claims into the account of moral 
motivation.
Perhaps this negative answer should not surprise u s . 
Reasons for being moral are notoriously difficult to find, 
not least because it is not clear what form such reasons 
could take.22 I have argued above that self-interest,
22See §32.
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conceived narrowly in terms of getting more of certain 
goods, provides a reason to be moral. This is 
insufficient, which is in a sense reassuring, because it 
does not seem to be the right kind of reason anyway; if one 
raised one' s child to be good only by rewarding it with a 
£1 every time it was so, one should be legitimately worried 
that the only reason the child has for being good is not a 
moral one. Likewise, I will argue below that the function 
of punishment is not merely to encourage the thought that 
one should not do X only because doing X will result (if 
caught) in certain bad consequences.23
Beyond self-interest, then, is there some other universal 
standard of practical reason to which we could appeal to 
offer the agent a decisive reason to be moral? Rawls, 
considering the same question, invokes the two most well 
respected options.24 First, a Kantian argument that in 
acting in accordance with the demands of justice we realise 
our natures as free beings and, thus, express our 
independence from the natural world of causation:
"The desire to express our nature as a free and equal 
rational being can be fulfilled only by acting on the 
principles of right and justice as having first priority.
23The structure of this paragraph owes much to D. Matravers 1995, 
4MS.
24See Rawls 1971, 571-72; Appendix A, SC. There is nothing
particularly valuable or interesting about Rawls's discussion of this 
point, I refer to him here and below because he neatly captures both 
positions. What is interesting is that a liberal theorist, concerned 
with the thinnest possible theory, should use two arguments derived 
from very different traditions: orthodox, transcendental Kantianism 
and neo-Aristotelianism.
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- it is acting from this precedence that expresses our 
freedom from contingency and happenstance."25 
The agent, however, has good reason to reject this motive 
for it rests on an implausible metaphysical argument.26
Rawls also offers a second argument which he associates 
with Aristotelian virtue ethics: "The Aristotelian
Principle runs as follows: other things equal, human beings 
enjoy the exercise of the realized capacities (their innate 
or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the 
more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity",27 and, claims Rawls, "it follows from [this] 
Principle (and its companion effect), that participating in 
the life of a well-ordered society is a great good".28 
On the face of it this argument is open to two, very 
different, interpretations. On the one hand, Rawls could 
be endorsing a neo-Aristotelian virtue perfectionism. Such 
an argument would be that the agent has a decisive reason 
to be moral because in so doing he realises his nature - 
his telos. This, however, is unsatisfactory for we have no 
reason to think that humans share a telos, let alone one 
which is uniquely fulfillable through living a moral life. 
What, however, if we drop the teleological element and 
claim that the agent has a decisive reason to be moral
25Rawls 1971, 574.
26The role of the Kantian Interpretation within Rawls's theory is 
examined in Appendix A, SC.
27Rawls 1971, 426.
28Rawls 1971, 571.
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because in doing so he shares in something which he will 
find of value?
Such a position would be a long way from Aristotelianism 
proper, and could be developed in quite complicated ways. 
We could say, with MacIntyre, that an agent needs to feel 
"at home" in the world - as if his life has purpose and 
meaning - and this is only achievable if the agent is able 
to make sense of her life in terms of "a narrative order". 
Such an ordering requires that the agent is situated in a 
moral tradition, engaged in certain practices in accordance 
with practice specific standards of excellence.29 This 
position, however, does not seem to be compatible with the 
personal reflective stance taken by the agent. It might be 
the case that the agent would feel emotionally happier and 
more secure (in the sense that they would feel that their 
life had a point, or that they had, after all, been created 
for something), in a moral tradition, but that is possibly 
true of all moral traditions (irrespective of their 
plausibility). However, once one has asked the question, 
"do I endorse the tenets of the moral tradition which 
informs my way of life?" then the problem of modernity has 
already struck; a problem, that is, if one cannot find 
grounds for the values that define one's tradition.30 It
29See MacIntyre 1984, especially Chapter 15.
30I, for example, used to complain to my girlfriend, when this thesis 
was proving particularly gruelling, or when my ability to "get on 
with life” was being impaired by my habit of analysing it, that 
things would have been much easier if I were a Klingon or an orthodox 
Catholic. I take it, however, that the accompanying thought that one 
can't decide to believe, or decide to endorse the values of a warrior 
culture, unless one considers that there are good grounds for
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is no good pretending to be a Klingon, or a Catholic in the 
hope that one will feel reassured as part of some greater 
whole, for the attempt is bound to be unsuccessful.31 It 
may be that the agent has reason to maintain herself as a 
moral being because given the type of person she is, she 
will be happier if she does so. This might be true 
(although it may well not be; sin, after all, is sometimes 
jolly good fun), but it will not do; the question the agent 
is asking, after all, is "do I have reason to be the sort 
of person I am?"
What, then, is left? I have shown that the agent has some 
reasons for theorising his relations with others in 
accordance with a principle of fundamental equality but I 
have admitted that these reasons are not decisive. 
Further, I have rejected the two most commonly invoked 
"turbochargers"32 to get the theory over the motivational 
hurdle. Is it, then, the case that as Williams and 
Anscombe have argued,33 the sorts of questions I am asking 
are the "ethical progeny"34 of distant times when we had
thinking that the ranking of goods in these traditions is the right 
one, was right, albeit occasionally depressing.
310ne cannot fool oneself if one knows that that is what one is 
trying to do.
32I have borrowed this term from Brian Barry; a "turbocharger is an 
optional extra that provides additional power but comes at a stiff 
price." Barry 1995b, 13MS.
33Anscombe 1958, Is "the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral 
obligation and moral duty, that is to say _ ought to be jettisoned if
this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or 
derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics 
which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it." 
Williams 1985, especially 160-63.
34The term is borrowed from Pence 1991, 252.
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good reason - or thought that we did - to believe in a 
punishing God or an enchanted world? Yes and no. Yes, in 
that there is no decisive reason that we can give to the 
agent to be moral; no, in that this does not mean that we 
have to remain silent. Given that the agent is already a 
social being engaged in co-operation we can press upon him 
the injunction, "be moral", not for any decisive reason but 
because in evaluating, endorsing and acting on the 
principles of justice he expresses himself as a being 
capable of taking responsibility for his choices and acts. 
In ordering his life in accordance with the demands of 
justice he gives his life a "narrative unity" of the sort 
MacIntyre so desires, and he expresses his independence of 
his contingent desires and preferences. It is, so to 
speak, a Nietzschean act of self-creation. Of course, it 
would be just such an act - as Nietzsche recognised (and 
pressed upon us) - for the individual to reject morality 
outright and reject the constructivist scheme being 
advanced here. Nietzsche calls for the individual to 
recognise that the death of God has freed the individual to 
reject morality, what we must respond is, first, that such 
a course of action would be prudentially irrational - 
rejecting co-operation would be to the detriment of the 
agent's self-interest - however, we have to recognise that 
this cannot be a decisive reason for the agent. We must, 
therefore, add that the death of God has merely made 
endorsing morality the responsibility of the agent. Here 
we have reached "the limits of philosophy" with the 
injunction "be moral", however, we have not exhausted our
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resources. Although we cannot offer a decisive reason to 
the agent, we can attempt to bolster our injunction by 
showing the agent that the moral life is an attractive one, 
and for this we have much of the canon of great literature 
at our disposal.35
Before going on to consider the theory presented here any 
further, I want to say something to meet the objection that 
what is being proposed is not a theory of morality at all, 
but simply one of co-operation. To an extent the intuitive 
drive behind this objection lies in a realist conception of 
morality and I have rejected such an account for this 
thesis. Instead I have defended a particular idea of 
morality that is more than simply any system of terms of 
co-operation.36 However, there is one particular facet of 
the theory outlined above - in addition to the absence of a 
decisive reason to be moral - that might cause considerable 
unease. This is the fact that one reason the agent has to 
be moral is that it is in his self-interest. As I noted 
above, this contradicts an intuitive feeling we have about 
morality which is that one ought to obey moral commands 
simply because they are such commands, independent of one's 
interests. However, to a degree this objection misses the 
point; it would of course be an odd theory of morality that 
said that when considering which of two acts to perform 
from a moral point of view, the agent ought to do the act
35Rorty makes a similar point in Contingency, irony, and solidarity
(1989), see especially Part III; See also D. Matravers 1995.
36See §32.
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that best serves his self-interest subject to the stability 
of the whole, (this sort of problem is what underlies our 
intuitive negative reaction to utilitarianism); but that is 
not the theory I am advocating. What I am considering is 
an agent who is asking whether he should endorse, maintain 
and cultivate being a moral person,37 that is as someone 
who is not considering whether to do this or that act but 
rather whether to be a moral character. As a moral 
character the agent is predisposed to perform moral acts 
just because they are moral, and thus the objection is met. 
In this sense the theory I am proposing can be identified 
with those of "character" rather than "act" morality.38
35. The Terms of Co-operation
In summary, a true constructivist scheme grounds morality 
in the wills of the participants; each agent, putting 
herself into a position to reflect on her relations with 
others - the equivalent of an original position - endorses 
her dispositions to behave morally, she commits herself to 
being a moral agent. By doing so she realises her capacity 
for full moral autonomy, she takes responsibility for the 
commitment to be moral as an act of will grounded in 
nothing other than that will. She does this first, because 
a stable system of co-operation is in her interest, and 
second as an act of self-creation; a method of giving unity
37And, likewise, reject those dispositions that he has towards 
immorality. See supra, note 16.
38For a brief but useful account of the differences between these see 
Ihara 1992.
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to her life and choices as a co-operative being,39 In 
willing the system of co-operation she wills norms of co­
operation which benefit all contractors, in willing moral 
terms of co-operation she goes beyond self-interest and 
commits herself to structuring her life around moral norms. 
The community is, then, grounded in nothing other than the 
collective wills of its members to organise in pursuit of 
their common good, and morality is the organising form 
through which this is achieved. In addition, insofar as 
the norms of the community, language and standards of 
rationality are socially engendered the contractors must 
recognise that they owe a debt as the people they are to 
the community: just as they are co-creators of it so they 
are co-created by it.40
Given, then, that each agent conceives of her relationship 
with her co-contractors as one grounded in an agreement to 
abide by norms which every agent could accept, that is 
norms which are the product of theorising from a position 
abstracted from relative bargaining strengths, what would 
the terms of such an agreement be? It might be thought 
that there is nothing very much that can be said about 
these terms given the nature of the theory I am defending, 
other than that they should be subject to a principle of
39The initial unity given by the agent to her life and choices is 
prudential. Prudential rationality commits the agent to conceive of
herself as one and the same being over time, and to act accordingly. 
(This is not something that I have defended here.) Moral rationality 
comprehends this unity but provides for a further level in which the 
agent comes to understand herself and her choices as a social being 
engaged in co-operation.
40See Charvet 1981, 158.
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equality. This is because given that the norms of co­
operation are grounded in nothing other than the will of 
each to co-operate on moral terms, these terms have no 
binding abstract form prior to the agreement, rather, they 
must be given a determinate content in the agreement of the 
contracting parties. In this way constructivism avoids the 
charge - and problems - of "atomistic individualism"41 
because the content of morality is given by collective 
determination (subject to the principle of equality), and 
thus avoids the conflict of individual rights that raises 
so many problems for liberal individualists.42
Nonetheless, although the determinate form of the 
principles is the subject of collective determination there 
are a number of questions one can address in the abstract, 
and the eventual content of the principles will have to 
give concrete embodiment to any claims that can be thus 
established. We can usefully divide the subject of 
distributive justice into three questions, although the 
distinctions between them should, perhaps, not be held too 
rigorously. The questions are over what is to be 
distributed, how it is to be distributed, and to whom.43
41See Taylor 1979.
42If each individual conceived of himself as entering co-operation 
already possessed of rights then we could not avoid the conflict 
between individuals each of whom makes a claim to absolute rights,
see §33.
43I am here following Fishkin 1992, 5.
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Concentrating on the first of these questions, we have seen 
that each individual agrees to co-operate in the first 
instance because co-operating serves his self-interest as 
this can be conceived independent of his social formation; 
that is, in terms of the acquisition of goods which are 
themselves independent of social formation. These are the 
goods of food, sex, shelter etc., and the area of negative 
freedom needed to gain access to, and use, these goods.44 
This, however, only makes sense as part of the thought 
experiment in which the agent is engaged when putting 
himself in an original position, reflecting on his 
relations with others as if he were independent of those 
relations. As a particular, concrete individual, formed 
and engaged in such relations, the agent does not desire 
the abstract form of these goods, rather, he desires these 
goods in their concrete social form, that is, in the form 
of such things as houses, stable monogamous relationships 
and pate de foie gras. The "resource" rights of the 
contracting parties, then, are derived from the abstract 
claim to access to these basic goods, although the form of 
such claims is in terms of concrete resources. The 
"liberty" rights claims stem from two inter-related 
sources, the negative freedom required by the agent as one 
of the "goods" better served by co-operation and the 
requirements of the principle of equality, for treating 
people as equal requires recognising the claims of 
responsible agency, that is giving them an area of negative
44See §33.
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liberty in which they may act, and thus actualise their 
particular interpretation of the right way to live.
The principle of equality is, of course, an answer to the 
question of how we are to distribute the "what". However, 
both these answers (to the questions of "what" and "how") 
are only partial, there are many ways of conceiving of such 
resource claims and of distributing things equally.45 For 
example, one could distribute resources in accordance with 
equal preference satisfaction or in terms of actual 
quantities, and one can treat everyone equally, likewise, 
by equalising levels of preference satisfaction or 
quantities of goods.46 It is also claimed that we treat 
everyone equally by giving everyone equal quantities of 
goods and letting them get on with it or by continual 
redistribution to correct the greater successes of those 
who do well with their initial allocation, i.e., by making 
the just distribution ambition sensitive or by making it 
correct the outcome of differential levels of ambition.
The intuition that drives the argument for equalising 
preference satisfaction rather than resources can be 
captured very easily in the following (well used), example:
45Kymlicka (1990) is an entire book dedicated to the idea that all 
the modern schools of political philosophy can be read as attempts to 
give substantive form to the injunction to treat people equally. 
Fishkin believes that the existence of these different 
interpretations of what and how to distribute undermines the project 
of formulating a liberal theory, see Fishkin 1992, Part I. I have 
criticised this argument in M. Matravers 1995.
46It should be noted that I have already rejected the maximising of 
average utility, see supra, note 20.
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two individuals, one of whom likes oranges but dislikes 
apples and one whom likes apples and dislikes oranges, are 
each offered equal baskets of apples. This, welfarists 
claim, cannot be treating these agents equally because it 
is clearly unfair to the agent who dislikes apples; what is 
needed is a distribution such that each agent ends up with 
the same net welfare gain or loss, in this case, equal 
sized baskets, one containing only apples and the other 
only oranges. Endorsing a welfarist solution to the 
problem of what to distribute has a number of problems, 
however, amongst them the problem of "expensive tastes" (in 
which people with expensive tastes would have to get much 
more of the resource pool because providing them with the 
same resources as someone with less expensive tastes would 
not equalise preference satisfaction47), and the problem of 
inter-personal preference measurement. But, more 
fundamentally there just seems to be something wrong with 
the whole idea. As Barry puts it;
"there is something mildly crazy about the idea that an 
ideally just society would be one where people who needed 
champagne and caviar to get to the average level of 
consumer satisfaction would get more money or where the 
adherents of some killjoy religion would have to be 
allowed to bring everybody else down to their own level 
by stopping others from enjoying themselves."48
47The standard example - which says something about the nature of 
academia - is of someone who has a discerning wine palate; the
argument is that such a person gets very little preference 
satisfaction from a cheap bottle of wine, and thus to equalise 
welfare it is necessary to give the agent more resources.
48Barry 1991, 154.
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Clearly, what is really driving the welfarists' intuition 
is the idea that people are treated equally only if their 
preferences are equally satisfied because the content of 
your preferences is not your fault.49 I am assuming that 
this is not the case for all preferences - or, at least, if 
it is the case then it is still compatible with a notion of 
responsibility. Where it is true that the content of the 
agent's preferences are such that she cannot be held 
responsible for those preferences, the principle of 
distribution would have to take this into account.
Likewise, in treating everyone equally we have to allow 
this idea of responsibility to make resource distribution 
ambition sensitive and thus allow for a degree of letting 
people "get on with it" given an equal starting point and a 
level playing field. Clearly, while being ambition 
sensitive the principles would have to take into account 
that not all differentials over time would be the outcome 
of ambition, some would be a consequence of bad or good 
luck and these would need to be corrected through a 
principle of compensation. Furthermore the requirements of 
equal agency mean that we must guarantee to each individual 
as much freedom as is compatible with a like freedom for 
all other co-contractors. For the moment it is enough to 
say, then, that the content of the principles must abide by 
the requirements of treating agents as equal with respect 
to the distribution of resource claims and claims to an
49The literature on this question is extensive and this is not the 
place to discuss it in detail. Useful discussions can be found in 
Barry 1990, xlvii-xlviii, 43; Cohen 1989; R. Dworkin 1981.
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area of negative freedom through protection of life, 
liberty and legitimately held property.50
This discussion of the terms of co-operation - the 
principles of justice - has been very brief, and there is 
clearly a great deal more that would need to be said if 
that were the concern of this thesis,51 however, I am 
concerned not so much with the precise content of the 
principles as the form they take and the grounding they 
have. In addition, it is clear that the principles would 
not be very different from those of any impartialist 
theory, and I would be happy, for the moment, merely to 
endorse the principles established by Barry;52 in essence, 
a principle of equality of distribution (perhaps with some 
addition such as a pareto condition),53 a principle of 
responsibility and one of compensation.
I intend to say no more about the principles of justice. 
The concern of this thesis is primarily with the grounding
50I have left the third question - to whom - relatively undiscussed, 
implicitly arguing that those who count are others in the society, 
that is, other co-operators. This is because I am concerned here 
with justice, coercion and punishment in a society (and in a 
generation).
51Not least, the account of autonomy and responsibility that 
underlies the claims made in the previous paragraph would have to be 
given.
52See Barry 1995c for a brief introduction to the principles he 
thinks would have to accompany a theory of justice as impartiality, 
although these would have to be amended to take into account my 
contractualist (and, in this sense, anti-cosmopolitan) limits. See 
also Charvet 1995.
53That is, that departures from equality can be justified if no-one 
is made worse off and at least one person is made better off.
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of justice and the rationale of coercion, however, it is 
necessary that the impartialist outcome of this theory is 
recognised, not least because the deep injustice of 
contemporary societies throws up the challenge of whether 
just punishment is possible in an unjust society.54 There 
is, however, one important aspect of the theory that I am 
presenting which I have so far ignored; this is the 
assurance problem and it is now time to turn to this 
problem as the final element in the constructivist theory.
36. Constructivism and The Assurance Problem
It is only rational for each person to make the moral 
commitment to regulate her conduct in accordance with the 
rules agreed by all (subject to the principle of equality), 
if every other person so agrees. This is because it is 
clearly not in the interests of the agent to so commit 
herself if she could, rather, enjoy the benefits of co­
operation without regulating her own behaviour, that is, if 
she could free-ride on the moral behaviour of others. Nor 
is it is in her interests to co-operate on moral terms if 
she believes that she will suffer as a consequence of her 
moral behaviour at the hands of another agent who is free­
riding. This is the assurance problem, or, as we have 
seen, the problem Hobbes calls that of providing a 
condition of "sufficient security".55 Hobbes recognises 
this as the fundamental problem of the state of nature, and
54I discuss this question briefly in §44.
55Hobbes 1651, Part I, Chapter 15, 215.
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as the reason for the individual to authorise the "common 
power" - the "sovereign" - without whom the condition is 
unlikely to be satisfied.56 Hobbes also recognises that so 
long as others are not willing to solve this problem by 
transferring their rights to the common authority, no 
individual can be bound (by reason), to do so:
"For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing 
any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition 
of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their 
Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any 
one, to devest himselfe of hiss For that were to expose 
himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than 
to dispose himselfe to Peace."57 
It is likewise recognised by a more modern theorist of 
justice, John Rawls:
"The assurance problem ~ is to assure the cooperating 
parties that the common agreement is being carried out.
Each person's willingness to contribute is contingent 
upon the contribution of the others. Therefore to 
maintain public confidence in the scheme that is superior 
from everyone's point of view, or better anyway than the 
situation that would obtain in its absence, some device
56Hobbes 1651, especially Part I, Chapters 13-16, 183-222. See, for
an interpretation of Hobbes based very much on the assurance problem, 
Barry 1968. "Contracts, Hobbes tells us, are only conditionally 
beneficial; it only pays me to do my part given that you do yours as 
well. Therefore, it is not obligatory for one party to perform his 
part if he has a 'reasonable suspicion’ that the other party will 
fail to do his. The key is trust; in the absence of a 'common power’ 
over the contracting parties, the larger the element of trust 
involved, the less chance there is that a contract will create an 
obligation to perform.” (Barry 1968, 123).
57Hobbes 1651, Part I, Chapter 14, 190.
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for administering fines and penalties must be 
established."58
The difference between the constructivist theory I am 
advocating and that of Rawls and other faux constructivists 
is that because they import a substantive prior moral 
commitment to the fundamental equality of humans, the 
ethical injunctions that emerge from their construction 
hold independently of the construction; this is the claim 
made above that in faux constructivism the construction is 
left doing little or no work.59 They introduce the 
assurance problem only after having established an 
unconditional moral theory. Having rejected any prior 
commitment to a substantive moral position, the 
constructivist theory I am offering makes morality binding 
on the individual only if the assurance problem is solved; 
morality is contingent on the provision of the condition of 
sufficient security.
This conclusion may, again, disconcert. We intuitively 
feel that morality is absolute, or limited only when there 
is a "tragic" conflict between two moral injunctions, in 
which case we have to choose to obey one or other and "feel 
regret at the deepest level" at the dilemma,60 however, it 
is nothing other than the corollary of the deeper 
contingency of the constructivist moral theory. Morality, 
on this theory, is conditional on the satisfaction of the
58Rawls 1971, 270.
59See §§26-28.
60See Williams 1979 reprinted in Williams 1981, 74.
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self-interest of each contractor, there is no appeal to a 
set of moral norms valid independently of self-interest, 
and thus there is a deep conditionality built into the 
authority of the moral norms. Such norms do not bind on 
individuals if those individuals have no reason to enter 
co-operation (because they could better satisfy their self- 
interest outside of society), or if they simply reject the 
co-operative option. This deep conditionality reappears in 
the assurance problem; morality is binding only in 
conditions of sufficient security.
The rationale of coercion, then, is grounded partially in 
the assurance problem. In the next Chapter I shall examine 
this and distinguish between justified coercion and moral 
punishment. I shall argue that while the assurance problem 
provides the justification for coercion, it is only one, 
albeit a necessary, element in the account of morally 
justified punishment.
Chapter 7: Justified Coercion and 
Moral Punishment
37. The Assurance Problem and Justified Coercion
I have argued that morality is deeply conditional and that 
this conditionality is reflected in the fact that the terms 
of agreement are only binding on the individual - they only 
take the form of moral injunctions - if the condition of 
sufficient security is met. The terms of agreement become 
moral norms only if they serve the self-interest of each 
co-operator and if the co-operators agree to conceive of 
these terms from a position of impartiality; this they do 
as an existential act of commitment, an expression of their 
autonomy and potential as moral beings.
The consequence of such a position is that where the 
individual rejects the co-operative option no moral ties 
exist and a "state of nature” relationship between that 
individual and others holds. Where such an individual 
threatens the co-operative enterprise (or any member there­
of), coercion may very well be required to restrain that 
individual. Coercion, here, is simply the protection of 
one's property and self (or the community's protecting of 
itself and its property), against an alien and, thus, there 
is no legal analogue in punishment.1
^his has implications for any attempt to "globalise" the 
contractualist theory being offered. The implication is that there 
are no moral commitments between contracting groups, or between those
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Of course, the mere act of free-riding represents an attack 
on the very foundation of the community, and through 
coercion the community expresses its abhorrence for such 
action. This is because given that the community is 
grounded in nothing other than the wills of its citizens to 
co-operate on terms on which they would agree in a 
(suitably constituted) original position, and that it is 
this agreement, and action in accordance with it, that 
gives the terms their binding nature as moral principles, 
the community cannot tolerate free-riding. To admit free­
riding would be to admit an agent as a beneficiary of co­
operation, without imposing upon her the burden of 
conceiving of her good as aligned with the good of others 
in the flourishing of the community through the maintenance 
of norms of co-operation. Not to differentiate between 
free-riders and other members of the community would 
destroy the identification of the personal and moral 
perspectives by breaking the connection between the 
individual's flourishing and the flourishing of the 
community; the individual could satisfy her self-interest 
without regulating the pursuit of that self-interest in 
accordance with the terms of co-operation.
In this sense, the formation in the individual of a sense
of himself as a member of the community is accompanied by a
will to coerce others who claim the benefits of membership
without at the same time regulating the pursuit of their
who contract and those who put themselves, or are, "outside" of 
morality, on this question see Charvet 1995.
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self-interest in accordance with the principles governing 
co-operation. This will, likewise applies to himself if he 
turns out to be the free-rider. Of course, the individual 
can free-ride without claiming membership, and, as we have 
seen, it is open to the individual to reject the co­
operative option and to reject morality.2 Where this 
happens, as I have said, the community must defend itself, 
and this may require coercion. This is, however, not a 
moral issue. In fact, I believe that this is only a 
theoretical possibility and I shall, for the most part, 
therefore, address the question of coercion and punishment 
as directed against individuals who do claim membership of 
the community and thus who do have, in what might be a 
primitive form, a moral will. I shall defend this position 
later,3 however not very much turns upon it; where the 
individual rejects morality and the co-operative option the 
community is justified in coercing him for its own defence, 
and that coercion will not be subject to the limits that I 
believe constrain the use of coercion in punishment. 
Perhaps a more interesting question arises where the 
community fails in its obligations and becomes unjust, and 
I shall make a few remarks about this difficult question in 
my conclusion at the end of the chapter.
Amongst the contracting parties, I have argued that the 
solution to the assurance problem provides the rationale
2See §§33-34.
3See §40, especially text accompanying note 32, and note 32.
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for coercion.4 However, I have also argued above, against 
the background of a theory of justice as mutual advantage, 
that a punishment system justified on these grounds is 
likely to yield counter-intuitive results; specifically, 
very harsh punishments for all offences, and relatively 
harsh punishments for minor (but very tempting), offences.5 
Indeed, there is an additional problem which is that if the 
assurance problem is the sole justification for punishment 
it may well not be necessary to punish everyone who commits 
a crime, or to punish like crimes in a like manner. This 
follows because the assurance problem is concerned with the 
beliefs of the contractors; it is a matter of assuring 
"public confidence".6 In this sense the truth or otherwise 
of the efficacy of sanctions is only relevant insofar as it 
affects the beliefs of the population; it would be 
perfectly compatible with the assurance problem 
justification of punishment for only some offenders to be 
punished. A lottery, for example, in which only one in 
every three offenders was punished might be sufficient to 
satisfy the condition of sufficient security.7 This 
problem is seldom recognised in the literature, although 
Rawls, for example, admits the possibility of some kind of 
deception in his brief answer to the assurance problem, 
(although it fails to recur when he comes to discuss the
4See §36.
5See §25.
^awls 1971, 270.
7Whether it would or not, of course, depends upon the conditions 
prevailing in the particular society.
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role of sanctions in greater depth)• Rawls argues that in 
order to meet the challenge of the assurance problem, "some 
device for administering fines and penalties must be 
established", his conclusion, however, is that "it is here 
that the mere existence of an effective sovereign, or even 
the general belief in his efficacy, has a crucial role".8
In order to clarify what is at issue let us return to a 
straight original position type choosing situation. The 
people in the original position would, I have argued, 
choose principles which have a coercive nature in order to 
solve the assurance problem and, thus, make the principles 
morally binding. This, however, is only sufficient to show 
that some degree of coercion is needed and justified; the 
precise degree and the distribution of coercion, however, 
are questions which, if the assurance problem is the only 
concern, are unlikely to be resolved in a manner that 
accords with our convictions about justice, although the 
degree of inequity will be determined by the precise 
conditions of the actual society.
One argument against coercing only some is immediately 
available; the people in the original position are not 
solely concerned with the assurance problem because they 
have to choose principles from a perspective of 
impartiality, that is, in accordance with the principle of 
equality. This means that in choosing principles which 
have a necessarily coercive element the people in the
8Rawls 1971, 270, emphasis added.
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original position cannot choose to coerce some and not 
others for like infractions of the terms.9 This means that 
at least one of the problems attached to the assurance 
justification can be met. As yet, however, this is simply 
a theory of justified coercion, it is not a theory of 
punishment.
38. Justified Coercion and "Moral" Punishment
The assurance problem, then, is the primary justification 
for the use of "hard treatment".10 However, justifying a 
system of punishment requires more than simply justifying 
coercion. In agreeing to necessarily coercive terms of 
agreement, the people in the original position cannot 
simply agree to coerce people to satisfy the condition of 
sufficient security, for to do so would not treat the 
contractors as members of the community capable of making 
the commitment to be moral. If the offender is a member of 
the moral community then to coerce him simply to satisfy 
the requirements of the assurance problem is to use him as 
a means to the better satisfaction of others and this is
9For the argument against choosing average utility as the outcome of 
impartiality see Chapter 6, note 20.
10"Hard treatment" is a term of art denoting the imposition of 
suffering or deprivation, as against education or therapy. I shall 
argue below that there may be conditions in which the other functions 
of punishment - moral expression and moral education - require hard 
treatment, however, I think that this is unlikely to be the normal 
case, see S. Hard treatment is distinguished from the expressivist 
elements of punishment by Feinberg (1965), where he admits that 
although the two elements are intertwined they can be separated for 
the purposes of analysis: "we can conceive of ritualistic
condemnation unaccompanied by any further hard treatment, and of 
inflictions and deprivations which, because of different symbolic 
conventions, have no reprobative force." (Feinberg 1965, 98)
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incompatible with the fundamental commitment made by all 
co-operators, to interact on terms that would be agreed by 
fundamentally equal beings. If the offender is not a 
member then the community would be justified in not 
respecting that requirement, but, as I have said, I am 
treating that as a mere theoretical possibility.11 Rather, 
in agreeing to a system of coercion, the people in the 
original position must address the offender as a member of 
the community, as entitled to equal consideration, and as 
potentially possessed of the moral will to live with others 
on moral terms.12 Moral coercion appeals to this will, it 
addresses the offender as a moral being, and ultimately it 
is justifiable to the offender as such a being as emanating 
from his own commitment. That is, moral coercion cannot 
take the form of a mere appeal to the agent as a 
prudentially rational being - it cannot simply increase the 
price of certain actions - instead it must address the
^Of course, there are ways of thinking of such a possibility that 
makes it far more real; prisoners of war, for example. Here I do 
think, as do most people, that the nature of imprisonment is 
fundamentally different to that imposed as a legal punishment. The 
other possibility that springs to mind is a member of a radical 
terrorist organisation who does not believe that co-operation on any 
terms except the "true” ones is acceptable, and this seems to me a 
very real problem for traditionally religious states trying to 
convert to a secular, liberal, constitution, (Egypt and Algeria might 
be examples). Of course, I believe that, in these cases, 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorists are mistaken in their beliefs, 
however, I do not believe that this means that they do not see the 
advantage of co-operation on moral terms, they merely mistake the 
grounds and nature of those terms. Insofar as they do identify with 
morality one could, therefore, attempt to appeal to them and 
"convert" them to accept responsibility for morality, which is why I 
do not think anyone is beyond redemption. It is clearly not 
inconceivable that I am mistaken, in which case I think an argument 
for imposing limits on coercion can still be made because of the 
importance of law and punishment in setting the moral tone in the 
society, see §41.
12The compatibility between coercion and the requirement to respect 
the agent's autonomy is discussed below, §43.
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agent as a potentially moral being, as someone who has, in 
this instance, failed to live up to his commitment to live 
with others on moral terms of co-operation
While this gives a moral dimension to coercion by linking 
it to the agreement to co-operate on moral terms, it does 
not, in itself, transform coercion into punishment. 
Punishment (as I am concerned with it in this thesis) is a 
legal response to illegality and nothing I have said 
commits the community to giving the terms of co-operation a 
legal form. In smaller societies in which each person is 
known to every other, the role of law and penal sanctions, 
as against positive morality and social sanctions, might be 
very limited. This raises the larger question of the 
relatively indeterminate nature of the terms of co­
operation themselves. The terms of co-operation are 
abstract requirements that must find embodiment in the 
positive law/morality of any moral community. Clearly, the 
people in the original position are not going to attempt to 
give a specific content to every issue that arises in 
regulating co-operation. For example, although some 
determinate form must be given to the right to travel 
freely with respect to road use (at the most basic level 
there has to be an agreement as to which side of the road 
to drive on), such decisions can be left to an agreed 
decision making procedure.13 For the moment I shall assume
13Given the principle of equality and the idea of agency, the form 
given to this decision making procedure must be one of democracy. In 
smaller societies there seems to be no reason not to endorse some 
form of direct democracy, in larger, more complex societies, a form
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that the assurance problem gives rise to the need for some 
hard treatment and that the form given for the imposition 
of this hard treatment is legal; that is, I shall use the 
language of "offender", "punishment" etc.
The justification of punishment has, then, a number of 
elements. First there is the assurance problem which will 
be solved by varying degrees of coercion, depending upon 
the circumstances of the society. Second there is the 
function of expressing the abhorrence the community feels 
for free-riders, and finally, linked to the second 
function, there is the role of law as a moral educator - as 
re-enforcing the community's values and the injunction to 
be moral - as a creator of the citizens the community needs 
for its continued flourishing.14 I now want to say 
something about each of these.
39. The Assurance Problem and the Quantum of Punishment
Providing the condition of sufficient security - solving 
the assurance problem - is the primary reason for imposing 
hard treatment. This means that part of the general 
justifying aim - and that part usually thought of as the 
most difficult to justify - has a basically preventative 
function.15 While such a rationale has traditionally been
of representative democracy accompanied by stringent checks and 
balances.
14As I said above, on the theory being presented here the citizens 
are co-creators of, and co-created by, the moral community.
^"Preventative" is meant to include the functions of deterring 
others, deterring the offender and preventing the offender from
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avoided by expressivist and educative theorists I cannot 
see that it can be: the whole penality system seems to 
reflect "a preventive design".16 As Andrew von Hirsch puts 
it:
"When the state criminalizes conduct, it issues a legal 
threats Such conduct is proscribed and violation will 
result in the imposition of specific penalties. This 
threat surely has something to do with inducing citizens 
to refrain from the proscribed conduct."17 
Of course, the extent and nature of the hard treatment 
necessary to solve the assurance problem is going to depend 
upon the society.18 This is something recognised by 
thinkers as diverse as Hegel and Nietzsche;19 it is
committing crimes during his punishment; in short, attempting to 
prevent the occurrence of future crimes.
16von Hirsch 1990, 275.
17von Hirsch 1990, 275-6, emphasis in the original. A similar point 
is made by John Charvet when discussing punishment as criticisms "The 
purpose of having a rule is to secure the general realisation of the 
conduct it prescribes. Therefore the existence of rules presupposes 
the possibility of affecting people's future actions. It is in this 
context that criticism operates, for it would indeed be meaningless 
and futile to criticise people for their actions, if such criticism 
never did or ever could have an effect on their future conduct. But 
since criticism is only relevant where rules exist, and since rules 
exist only where it is possible to affect people’s actions by means 
of the rules, criticism is assured of having such general effects. 
Thus criticism does always in part look forward to the future actions 
of the rule-breaker and the other members of the community, as the 
Utilitarians have always insisted that punishment must." (Charvet 
1966), 578. Cf. Primoratz 1989, 70-71.
18See von Hirsch 1985, 53; von Hirsch 1990, 275, 278.
i9"The - magnitude [of the crime] varies, however, according to the 
condition of civil society, and this is the justification both for 
attaching the death penalty to a theft of a few pence or of a turnip, 
and for imposing a lenient punishment for a theft of a hundred and 
more times these amounts". (Hegel 1991, S218R, see also §218, S218A). 
"The 'creditor' always becomes more humane to the extent that he has 
grown richer- It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such 
a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest 
luxury possible to it - letting those who harm it go unpunished. 
What are my parasites to me? It might say. May they live and 
prosper: I am strong enough for that!" (Nietzsche 1967, 72).
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conceivable that in small societies in which the communal 
bonds are extremely strong, hard treatment could be 
replaced by, say, public stigmatisation. Elsworth Faris, 
for example, tells of a primitive society in which the mere 
fact of being reprimanded by a small, weak, old woman, is 
enough to cause extreme remorse in a brutal warrior (who 
has offended against the tribal code), accompanied by a 
desire to make reparations.20 Likewise, it is conceivable 
that a society could be so unstable as to need extremely 
harsh penalties to solve the assurance problem. This 
raises a difficulty for the account of punishment being 
advocated here - a tension between the need for hard 
treatment to solve the assurance problem, and the degree of 
punishment needed to express censure - which needs serious 
consideration. I cannot properly address this problem, 
however, until I have considered the expressivist elements 
in this account.21
40. Punishment as Censure
Given the nature of the community as grounded in nothing 
other than the wills of the contractors to co-operate on 
the basis of norms agreed in a suitably constituted 
original position, and that a necessary condition of the 
agent theorising his relations in this manner is that it
20Faris 1914, 58; see also Tunick 1992, 78; von Hirsch 1985, 53; 
1990, 278.
21Similarly, the reader may have noticed a tension between the use of 
hard treatment to affect the actions of agents and the requirement to 
address agents as responsible beings. This is discussed below in 
§43.
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serves his self-interest, the people in the original 
position must reinforce this identity between self-interest 
and morality by expressing disapprobation at free-riding; 
free-riding strikes at the heart of the community by 
denying the necessary connection between self-interest and 
the regulating of the pursuit of self-interest in 
accordance with the terms of co-operation. When the 
individual commits an offence against those terms, then, 
she, as Hegel insisted, harms not just her victim but also 
the community of which she is a part.22 The first function 
served in censuring the offender, then, is in reaffirming 
the principles against which the criminal has offended; as 
Igor Primoratz puts it, in language distinctly similar to 
Hegel's s
"in expressing emphatic condemnation of the crime 
committed, punishment vindicates the law which has been 
broken, reaffirms the right which has been violated, and 
demonstrates that the misdeed was indeed a crime."23
In censuring the offender, however, the community not only 
reaffirms the rights established by the agreement, and the 
identity of the personal and moral perspectives that 
underlies that agreement, but also treats the offender as a 
responsible agent. Censure is, in Strawsonian language, a 
"reactive attitude", that is, it makes sense against the
22See SSI1-13. The free-rider might deny this, and if she genuinely
does so then she puts herself outside of morality, and we may 
justifiably coerce her as an alien, cf. supra, lln.
23Primoratz 1989, 196.
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background of holding the agent censured as responsible.24 
On the theory I am advocating, censure includes the claim 
that the agent, as a co-operator, in offending against the 
terms of co-operation is offending against her own will to 
co-operate on moral terms; a will which must include the 
denial of the appropriateness of free-riding.
It might be objected that the offender can hardly be said 
to have the will to co-operate on moral terms given that 
she is an offender; she has manifestly not co-operated on 
such terms. This, however, is to commit the mistake of 
thinking that someone who free-rides in a particular 
instance rejects co-operation and morality tout court. The 
community in censuring, appeals to the agent as a 
responsible being who has demonstrated, in a myriad of 
other ways, her commitment to co-operation on moral terms. 
It takes her "at her word" when she claims membership and 
benefits from the community, and imposes on her the "costs" 
of that membership when she fails to live up to its 
requirements, in so doing it reminds her of her 
responsibility and commitment to the moral life. Censure 
is, in this sense, retributivist, not consequentialist: we 
do not censure so as "to teach moral standards of self-
240f course, a consequentialist determinist might argue that censure 
could be made sense of as a policy of social control, that is we 
pretend to blame people because that blame will effect the causal 
chain that determined that - or other - agents' future behaviour. In 
this case I would argue that either a compatibilist case could be 
made for regarding the agent as responsible, or, if that were not the 
case, this would be a very different thing from "censure" even if we 
chose to call it that. For consequentialist accounts of the use of 
blame and censure see Benn 1958; Nowell-Smith 1961, 301-04. For a 
useful discussion of consequentialism and blame see Duff 1986, 42-47.
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restraint to the citizenry or to strengthen social 
cohesion", although those ends may play a part in how we go 
about censuring, rather, "it is because we share certain 
moral standards that a response is required that recognizes 
both the conduct's wrongfulness and the actor's fault."25 
Duff is, therefore, right in emphasising the important way 
in which condemnation is part of a discourse, "a moral 
discussion" in which a "challenge" is made to "respond to 
this moral charge".26
It is important to note the importance - the centrality - 
of the censure element in the account of punishment, as 
against the importance of the assurance problem in the 
account of coercion; if the community were to coerce the 
offender in a manner that was morally neutral it might well 
satisfy the demands of the assurance problem but it would 
fail on two vital counts. First, it would not be 
addressing the offender as a moral being; it would not 
offer the offender a moral reason why he ought not behave 
in the manner he has, it would merely offer him a 
prudential reason why it is in his self-interest not to do 
so in the future. Second, and relatedly, it would not 
affirm the moral status of the terms of co-operation, that 
is, it would not affirm their status as authoritatively 
binding on the pursuit of self-interest, rather they would
25von Hirsch 1990, 272. This view of the role of blame is vital in 
Duff’s "penitence" account (see Duff 1986, esp. 47-54, and Chapter 9;
also Duff 1988) and appears in some version also in Primoratz 1989; 
Hampton 1984; Morris 1981, but see Duff 1977.
26Duff 1986, 48.
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be affirmed merely as means to better fulfil one's self- 
interest; means that can be evaluated on a case by case 
basis in the light of this.
Does it follow from the above account that the "offender 
wills her own punishment”? Insofar as the offender is 
addressed against the background of the constructivist 
theory I have defended she does, indeed, will her own 
punishment. This is an idea that is often viewed 
scornfully27 and it brings into focus the difficult 
question of the role of consent in the constructivist 
theory I am proposing, a question which I addressed very 
briefly in a note above.28 There I argued that the agent, 
taking up the reflective stance, asked whether she wanted 
to maintain and cultivate the moral dispositions that make 
her into a moral character, and reject those that disposed 
her otherwise. I argued that the constructivist theory I 
proposed gave an account of why she should do so, although 
I could offer no decisive reason. This I thought, made 
some sense of the idea of consent; it is not a once and for 
all commitment to "obey the state" or "enter the contract" 
it is a continual, one might say hermeneutical, process in 
which the agent affirms her status as a moral character 
through self-creative reflection and action.29 As part of 
the constructivist scheme I am offering as the answer to
27See Honderich 1984, 219-27, esp., 226.
28Chapter 6, note 16.
29See Taylor 1985, Chapters 1, 2, 4. Compare this account of consent 
with that given in §23.
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the personal reflective question concerning the nature of 
the agent' s relations to others , I have argued that the 
commitment to be moral involves a renunciation of free­
riding, and this renunciation is visited on those who free- 
ride as, in this sense, their will.
The most common objection to such a theory revolves around 
the claim that some - perhaps, most - people have never put 
themselves into an original position, they have never 
"chosen" to affirm themselves as moral characters, so they 
have not willed anything. I do not think such a criticism 
is plausibly levelled at the model of consent offered 
above. People in relatively just societies30 do reflect on 
moral issues every day, and do ask themselves whether, for 
example, the want to be the kinds of persons who cure 
dishonest, or greedy, or who lie and steal. For this 
reason, censure aimed at involving the agent in a 
discussion, aimed at the agent as a rational, responsible, 
being is not consequentialist. Although the aim is, 
partially, to try to get the agent to reflect on his 
actions, regret and "repent" them, even if we were sure
that the agent would not do so - Primoratz gives the
example of Klaus Barbie31 - we would still be justified in
addressing him as an agent, (so long, that is, as he
fulfilled the requirements of being a responsible agent and 
did not completely renounce the co-operative option),
30How all of this is effected by a background of injustice is
discussed below, §44.
31Primoratz 1989, 195-6.
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because he is capable of doing so, of understanding that 
his actions have evoked the disapproval of others, even if 
he finds that such disapproval carries no weight with 
him.32
In a sense, then, I am defending the idea that everyone in 
a relatively just society does consent to live under moral 
terms of co-operation, that is terms which authoritatively 
bind the pursuit of self-interest, I aim merely using a 
different idea of what it is to consent, one which is far 
removed from the voluntaristic single act that is its more 
common meaning. This seems to me important if we are to 
avoid the imbecility of theories of obligation that 
understand consent to be a single act of agreeing to be 
bound by the law. Of course, whilst people do consent (on 
my interpretation), they consent to all sorts of moral 
rules that have no foundation, and for all sorts of 
reasons. On the theory I am proposing, moral rules which 
have no foundation in the agreement should be rejected, and 
the reason to live morally is a combination of self­
32See on this Duff 1986, 266; von Hirsch 1990, 274; Primoratz 1989, 
195-6. Primoratz tries to argue that Duff’s account of censure is 
consequentialist, von Hirsch argues on a similar basis to me that 
this does not have to be the case, although he thinks that "Duff 
seems to lay himself open to this charge" (von Hirsch 190, 274, 48n). 
Contra von Hirsch, I think Duff is pursuing a similar line to myself 
and von Hirsch, that no agent is conceptually incapable of redemption 
(if she were she would not qualify as an agent), independent of how 
empirically likely it is. This is not only compatible with the 
account of blame offered throughout Trials and Punishments. but is 
also explicitly stated in the passage cited by von Hirsch; Duff says 
"to talk thus of ’the good that is in him’ is not to make some 
psychological claim to the effect that he ’really’ cares for the 
values which he flouts: it is rather to combine the conceptual claim 
that every moral agent has the capacity or potential for moral 
development and reform, with the moral claim that we should never 
give up hope of bringing him to actualise that potential." (Duff 
1986, 266).
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interest and existential commitment. Education, and 
perhaps the increasing disenchantment with spiritual 
explanations, might slowly convince people of this, and it 
is important that it should do so, for it is important that 
people realise their responsibility for the moral life of 
their community. Punishment, in a just society, also has 
its part to play, for in saying to the agent "you, and you 
alone, are responsible for your commitment to be moral, 
(albeit that we can try to help you in making that 
commitment)", it can deepen the agent • s understanding of 
morality and perhaps lead to his becoming a fully morally 
autonomous being; that is, a being who takes full 
responsibility for his moral commitment.33 This brings me 
to the role of punishment as a moral educator.
41. Punishment as a Moral Educator
Punishment in reaffirming the terms of agreement, in 
declaring the criminal action wrong, also contributes to 
the moral education of the contractors;34 it reinforces the 
injunction to be moral. In large modern societies, in 
which the traditional spheres through which moral education 
occurred have either disappeared or been discredited, law 
has an important role in setting the tone of the society. 
Law is an alternative form through which to inculcate as
33This idea, that in accepting his punishment the agent deepens his 
understanding of himself, is important to Hegel’s account of 
punishment, see SS14-15 for a discussion of this.
34The best known defence of the moral education approach is Hampton 
1984.
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well as enforce moral injunctions and penal sanctions, 
likewise, share this role. This is not to say that law can 
replace social morality;35 law is by its very nature 
cumbersome and general, and, most importantly, many of the 
commands of law are inapplicable to children (because they 
do not qualify as agents), who are the most obvious 
candidates for moral education. Nonetheless the moral tone 
of many societies is dependent upon the law as the most 
important and visible instance of morality.
This is not to say, of course, that the law ought to 
enshrine and enforce every piece of traditional morality, 
(or, perhaps worse still, popular calls from a "moral 
majority") a la Devlin's attack on the Wolfenden 
Committee,36 it is to say that the law ought to enshrine 
and enforce those justified moral injunctions (which are 
best enshrined in a positive law, rather than a positive 
morality), which would emerge from the reflective agreement 
of agents committed to a system of co-operation and to a 
principle of equality.
This is an instance of the idea that just as the moral 
community is created by the agreement of its members to co­
operate on moral terms, it is also the case that the 
community is the creator of its members; it is only through 
living in the community that the agent comes to flourish as 
a self-conscious, rational being. Further, the concrete
35See §25.
36See Devlin 1959 and the reply by Hart (1963).
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form given to the abstract constructivist injunctions are 
given by the community, and it is these concrete rules that 
form and shape each agent's dispositions. Insofar as the 
community is challenging the agent to choose the moral 
life, punishment has an important role reinforcing the 
community's standards and values.
Punishment, then, while serving the assurance problem also 
has an element of censure - an expressive element.37 In 
this regard I can concur with Michael Davis's criticism of 
expressive theories that punishment is more than merely 
censuring; it is, but what Davis does not recognise, is 
that it is also censuring.38
Having established this "two-pronged rationale",39 it is 
now time to address a problem I put off above concerning 
the tension between the hard-treatment required to solve 
the assurance problem, the expression of blame, and the 
requirement to treat people as agents.
42. Blame, Hard Treatment and Punishment
The first and most obvious tension that arises would be if 
the assurance problem demanded a relatively harsh penalty 
and yet the degree of censure the society thought
37The best known defence of expressivism is Feinberg 1965. For a 
detailed criticism see Skillen 1980.
38See Davis 1988; von Hirsch 1990, 270.
39This term is borrowed from von Hirsch 1990, 278.
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appropriate was not too great. Let us take the offence of 
overriding on public buses.40 It is fairly clear to anyone 
living in London that such an offence is common, and very 
difficult to detect without spending more money on 
Inspectors than one could hope to recoup on fines. 
Interestingly London Regional Transport have tried, over 
the last few years (approximately 1988-1994), two, very 
different, approaches. The first was a campaign aimed to 
stigmatise fare evaders, amongst the posters that went up 
was one declaring that it was better to override on a 
double decker bus because then only half the bus could 
stare at you when you were apprehended. Others, likewise, 
pointed out how embarrassing it would be to be caught. 
This campaign has recently been replaced, all invocations 
to play fair and references to social stigma have been 
removed and the posters now simply declare that the maximum 
fine for fare evasion has been raised to £1000; the posters 
now juxtapose "overriding” and "overdrawn”.
This example is clearly not meant to be a criminological 
case study, the point I wish to make is that the blame 
attached to overriding on the buses is not very great - a 
lot of people who would not dream of, say, stealing from 
another individual regard overriding as a legitimate 
activity given that they "give so much to London Regional
40That is paying for a certain distance and then remaining on the bus 
for longer than one's ticket permits.
270
Transport anyway",41 yet a fine of £1000 is very serious, 
not to convey censure, but because deterring such 
activities requires severe penalties.42 The problem is 
simple; sometimes deterrence and censure will yield 
conflicting demands of the penality system.43
There are two reasons why precedence should be given to the 
censure element over the preventative in deciding the 
quantum of punishment. The first is that to deter 
potential offenders only by threatening them with extreme 
penalties is to give up on the idea that the penality 
system addresses the person as a moral agent and member of 
the community. When Armstrong writes "let him be whipped 
to death, publicly of course, for a parking offence; that 
would certainly deter me from parking on the spot reserved 
for the Vice-Chancellor!",44 he is making the point that 
although such sentences would prevent crimes they are not
41There are many similar examples; people who "taste" goods in 
Supermarkets do not think of themselves, and others do not think of 
them, as shop lifters.
42Although see infra, 47n.
43Andrew von Hirsch, whose "mixed" account is very similar to my own, 
singularly fails to address this. He states that "the intertwining 
of [prevention and expression] is critical: It means that the 
severity of the hard treatment will convey the degree of censure. 
This is why _ it is desert rather than preventative efficiency that 
should determine the quantum of punishment." Why should the severity 
of the hard treatment not reflect the needs of prevention? von 
Hirsch refers the reader "for a fuller discussion" to later in the
article where again the position is merely stated: "In punishment, 
deprivation or hard treatment is the vehicle for expressing 
condemnation." Remarkably, the reader is then referred back to the 
original discussion for a defence of this argument! (von Hirsch 
1990, 276-7, 279. In fact, throughout this article von Hirsch moves 
from a "two-pronged" approach to an expressivist approach in which it 
is simply a fortunate by product that prevention also occurs, see, 
e.g., 287.
44Armstrong 1961, in Acton 1969, 152.
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acceptable. One reason that they are not acceptable is 
that they are incompatible with the commitment to treat 
others as deserving of equal consideration. Punishment, on 
the "two-pronged" approach given above, is meant to 
communicate - to express - to the agent and to the 
community precisely what it is that the offender has done 
and what the appropriate response is. As Duff insists it 
must be, punishment is about engaging the criminal in a 
discourse over the true nature of his actions, and I would 
add, this discourse extends wider to the community at 
large. It aims to show the offender the real nature of his 
commitment to live the moral life as demonstrated in his 
participation in the community and, thus, to reconcile him 
to his punishment.
"An offender’s punishment must be such that it appeals 
to, but does not coerce, his understanding and his will-.
It must also be proportionate in its severity to the 
seriousness of his offences only then can it communicate 
to him an adequate understanding of the moral character 
of his offence".45 
Similarly, only then can it express from and to the 
community the true moral character of the offender's act.
The second reason for the precedence of censure over 
prevention in deciding the quantum of punishment is that if 
harsh penalties for minor, but prevalent, offences were 
imposed they would be disproportionate, and this is 
important not only because it is vital to the expressivist
^Duff 1986, 278.
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and educative functions of punishment that the response is 
thought appropriate, but also for more practical reasons. 
In a just society, or a relatively just one, I have argued 
that there will need to be respect for something akin to 
what we think of as broadly liberal individual rights. Let 
us assume that in such a society a category of offences 
exists which are not thought particularly reprehensible.46 
If that society decided to penalise one minor non- 
reprehensible offence (which was extremely prevalent), by 
several years imprisonment, then the expressivist could 
raise two related objections. The first is that such a 
response would violate a principle of ordinal 
proportionality. Ordinal proportionality requires that 
"persons convicted of crimes of comparable gravity should 
receive punishments of comparable severity (save under 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances altering the 
harmfulness of the conduct or the culpability of the 
actor).”47
46See von Hirsch 1990, 284. von Hirsch points out, positing a
similar society (which he calls "Draconia"), that if one had a 
sufficiently authoritarian view of the sovereign power then any 
infraction of the rules might be viewed as serious because it 
displayed an arrogant disregard for the powers that be.
47von Hirsch 1990, 282; von Hirsch 1985, Chapter 4. See also Bedau 
1984. Of course, the seriousness of a crime is going to depend in 
part on the frequency of its occurrence. It could, therefore, be 
argued that a frequently committed minor offence is more serious than 
a similar offence which is only occasionally performed. This doesn’t 
effect the argument here, which is about the tension between the 
censure that is actually felt by the community for those who commit 
an act and the requirement to deter others from performing that act. 
It may mean, however, that more should be done to alert the 
population to the seriousness of certain, seemingly minor, offences. 
This was, in fact, tried as part of the initial, stigmatising, 
campaign on the buses, posters were put up describing overriders as 
parasites on the fare paying public and detailing the costs to each 
paying traveller of fare evasion. Within the limits of censure, 
greater penalties might play a role in this education as the 
relationship between the penalties imposed for certain crimes and the
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A prison sentence for overriding on buses, then, would 
require a similar sentence for similarly grave offences; 
littering, perhaps. But why should we endorse a principle 
of ordinal proportionality? The answer is clear: if
punishment is the appropriate response to the agent through 
which the community expresses its censure, then actions 
which are similarly censured should evoke similar 
responses. This is necessarily very rough, both because 
judging the similarity of different legal sanctions is 
difficult (is 100 hours community service a lesser or 
greater punishment, in terms of the censure it conveys, 
than a day in prison?48), and because, as I argued above, 
the response of the community may not necessarily be legal. 
Where there is no preventative rationale, the community
seriousness with which those crimes are viewed is clearly a complex 
one. I have tried to simplify it here because I am interested in 
showing how to reconcile the demands of censure and those of 
prevention and, thus, it has been useful to show them in straight 
conflict. In fact, as the above demonstrates, it is not as simple as 
that, and this would need to be take into account when actual 
punishments were imposed, given that censure is still going to allow 
a degree of flexibility.
48This raises the very interesting question of the difference betweeii 
types of penalties. Again no abstract analysis can really be 
definitive in that it is possible to think of a society in which some 
material possession was so valued that a fine of that thing was 
considered vastly more severe than a term in prison. There is little 
doubt that the reverse applies in contemporary Britain, in other 
words, although a fine may have disastrous effects on a family which 
could be avoided by a term in prison for the offender, it is still 
considered, especially by judges, to be a more serious "statement" to 
impose a custodial sentence. I would explain this by saying that the 
"communication" in a custodial sentence carries implications of much 
greater censure. Firstly, because a fine my be dealt with relatively 
discreetly; one's neighbours, employer, family, etc., may not have to 
know. More importantly, consider what is said to the offender in a 
custodial sentences he is being told that he has done something so 
grave that society cannot tolerate him, it needs to purge itself so 
completely of his action that it can only express this by removing 
him temporarily from its orbit. Anyone who remembers their childhood 
will know that to have one's pocket money docked may have imposed 
real hardship but it was as nothing to the remorse evoked by feeling 
as if one had (albeit temporarily) lost one’s place in the affections 
and concern of one's parents.
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might use social stigmatisation, nevertheless the point is 
that the level of stigmatisation should be appropriate to 
the measure of censure, just as, within the legal system, 
the punishment should also reflect the degree of censure.49
The second, related, objection the expressivist position 
raises against the use of harsh penalties for some minor 
crimes is that it is likely to cause problems when fitted 
in to a scale of cardinal proportionality. Cardinal 
proportionality concerns "the overall magnitude and 
anchoring points of a penalty scale";50 that is, it 
concerns the ranking of crimes and penalties vertically by 
seriousness. Of course, if overriding on a bus were to 
carry a sentence of several years imprisonment then this 
could be the point around which the scale could be fixed. 
But this is not satisfactory because of the moral 
assumption I built in to the example that rights are 
important in the society. If the community appears to say
^"Hard treatment" can, therefore, be used to express censure, and 
given certain empirical facts, may have to be. This is why one of 
the standard criticisms of expressivist theories is so misplaced; the 
criticism has it that if punishment is expressive one could just as 
well "'say it with flowers' or, perhaps more appropriately, with 
weeds" (Scanlon 1988, 214), but the whole point is that some
societies do not say it with flowers or weeds but with suffering. It 
may be hoped that we, in contemporary Britain for example, could 
reduce the public perception of what is a "serious statement" from 
life imprisonment (where it seems to be at the moment), to say, 
something like four years, but this is a process that will take time. 
The point is that, of course there is no necessary connection between 
the expression of blame and hard treatment, but if the cultural 
connection exists then that has to be included in any expressivist 
theory. The claim is that society needs hard treatment to express 
itself, and it may also be true that the offender needs hard 
treatment to appreciate the level of censure; Duff argues, (1988, 
162-3 and 1986, Chapters 9-10) that a degree of "hard treatment" is 
also required so as to "force [the offender's] attention onto his 
crime" (Duff 1988, 162).
50von Hirsch 1990, 282.
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to the offender, "this isn't a terribly heinous crime so 
we'll just send you to prison for several years", the 
message it is sending is that the right to liberty is not 
all that important. It is undermining the very values it 
is seeking through punishment to affirm and inculcate. As 
von Hirsch puts it, "it’s a bit like saying, 'I'm not so 
upset, so I'll only break your arm'"51
There is an additional, non-principled, practical 
objection, to very harsh penalties for minor crimes, 
related to the need for cardinal proportionality and that 
is that if the punishment for car parking is the same as 
that for, say, killing a policeman, then an offender of the 
car parking rule who is apprehended by a policeman may just 
as well kill the policeman in an attempt to escape. In 
other words punishment ought "to induce a man to choose 
always the least mischievous of two offences" by ensuring 
that "where two offences come in competition, the 
punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to 
induce a man to prefer the less". Similarly punishments 
ought to be such that having "resolved upon a particular 
offence" the offender is induced "to do no more mischief 
than what is necessary for his purpose".52
51von Hirsch 1990, 284.
52"If any man have any doubt about this, let him conceive the offence 
to be divided into as many separate offences as there are 
distinguishable parcels of mischief that result from it. Let it 
consist for example, in a man’s giving you ten blows-If then, for 
giving you ten blows, he is punished no more than for giving you 
five, the giving you five of these ten blows is an offence for which 
there is no punishment at all: which being understood: as often as a 
man gives you five blows, he will be sure to give you five more, 
since he may have the pleasure of giving you these five for nothing.
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In itself this objection would not be sufficient, because 
it would always be possible to counter it by denying that 
there is an upper limit on the punishments being imposed. 
In other words, it might be true that having the death 
sentence for car parking offences and killing policeman 
will encourage car parking offenders to kill policemen, and 
therefore that the penalty for killing policemen should be 
far greater than the penalty for parking your car 
illegally, but it does not follow from that alone, that the 
punishment for illegal car parking should necessarily be 
scaled down. History has demonstrated man's amazing 
capacity to invent hideous and painful treatments for 
others53, and thus it would be possible to respond to this 
objection by scaling the punishment for police killers up. 
Anybody who finds such an idea absurd should look at 
Hanging not Punishment Enough for Murtherers, Highway Men, 
and House Breakers, etc.54 The author of this pamphlet 
argues on identical lines to those above, i.e., on the 
basis of cardinal proportionality, that since hanging is 
punishment for larceny it cannot be sufficient punishment 
for more serious crimes such as those listed in the title.
On the theory being defended here such a policy would not 
be justified, for an upper limit is put on possible
—This rule is violated in almost every page of every body of laws I 
have ever seen." All quotations from J. Bentham 1798, 168.
53See the much quoted description of the execution of the regicide
Damiens in the opening pages of Foucault's Discipline and Punish. 
Foucault 1977, 3-5.
54Anon. 1702
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punishments by a combination of the expressivist and 
educative elements and the moral theory underlying the 
account of punishment itself. It is important to realise 
the necessity of the moral theory because the requirements 
of cardinal and ordinal proportionality do not tell us 
where to set the penalties for different offences55 and 
this is as it must be. I have claimed throughout that such 
questions must depend upon the society in which the 
penalties are to operate. All that I attempted to show 
above is that where there is a conflict between prevention 
and expression, the latter must take precedence. The moral 
theory I have defended tells us that rights and agency are 
important, and thus puts a limit on the types of penalties 
that could be said to appropriately express the community’s 
censure.
The conflict between the prevention and expression can, 
then, be resolved, however, there remains one promise that 
I have yet to fulfil and that is to consider the tension 
between the need for hard treatment (to serve the 
requirements of the assurance problem), and the requirement 
to treat offenders as responsible beings.56
55Nor, of course, do they determine what offences (if any) will
necessarily be legal.
56See supra, note 12.
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43. Hard Treatment, Coercion and Respect for Agency
Antony Duff argues that any account of punishment that 
takes seriously the Kantian claim that agents are to be 
treated as responsible, autonomous beings,
"rules out, as improperly coercive and manipulative, any 
kind of punishment which (whether by design or in fact) 
serves to beat, cow or manipulate the offender into 
submission, instead of communicating to him, and trying 
to persuade him to accept, the reasons which justify his 
punishment."57
The tension is, then, not between the need for hard 
treatment and the need to censure appropriately, but 
between the use of hard treatment for preventive purposes 
and the very theory that underlies the account of 
punishment given here. But is Duff right in his insistence 
that a system of "punishment as a rational deterrent", 
is still open to the objection that it does not show 
punishment to be consistent with a proper respect for the 
citizen as a rational and autonomous agent; that it still 
portrays punishment as an improperly manipulative attempt 
to coerce the citizen into obedience to the law."?58 
Duff is only right if his objection is aimed at deterrence 
only punishments, and the agent has a claim not only to be 
treated as "rational and autonomous", but also as part of 
the moral community. However, this is clearly not Duff's
57Duff 1986, 278. See also Duff 1986, 186; 268-77.
58Duff 1986, 186.
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intention. Duff argues that insofar as we punish to a 
preventative end (even if we also have other ends), we 
coerce the offender and thereby fail to treat him as an 
equal, autonomous, being.59
It should be clear why Duff's account and my own have 
parted ways. Duff’s self confessed intention is to "explore 
the implications of the Kantian demand that we should 
respect other people as rational and autonomous moral 
agents", and (again, self-confessed), this demand is not 
explained or justified.60 Duff gives this demand the 
status of an unconditional moral principle and that is, of 
course, why he cannot reconcile moral treatment and 
coercion; it is this, precisely, that has been the basis 
for my attack on Kantian and impartialist theories.
The conditional moral theory that I have offered, in 
contrast, has as its strength the compatibility of coercion 
and moral censure, because prudential reason is a necessary 
and crucial element in moral reason. I have demonstrated 
that mutual coercion is part of prudential reason, however, 
I have also argued that if we are to convert justified 
coercion into moral punishment then the community must 
combine the threat of coercion with the communicative 
element of punishment, with the appeal to the moral will of 
the offender, and the argument that he should recognise the 
justice of his own punishment. This combination does not
59See esp. Duff 1986, 268-77.
60See Duff 1986, 6.
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undermine or subvert the offender's autonomy, rather, it 
reinforces it. The offender is coerced as a member of a 
necessarily coercive community in accordance with his 
prudential reason, and in addition, he is appealed to as a 
moral being. Insofar as the communication is successful 
and he realises his responsibility for organising the 
pursuit of his self-interest through binding, moral, terms 
of co-operation, he becomes a fully morally autonomous 
being.
44. Conclusion: Justice and Punishment
That completes my account of the rationale of coercion and 
of moral punishment. I have, I believe, addressed both 
parts of Tolstoy's question with which I began this thesis; 
"why, and by what right, do some people punish others". 
This is not the place to restate the arguments, but, in 
summary, I have shown that there is a possible rationale 
for coercion which is compatible with the autonomy of the 
agent being coerced, but that this is not sufficient for a 
practice of moral punishment. The latter requires that we 
address the agent as a member of the community, possessed 
of the potentiality to fully commit himself to morality, to 
take responsibility for organising his own life, and the 
pursuit of his self-interest, in accordance with terms 
which would be agreed in a suitably constituted original 
position.
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The argument for this position has reconciled at the "deep 
level" demanded the agent’s prudential reason, the personal 
perspective from which morality (and coercion) seem to be 
restraints imposed from the outside and against which self- 
interest strains, and the moral perspective, the demand 
that the agent treat everybody as deserving of equal 
consideration. In reconciling these two perspectives, the 
theory, applied to punishment, has comprehended those 
aspects of the retributive and consequentialist positions 
that did, indeed, seem attractive. Punishment is both 
needed for its consequences, but is also of an offender for 
an offence.
There remains only one promise to fulfil and that is to 
discuss the place of just punishment in cin unjust society. 
This is an important issue and I will only be able to 
provide pointers as to how it might be addressed here. To 
give the argument some structure, and allow the discussion 
to seem real, let us take the problem of punishing a black 
man of eighteen from the South side of Chicago. Anyone who 
has visited this area will be aware of the crushing poverty 
and the sense of hopelessness and alienation that pervades 
it. 61
61 r have visited both this area and Soweto and can honestly say that, 
even during the apartheid regime, the sense of "not belonging", of 
alienation from the country and system, seemed to be stronger in 
Chicago. I could not, anyway, take the example of pre De Klerk South 
Africa because such a society was not, in any sense, a moral 
community; the non-white population was systematically oppressed and 
no moral ties linked them with the white government.
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At two important points my argument as presented above 
seems no longer to apply. The first is the connection 
between self-interest and co-operation that is absolutely 
central to my account, and the second the idea that each 
person, in their everyday lives, lives as a moral being, 
consenting to the terms of agreement that would be agreed 
in a suitably constituted original position.
If, indeed, the offender would be better off outside of co­
operation then it is rational for him to put himself 
outside of the terms of agreement, that is, it would be 
rational for him to take up a state of nature relationship 
with the community and pursue his good independently of it. 
In fact, I believe that this might be the case for my 
example; of course, the society could then coerce him as an 
alien, however, given the limited empirical chance of his 
being apprehended it may still be better for him to take 
the risk and pursue his self-interest in such an 
unconstrained manner.
Assuming that he would not be better off in such a 
position, what are we to make of the idea that such a 
person has committed themselves to live with others on 
moral terms? If the community is to coerce the offender as 
a member of such a moral community and, thus, a potentially 
moral being, the community's authorities will, as part of 
their address to him, have to explain that he is part of a 
system that treats everybody as fundamentally equal, not in 
some abstract sense but also in the initial stages of the
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distribution of resources and opportunities. In explaining 
this , the community' s failings would be obvious to both 
punishers and the punished, and reason demands that this 
force on them changes. In other words, if it is the case 
that the community is, in fact, organised around principles 
of justice as mutual advantage, then the authorities cannot 
legitimately claim to be imposing moral punishment, and 
insofar as they do, they will be acting hypocritically.
Of course, the current punishment practices, (indeed, the 
current social policy), of the USA (and, for that matter, 
Britain), have almost come to resemble that which might 
hold between communities bound by mutual advantage, not 
tied by moral norms, and, insofar as the pretence of equal 
treatment is maintained it does not seem to force the 
attentions of the authorities to the anomalies of the 
system; rather, coercion is used without the expression and 
attempt to communicate that would make such coercion moral 
punishment. All this shows, however, is how far the 
imposition of just moral punishment requires the radical 
overhaul of current practices in distributive as well as 
retributive justice.
In the end the only conclusion we can draw, and a fitting 
finish to this thesis, or so it seems to me, is Jeffrie 
Murphy's:
"If we think that institutions of punishment are 
necessary and desirable, and if we are morally sensitive 
enough to want to be sure that we have the moral right to
punish before we inflict it, then we had better first 
make sure that we have restructured society in such a way 
that criminals genuinely do correspond to the only model 
that will render punishment permissible".62
62Murphy 1973, 243.
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Appendix A: Rawls on Punishment
"Rawlses view of retributive justice is not developed at 
any length and plays virtually no role in the overall 
argument of the book ~ it is dubiously consistent with 
his account of distributive justice _ I regard it as a 
small and insufficiently motivated departure from the 
general attitude toward desert that dominates his work".
Samuel Scheffler 1982, 306n.
A. Rawls, Retributive and Distributive Justice
In this Appendix I intend to discuss the approach taken by 
John Rawls to the problem of punishment in A Theory of 
Justice. It seems to me that there are a number of reasons 
that make undertaking such an exercise worthwhile; first, 
the work of Rawls, and especially A Theory of Justice, is 
of such importance in the discipline of political theory 
that textual analysis, if it can add to our understanding 
of the work, is justified for that reason alone. Second, I 
believe, pace Scheffler, that in certain instances what 
Rawls says about punishment can shed light on other, 
crucially important, ideas in A Theory of Justice. Third, 
in his reflections on punishment, and his inability to come 
to terms with the problem of coercion, Rawls demonstrates 
the problem facing impartialist theorists that I discussed 
above (in Chapter 5). Finally, there is a certain 
challenge in trying to unravel the puzzle highlighted in 
the quotation with which I began this Appendix; Rawls, in 
at least one of his comments on the problem of punishment 
seems directly to contradict the foundational intuition of 
A Theory of Justice, that institutions should not be 
designed in the first instance so as to reward (or
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penalise) individuals on the basis of their social or 
natural talents, abilities or disabilities. It could be 
that Rawls uses two different psychological models, one 
broadly deterministic and the other broadly libertarian and 
such a view should be treated as a kind of "default option" 
if no better explanation can be found. However, I shall 
argue below that a more radical solution might lie with the 
"Kantian Interpretation",1 and in the nature of the claim 
that something is "morally arbitrary".
As we saw above (in Chapter 5), Rawls, like Scanlon, 
replaces desert in his account of distributive justice with 
the idea of legitimate expectations (adding the premise 
that everyone is responsible for all their tastes, 
aspirations, beliefs, conceptions of the good, etc.2). 
Yet, unlike Scanlon, he specifically denies any symmetry 
between retributive3 and economic justice:
"No doubt some may still contend that distributive shares 
should match moral worth- [and] -this opinion may arise 
from thinking of distributive justice as somehow the 
opposite of retributive justice. - the purpose of the 
criminal law is to uphold basic natural duties - [It is] 
not simply a scheme of taxes and burdens designed to put 
a price on certain forms of conduct and in this way to
^awls 1971, §40.
2I shall, from now on, group these things together under the general 
term "preferences". In doing so I am following Barry 1991a.
3"Retributive justice" is here taken to be a general term for 
denoting the response to criminality. This is so as to keep in line 
with Rawls's terminology. It is not meant to refer to any particular 
(retributivist) conception of punishment.
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guide men's conduct for mutual advantage. It would be 
far better if the acts proscribed by penal statutes were 
never done. Thus a propensity to commit such acts is a 
mark of bad character, and in a just society legal 
punishments will only fall upon those who display these 
faults.
It is clear that the distribution of economic and 
social advantages is entirely different. _ The function 
of unequal distributive shares is - to attract 
individuals to places and associations where they are 
most needed from a social point of view_ "4 
Precisely how Rawls believes this distinction holds up is 
not clear (at least to me), from this passage. Rawls is 
very careful to avoid saying that the criminal deserves his 
punishment, in fact, he does not commit himself to any 
detailed view of the purpose of criminal law (beyond 
upholding "natural duties"). What he does do, however, is 
deny that it is to be understood on the legitimate 
expectations model. Rather, he implies that retributive 
justice is a response to "moral worth", specifically to a 
"bad character". It is this that has led commentators such 
as Scheffler, Brubacker, Honig and Sandel5 to question 
whether Rawls * s views on punishment are compatible with the 
rest of A Theory of Justice. "Character", Rawls's critics 
point out, is one of the attributes of the individual 
specifically picked out by Rawls as "morally arbitrary" in
4Rawls 1971, 314-5. Emphasis added.
5Brubaker 1989, 1990? A. Rawls 1990; Honig 1993a, 1993b; Sandel 1982, 
89-92; Scheffler 1992.
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the argument for the difference principle.6 In this 
Appendix I shall offer an account of Rawls's views on 
punishment and address the question of why he is so 
confident (and whether that confidence is justified) in 
distinguishing, say, indolence and criminality. Before 
this, however, I have to develop the short account of Rawls 
offered above (in section 27).
B. Rawls, the "Strains of Commitment" and the Problem of 
Stability7
Rawls in A Theory of Justice argues that there is a second 
stage for the people in the original position; a stage in 
which they consider whether they will be able to abide by 
the commitments they have made. The people in the original 
position must consider the stability of the society founded 
on their choice of principles. They:
"cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences 
they cannot accept. They will avoid those that they can 
adhere to only with great difficulty. - Moreover, when 
we enter an agreement we must be able to honor it even 
should the worst possibilities prove to be the case. 
Otherwise we have not acted in good faith. Thus the
6Rawls 1971, 103. As F. Scott Fitzgerald noted: "I am still afraid 
of missing something if I forget that _ a sense of the fundamental 
decencies is parcelled out unequally at birth." (Fitzgerald 1926, 7).
7My understanding of this part of Rawls's argument has been greatly 
increased by having had the advantage of three manuscripts: Chapter 3 
of Barry 1995a; Ivison MS; and a paper presented by Barry (1995b) at 
the LSE Political Theory workshop. Subsequent discussions with Brian 
Barry and John Charvet have - as ever - proved invaluable.
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parties must weigh with care whether they will be able to 
stick by their commitment in all circumstances." 8 
It might be thought that this is directly relevant to 
Rawls’s views on punishment because it is clear that penal 
sanctions would be one way of trying to ensure stability if 
people, once they had emerged from the original position, 
found the pursuit of their own advantage so at odds with 
the principles of justice that the burden of commitment was 
too great to bear. But this is not what Rawls is getting 
at; the people in the original position must not consider 
whether the principles can be maintained by force (by 
"means of persuasion or enforcement"9) but whether (even 
given "the worst possibilities") they will be able to 
"honor" the agreement. What seems to be at the heart of 
this is the idea that out of the veil of ignorance one 
should be able to accept the reasons given for the 
principles of justice.10 Rawls seems to think that his two 
principles can secure such acceptance and, indeed, can 
generate a kind of "ethos of justice" but that, for 
example, utilitarianism could not:
"when the principle of utility is satisfied, however, 
there is no such assurance that everyone benefits [as 
there is with the two principles]. Allegiance to the 
social system may demand that some should forgo 
advantages for the sake of the greater good of the whole.
8Rawls 1971, 176.
9Rawls 1989, 246; Rawls 1993, 142.
10As Barry points out this is a moral argument. (Barry 1995a, 
Chapter 3).
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Thus the scheme will not be stable unless those who must 
make sacrifices- accept the greater advantages of others 
as a sufficient reason for lower expectations over the 
whole course of [their] lifves]."11 
Rawls seems to have every justification in considering this 
to be "an extreme demand"12 and thus utilitarianism to have 
failed the "strains of commitment" test.
On the face of it, however, this interpretation of the 
strains of commitment, as a moral argument about accepting 
the reasons for one's position, makes the test a redundant 
replication of the first stage. Utilitarianism is an 
inadequate account of justice because it is not chosen in 
the original position, and if it were, it would show that 
the "situation" (i.e., the original position) was 
incorrectly formulated; that is, it would fail in the 
process of finding a reflective equilibrium. The fact that 
one is unable to accept the reasons for one’s position 
shows that the principles under which that position is 
established are not principles of justice.13
The strains of commitment test, then, does not seem to add 
to the theory nor is it really an argument about stability.
n Rawls 1971, 178-9.
12Rawls 1971, 179.
13Barry 1995a (Chapter 3), argues that the "strains of commitment” 
test essentially amounts to a free standing Scanlonian argument, 
i.e., that the principles of justice are those that would emerge if 
each person has the right of reasonable veto. This adds credibility 
to the thought expressed here that it is a replication (or 
alternative) first stage rather than an additional second stage 
argument.
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Yet, Rawls gives great weight to the problem of stability14 
and the strains of commitment seem to have some place in 
his thoughts. The problem is that it is not always clear 
that Rawls understands the nature of the question he is 
asking. The strains of commitment test is not really a 
stability problem because it is not in the end about 
whether people can accept the principles of justice, but is 
another way of asking what the content of those principles 
is. At other times, Rawls does ask, however, whether 
people can live by the principles once it is established 
that they are, indeed, the principles of justice. In these 
passages Rawls confuses the issues by combining two 
problems, one about the feasibility of coercion and the 
other about the motivation the agent has for being just. 
Together Rawls treats these as a problem of stability, 
however, this is not altogether helpful and obscures the 
fact that the second of these problems is a crucially 
important one with an impeccable philosophical pedigree.
C. Rawls on Moral Renegades and Punishment: The Question 
of Motivation and the Kantian Interpretation
It is important to note in considering the question of 
motivation that Rawls, despite the popular misconception to 
the contrary, does not address his theory to moral 
egoists.15 Egoism (or mutual disinterestedness) is the
14As a rough guide, the entries for "stability" in the index of A 
Theory of Justice take up some 35 lines, several more than, for
example, the "Original Position".
^See Rawls 1971, 568.
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psychological motivation given to the people in the 
original position but in the "real world" Rawls assumes 
that persons have a "sense of justice". The content - or 
demands - of the agent's sense of justice is what that 
agent attempts to determine through the process of 
reflective equilibrium. Given the two principles as the 
content of justice, then, the agent's "sense of justice" 
is "an effective desire to apply and to act from the 
principles of justice and so from the point of view of 
justice".16 Rawls believes that he can show that 
"affirming" one's sense of justice is rational but that 
this, nonetheless, may not provide the agent with 
"sufficient reason" to do so. The rationality of affirming 
one's sense of justice is, in one sense according to Rawls, 
"trivial" for "being the sorts of persons they are, the 
members of a well-ordered society desire more than anything 
to act justly and fulfilling this desire is part of their 
good."17 Rawls seems to accept that this is a pretty weak 
answer to the problem of accounting for why the agent ought 
to be moral for he goes on to ask what happens if people do 
not desire "more than anything" to act justly, although 
whether this means that they are not the right "sorts or 
persons" or that the well-ordered society is not quite what 
he thinks it is is unclear. "Suppose", he says, "that the 
desire to act justly is not a final desire" why is it
16Rawls 1971, 567; cf. Rawls 1993a, 19.
17Rawls 1971, 569. Remember, a well-ordered society is defined as 
one in which "everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the 
same principles of justice, and the basic institutions satisfy and 
are known to satisfy these principles." (Rawls 1971, 453-4).
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rational to "confirm this sentiment as regulative of 
[one's] plan of life"?18
Rawls gives three answers; first, he assumes that people 
will be motivated by the desire to act fairly: "wanting to 
be fair with our friends and wanting to give justice to 
those we care for is as much part of these affections as 
the desire to be with them and to feel sad at their loss .. 
in a well-ordered society these bonds extend rather 
widely."19 Second, "it follows from the Aristotelian 
Principle (and its companion effect), that participating in 
the life of a well-ordered society is a great good".20 
Third (and most importantly21), there is the Kantian 
interpretation: "acting justly is something we want to do 
as free and equal rational beings. The desire to act 
justly and the desire to express our nature as free moral 
persons turn out to specify what is practically speaking 
the same desire."22
This final argument, which in the end is the only one Rawls 
thinks can do the required work, seems at first glance to 
be odd. If the "desire to act justly" and the "desire to 
express our nature as free moral persons" are "practically
18Rawls 1971, 569-70.
19Rawls 1971, 570-1.
20Rawls 1971, 571. For further consideration of this argument see 
§33.
21Rawls 1971, 574.
22Rawls 1971, 572. I shall be returning to the Kantian
interpretation below.
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... the same" and the problem is that the first desire is not 
final (or decisive), then how does it help to invoke the 
second, Kantian, desire? It can only add to the argument 
if the Kantian "desire to express our nature as free moral 
persons" necessarily is (or ought to be) a final, decisive, 
desire.23 If this is right then the Kantian element in 
Rawls is much more than an interpretation, it is a 
metaphysical claim about the nature of humans that explains 
why the agent ought to be just.24 Rawls certainly gives 
considerable textual evidence for this interpretation; 
consider the following passages:
"The desire to express our nature as a free and equal 
rational being can be fulfilled only by acting on the 
principles of right and justice as having first priority.
- it is acting from this precedence that expresses our 
freedom from contingency and happenstance."
"We cannot _ express our nature by following a plan that 
views the sense of justice as but one desire to be 
weighed against others. For this sentiment reveals what
23That it is a final desire might be inferred from Rawls later work 
in which he describes the Kantian element (in a slightly different 
form) as one of "two moral powers" the realisation of which takes 
precedence over all other preferences, see, e.g., Rawls 1982, 16.
24This is one claim made by Sandel 1982. Barry, in 1995b, goes some 
way to endorsing it; suggesting that this is the part of Rawls’s 
theory that is most plausibly described as "comprehensive" (in 
Rawls's new terms) and, thus, that it is the Kantian interpretation 
that has motivated Rawls's recent expressions of dissatisfaction with 
A Theory of Justice: "the 'Kantian Interpretation'", Barry says,
"functions rather like a turbocharger on a car: it is an optional 
extra that provides additional power but comes at a stiff price. The 
power lies in its, uniquely, supplying a 'decisive' reason for 
affirming our sense of justice. -The cost is that we have to endorse 
a particular (second-order) conception of the good - and one that 
comes under strong suspicion of trailing metaphysical clouds behind 
it." Barry 1995b, 13MS. See also Rawls 1993, especially, 175.
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the person is, and to compromise it is not to achieve for 
the self free reign but to give way to the contingencies 
and accidents of the world."25 
These passages do not. occur as part of the Kantian 
interpretation, they rather strengthen the case Rawls is 
making for the stability of the well-ordered society. Yet 
they are extraordinarily (one might almost say orthodox) 
Kantian in nature and they certainly lend credence to 
Sandel1s claims that Rawls makes metaphysically rather than 
merely empirically implausible assumptions.26
But, although the Kantian desire is, on this 
interpretation, an integral part of the nature of the agent 
Rawls does not claim that it is decisive in every case. In 
addressing the actual agent Rawls admits that it might 
sometimes be the case that none of the above answers is 
going to provide "sufficient reason" to a particular 
individual "to preserve his sense of justice". There will 
be "those who find that being disposed to act justly is not 
a good for them".27 It is not immediately clear whether 
Rawls is denying that these people are Kantian agents; if 
they were free moral persons then the Kantian desire to 
express their natures by being just would be a decisive 
motivation for them. Such a position, however, would be 
absurd; the Kantian claim can only be held as a 
universalist claim about humans, or at least minimally
25Rawls 1971, 574 & 575 (Emphasis added).
26Sandel 1982.
27Rawls 1971, 576.
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rational humans. If Rawls were denying that criminals have 
the capacity - the nature - of free and equal beings that 
would be to make them Aristotelian "natural slaves".28 
Rather, what Rawls must mean is that something else about 
these individuals, their conceptions of the good and the 
desires that flow from them are such that they find 
themselves unable to constrain their self-interest in 
accordance with the principles of justice; they fail to 
recognise that it is in their true nature to be just.
The situation for these people is different then from those 
who feel unable to keep their commitments, the latter 
cannot accept the reasons for their position, i.e., they 
regard it as unjust. The former - who fail to recognise 
that being just is their true nature - however, do not 
challenge the principles of justice, they merely fail to 
recognise that acting in accordance with the principles is 
realising their true nature. For such people, "being 
disposed to act justly is not a good for them", and thus 
"it is, of course, true that in their case just 
arrangements do not fully answer to their nature,29 and 
therefore, other things equal, they will be less happy than 
they would be if they could affirm their sense of justice." 
Rawls's sympathy for undeserved characteristics, however,
28Aristotle 1951, 64-69 (1253bl-1255a3).
29If Rawls is to avoid the "natural slave" position, he must mean 
this use of "nature" in a some contingent, empirical sense; this is 
the argument pursued below.
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does not extend as far as these people, he continues: "But 
here one can only say: their nature is their misfortune."30
It is, of course, also unfortunate because such people are 
going to have to be coerced and coercion costs money. 
However the integrity of the two principles eases the moral 
burden on those who are going to have to coerce them;31 
"requiring them [those who cannot affirm their sense of 
justice] to comply" - "is not treating these persons 
unjustly"32 Rawls argues, because "having agreed to the 
[two] principles it is rational to authorize the measures 
needed to maintain just institutions". Punishment is 
morally worry free for those doing the punishing even if 
"there are many" people unable to affirm their sense of 
justice. Of course, if there are many such people, "the 
forces making for stability are weaker" and "penal devices 
will play a much larger role in the social system."33 This 
is a true stability problem, but for Rawls the answer, once 
justice has been established, is a simple one; the only 
limit on the role of the penal system in ensuring stability 
is one of feasibility.
The two principles pass the "strains of commitment" test 
because the people in the original position know that even 
should they turn out to be the worst off group they will be
30A11 quotations from Rawls 1971, 576 (Emphasis added).
31See Honig 1993, 137-48 for a discussion of this point.
32Rawls 1971, 575.
33Rawls 1971, 576.
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able to accept the reasons presented for their position 
(although they may not be able to behave accordingly).34 
The moral renegade is supposedly in the same position; 
according to Rawls, he cannot deny the arguments presented 
for the principles of justice and thus, Rawls thinks by 
extension, the rationality of the sanctions needed to 
maintain them. Here, "persuasion or enforcement" are 
acceptable as means of ensuring stability because the 
challenge is not to the rationality of the two principles - 
no matter how many moral renegades there turn out to be, so 
long as there are not so many as to overload the means of 
coercion - even if the criminal does not accept his fate, 
he ought to do so and this reassures those to whom Rawls 
addresses himself; those who have to do the punishing.
The grounds for complaint - should one turn out to be a 
moral renegade - are not, then, that penal institutions are 
unjust; rather, if there are grounds for complaint it is 
surely that should one turn out to be a moral renegade one 
suffers as a consequence, but if one turns out indolent and 
thus unable to command a decent salary in the market then 
some degree of your misfortune is abated under the 
provisions of the difference principle. Does one "do 
enough" for those who are unable "to affirm their sense of 
justice" which is another way of asking whether the people
34Thisf of course, raises the crucial question of whether they would 
be rational to agree to a system of sanctions directed against those 
who cannot "affirm their sense of justice" given that they may turn 
out to be one of those people.
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in the original position should endorse a scheme of 
retributive justice.
Bonnie Honig has argued that the difference between, say, 
indolence and criminality lies in the Kantian reading of 
Rawls. Criminality is different, argues Honig, because 
whilst our talents, abilities and liabilities are 
contingent parts of us, our ability to "affirm our sense of 
justice" reveals who we are and is thus subject to a 
"brute" notion of desert;
"The mesmerizing pull of desert is not finally overcome 
by Rawls's critique; it returns to haunt justice as 
fairness when Rawls reaches for antecedent moral worth 
(or unworthiness) to account for the presence of 
criminality in a just regime and to justify its 
punishment. In so doing, he relies on desert to serve 
its traditional functions it explains the inexplicable, 
it makes sense of evil and justifies our dealing harshly 
with it. ~ Rawls, because he does not acknowledge 
desert's return, makes no provisions for its 
engagement."35
Honig’s claim is that whereas the agent can reflect on his 
preferences and change them, the agent's ability to affirm 
her sense of justice is not similarly subject to critical 
self-reflection, it is rather constitutive of the Rawlsian 
self. That, according to Honig, is why the Rawlsian agent 
can be subject to retributive justice but is not rewarded
^Honig 1993, 131.
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in the distributive sphere on the same grounds. This, 
however, cannot be right. As noted above, the capacity to 
"affirm our sense of justice" must be a universal one (or 
at least it must be held as true of minimally rational 
agents), and thus it could not distinguish between people. 
Actually affirming our sense of justice is, of course, 
different; some people, as Rawls notes, are unable to do 
so. But what is the nature of this incapability? If Rawls 
is not to claim that some are "natural slaves" he has to 
admit that the inability of some to affirm their sense of 
justice is, indeed, their misfortune; but it is difficult 
to see that it is their fault. In Kantian terms, if (as 
Honig rightly claims), Rawls believes that affirming one's 
sense of justice "reveals what the person is" not doing so 
is "to give way to the contingencies and accidents of the 
world",36 it is to give way to "contingency and 
happenstance ".37
This is why punishment cannot be simply desert based 
retributivism as Honig thinks, for all the problems with 
Kant's account seem to reappear in a surprisingly 
traditional form; the role of the phenomenal world being 
taken by the contingency of our talents, abilities and 
character traits and the noumenal by our transcendental 
natures as free and equal beings. As with Kant' s early
work, this makes the "unable" a matter of contingency,
something about the criminal's character makes him unable
36Rawls 1971, 575.
37Rawls 1971, 574.
301
to realise his true nature as a free being; it is 
"unfortunate" and unavoidable. Honig's interpretation of 
Rawls has to make the contingency of the agent's inability 
to affirm his sense of justice compatible with her claim 
that this inability is revealing of something inherent and 
deserving about the agent. Yet if, as Kant recognised and 
Rawls seems to in the quotations given above, this failure, 
whilst the agent's, is part of the realm of "contingency 
and happenstance", then there is a clear problem with 
holding the agent responsible and deserving (of 
punishment).
Kant, in an attempt to avoid just such a conclusion adapted 
his theory so that the free will could choose to do evil, 
it could choose wrong. Rawls, however, has no need to 
import such a metaphysical move because he does not, for 
all his talk of "moral worth" and "bad character” endorse a 
retributive theory of punishment. Rather, sanctions are 
needed "to maintain ~ the principles of justice". Rawls, 
then, despite his protestations to the contrary, does seem 
to endorse a justification for punishment close to the 
legitimate expectations view. Rawls argues that once the 
rules of justice are up and running persons must revise 
their choices so as to be compatible with their legitimate 
expectations.38 If I, for example, find that my enjoyment 
of food is considerably reduced unless it is accompanied by
38"Citizens (as individuals) and associations accept responsibility 
for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations - this ~ relies 
on the capacity of persons to assume responsibility for their ends 
and to moderate the claims they make on their social institutions in 
accordance with the use of primary goods.” (Rawls 1982, 170).
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a fine wine, and yet my expected (just) income is not 
enough to sustain a life style in which meals are 
invariably accompanied by a fine wine, Rawls claims that I 
am to change my desires, my tastes.39 If I cannot change 
my tastes, however, then it seems to me that Rawls would 
say that whilst I could not deny the validity of the rules 
of justice, I could be pitied for the fact that they "do 
not match my nature", that would indeed be, "my 
misfortune". I do not suffer because I did not deserve 
more, but because I was not entitled to more, that is why 
it is "my misfortune" rather than my fault.
This seems to me exactly what Rawls does say to the moral 
renegade in the passages near the end of A Theory of 
Justice40, and is also compatible with what he says there 
about the nature of the institution of punishment - that it 
is the means to maintaining the well-ordered society. The 
outcome, if this theory of punishment is worked out is 
presented, and rejected, above in section 31. Although 
such an account is clearly not compatible with the remarks 
quoted above in which the justification for the institution 
of punishment appeals to such things as "moral worth" and 
"bad character", it is these retributive passages that seem 
to me to be an exception in A Theory of Justice.
39lt is not enough for me just to regret that I cannot fulfil my 
desires, I have to change my desires because I have to affirm my 
nature as a free being by giving precedence to the demands of
justice. This seems to me to be a consequence of the Kantian nature 
of Rawls's answer to the motivation problem. A more reasonable 
answer would, surely, allow me to constrain my desires (with regret) 
without actually having to revise them.
40Quoted above at the beginning of this section.
303
In the passages where Rawls considers punishment, he says 
one of three things; in the remarks cited above he talks as 
if there is an independent desert based justification; in 
the passages in the penultimate section of A Theory of 
Justice I have argued that he is best read as endorsing a 
legitimate expectations view consistent with the account of 
distributive justice, and this is also compatible with his 
remark that even in a "well-ordered society" punishment 
would be necessary to solve the assurance problem; that is, 
as the rational addition to the assent to the rules of 
justice. In the remarks in sections 38 and 39 of A Theory 
of Justice, however, Rawls brings in a further account, one 
derived from the First Principle.41 The principle of 
liberty has it that: "Each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all."42 
Rawls' s claim is that the basket of liberties each may 
enjoy must be equal, and that the only way to ensure such 
equality is to restore disequilibrium caused by individuals 
claiming greater liberty than that to which they are 
entitled, and, better still to deter individuals from those 
actions which cause disequilibrium in the distribution of 
liberty. In these sections, it is equal liberty and an 
associated fair play theory of punishment that underlies 
Rawls’s theory of penal sanctions. It is thus liable to
41”The principles justifying these sanctions can be derived from the
principle of liberty", Rawls 1971, 241.
42Rawls 1971, 250.
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the criticisms that I levelled at such theories in Chapter 
4.43
The point of this Appendix was not to attempt to present a 
single, coherent, account of punishment culled from A 
Theory of Justice. What I wanted to do was show that the 
much cited passage in which Rawls denies the similarity 
between distributive and retributive justice is an 
exception not just to the rest of the book, but also to the 
other important passages on punishment. In the best of 
those passages, Rawls commits himself to a consequentialist 
justification for punishment within a legitimate 
expectations view of responsibility. What is interesting 
about this is that the reason he does this is that it is 
the only outcome of his endorsing a Kantian answer to the 
motivation problem; if individuals are contingently unable 
to realise their true selves as free beings then they 
cannot be held as deserving for the same reason as that 
which informs the principles of distributive justice. They 
can, however, be held as subjects of entitlements, and if 
they do badly as such it is a matter of regret, "their 
nature" is indeed "their misfortune". I have shown above, 
in Chapter 5, why I think such an answer to the problem of 
punishment is an unsatisfactory one.
43Rawls, I believe, does not see this as a different account of 
punishment from the claim that punishment is justified as an answer 
to the assurance problem. This is because he makes the same mistake 
as Dagger in thinking that fair play theories are of the two level 
consequentialist type, rather than independent justice based 
retributive accounts. This, as I showed above, is a consequence of 
conflating fair play and contractualist accounts. See S21.
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